Shots per casualty: an indicator of combat efficiency for the first Australian task force in South Vietnam

ABSTRACT

In combat, the ratio of shots fired per casualty inflicted can provide a measure of the combat effectiveness of a force. The shots per casualty ratio achieved by the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam is shown to change according to factors including marksmanship, tactics and combat type. While, over the course of the campaign, 1ATF fired an increasing number of shots to achieve a casualty, this is explained by improvements in the quality of Viet Cong and People’s Army small arms. Australian Task Force and US Army shots per casualty ratios are briefly compared..     

数字化步兵作战态势感知建模与仿真研究

通过分析数字化步兵的态势感知需求和信息获取来源以及信息传递方式，建立了数字化步兵单兵和连以下分队的态势感知模型，并进一步讨论了该模型的仿真实现途径。该模型可应用于数字化步兵作战仿真和单兵综合作战系统的效能仿真。     

Bringing it all back home: Hollywood returns to war

This essay looks at two Hollywood films Black Hawk Down and We Were Soldiers as reflective of a more general popular mood in the US that accompanied Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ and the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In part this mood was a militaristic one, though this can also be seen as a rather belated response by Hollywood to invest moral purpose in the US military following an earlier spate of hostile Vietnam war films. The two films examined are different in form: Black Hawk Down is a combat film about extraction while We Were Soldiers is unusual for a US Vietnam war film for investing moral purpose in both the US combat troops as well as the Vietnamese enemy. Overall it is possible to conclude that both films contribute to a kicking by Hollywood of its earlier Vietnam war ‘syndrome’ which is likely to have wider cultural and political repercussions.     

基于A~*算法的虚拟士兵城市作战路径规划

针对虚拟士兵在城市作战仿真领域的需求,重点研究了虚拟士兵在城市环境中路径规划问题。通过对三维城市虚拟环境空间进行分层信息处理,生成虚拟士兵能够感知的虚拟信息层。用A*算法求出虚拟士兵从初始位置到达目标位置的最佳路径,并给出算法的具体设计与实现。     

An examination of the effects of the criterion functional on optimal fire-support policies

This paper examines the dependence of the structure of optimal time-sequential fire-support policies on the quantification of military objectives by considering four specific problems, each corresponding to a different quantification of objectives (i.e. criterion functional). We consider the optimal time-sequential allocation of supporting fires during the “approach to contact” of friendly infantry against enemy defensive positions. The combat dynamics are modelled by deterministic Lanchester-type equations of warfare, and the optimal fire-support policy for each one-sided combat optimization problem is developed via optimal control theory. The problems are all nonconvex, and local optima are a particular difficulty in one of them. For the same combat dynamics, the splitting of supporting fires between two enemy forces in any optimal policy (i.e. the optimality of singular subarcs) is shown to depend only on whether the terminal payoff reflects the objective of attaining an “overall” military advantage or a “local” one. Additionally, switching times for changes in the ranking of target priorities are shown to be different (sometimes significantly) when the decision criterion is the difference and the ratio of the military worths (computed according to linear utilities) of total infantry survivors and also the difference and the ratio of the military worths (computed according to linear utilities) of total infantry survivors and also the difference and the ratio of the military worths of the combatants' total infantry losses. Thus, the optimal fire-support policy for this attack scenario is shown to be significantly influenced by the quantification of military objectives.     

Effective in battle: conceptualizing soldiers’ combat effectiveness*

How do we understand combat effectiveness – soldiers’ performance in battle? Despite the broad consensus that understanding combat effectiveness is important both for scholars and policymakers, there is widespread disagreement about what combat effectiveness is. More specifically, studies of effectiveness tend to focus on either the skill of soldiers in battle, or their will to fight. Yet both skill and will are essential components of an effective fighting force. This article argues that understanding combat effectiveness requires understanding both of these key components of effectiveness. In other words, combat effectiveness requires both the skill and will to engage the enemy in an organized manner. It then demonstrates the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of British, Indian, and Australian forces fighting the Japanese during the Second World War. Only when scholars are talking about the same concept will our understanding of the conditions under which militaries are effective in battle progress. By comparing different units fighting the same opponent under the same material conditions, I demonstrate that units vary both in their combat skill and their will to fight, and that understanding their effectiveness in battle requires analyzing both of these key factors.     

Beginning of the End: ARVN and Vietnamisation (1969–72)

The ‘Nixon Doctrine,’ announced on 25 July 1969, which emphasised the singularity of US interest over all others, was a reflection of US war weariness and the President Richard Nixon's political constraints. The net effect was the unilateral withdrawal of troops in phases and Vietnamisation returning combat responsibilities to the South Vietnamese. Indeed, negotiations and diplomacy fell short of expectations, failing to force the North Vietnamese to abandon their objectives. However, Vietnamisation, the third leg of Nixon's strategy, became the most visible of Nixon's failures. Such was the debacle that Nixon was sorely tempted to simply walk away concluding, ‘Vietnamization has been completed and [South Vietnam President Nguyen Van] Thieu then can do what he likes.’     

On the production of victory: Empirical determinants of battlefield success in modern war

Using a data set of historical battles from 1600 to 1973, this paper analyzes the empirical determinants of tactical success in modern war. Based on a reduced form approach we consider key elements of military theory as production factors for combat success as an output of a military production function. The paper focuses on the relationship of material and non-material factors to battlefield success, and especially on the role of superior force strengths. Contrary to the emphasis on technology which can be found in the recent literature, our estimation results indicate that numerical superiority has retained its crucial role for battlefield performance throughout history. In general, human elements of warfare, like leadership, morale and surprise, have continued to be important determinants of battle outcome despite technological progress in weapons.     

适应低时延业务需求的分布式可穿戴单兵作战信息系统

针对云计算应用在单兵作战系统场景下业务处理时延高、服务质量无法保障的问题,提出一种基于可穿戴计算的分布式单兵作战信息系统。利用士兵身上的可穿戴智能设备构建本地计算层,在作战地点就近处理计算数据,提供给士兵本地的信息处理与融合能力,并采用广义扩散负载均衡算法平衡各设备负载,降低业务处理时延;同时利用分布式计算的容错能力增强系统的可靠性。仿真结果表明,基于可穿戴设备的分布式本地网络架构能有效地降低作战任务的处理时延,同时增强系统的可靠性。     

Rent seeking and defence expenditure

A plethora of arguments from the ‘public choice school’ suggest that public goods are ‘under‐supplied’ by comparison with public sector provision of more private goods. The implication is that rent seeking by the ‘military‐industrial complex’ serves, in some measure, to offset potential allocative inefficiency. In this paper a comparison of rent seeking by producers of public goods and producers of private goods identifies a bias that favours public good supply. The bias results from the different way in which collective demand for public goods and for private goods is expressed. The prospect of larger rents to the ‘military‐industrial complex’ implies greater rent‐seeking expenditures in this sector. The extent to which public goods (and, in particular, defence) are ‘under supplied’ is much exaggerated.     

Norms,Military Utility,and the Use/Non-use of Weapons: The Case of Anti-plant and Irritant Agents in the Vietnam War

The role of norms and military utility in the use of weapons is disputed by constructivist and realist scholars. Through an examination of US decision-making regarding anti-plant and irritant agents in the Vietnam War, I advance this debate in three key ways. First, I develop structural realism’s expectations regarding the role of military utility. Second, I demonstrate that social and material factors are at play in our understandings of both ‘norms’ and ‘military utility’, and that both played a role in US decisions. Third, I find that the dominant role – as structural realism expects – was played by military utility.     

步兵分队侦察模拟训练系统构建

针对步兵分队侦察训练存在地形受限、战斗情境失真、训练条件构设难等问题,本文在系统分析军事需求的基础上,采用软、硬结合的虚拟仿真技术对步兵分队侦察模拟训练系统框架、体系结构、物理结构、内外接口和应用模式进行了详细分析设计,并对关键技术进行了剖析,该系统方案设计已应用于步兵分队侦察模拟训练系统建设,并投入到院校教学训练中。实践表明,系统通过逼真的视、听一体化实现了高度沉浸式的训练,以现实地形和敌情的高度仿真与灵活组合,满足了步兵分队侦察技能训练对多样化战场环境、实战化目标设置的特殊要求,大大提升了步兵分队地形侦察、敌情侦察及综合对抗训练效益。     

‘A Time of War’: contextual and organisational dimensions in the construction of combat motivation in the IDF

This paper explores the construction of combat motivation in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), arguing that although Israeli society at large is in a ‘Post Heroic’ era, the ‘Heroic Spirit’ is revealed during emergencies. A total of 1535 questionnaires were administered among combat soldiers during large-scale operations fought during national emergency and during small-scale routine operations. The results reveal differences in the construction of combat motivation typical for emergency vs. routine, as well as for reserves vs. regular units. These results indicate that the Post Heroic era is a condition that could be shifted according to cultural, organisational and individual determinants. This paper discusses the roots of these constructions and their implications on the theory of combat motivation and combat experience.     

单兵电源系统研究进展与挑战

单兵电源作为单兵作战系统的重要组成部分,对提升单兵作战能力和生存能力具有重要作用。文章论述了单兵作战系统的作用及其对单兵电源的需求,对国内外单兵电源系统的研究进展进行了综述分析,指出了单兵电源系统研究面临的挑战。     

From Civil War Victor to Cold War Guard: Positional Warfare in Korea and the Transformation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1951–1953

This article analyses the impact of the Korean War on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly the period of positional warfare from 1951 to 1953. In the war of movement between October 1950 and June 1951, the PLA relied on its civil war era weapons and experience, including the doctrine of ‘battle of annihilation’. Operations in early 1951 suggested that the civil war legacies of the PLA no longer applied to the realities of combat in Korea. Based on both Soviet aid and domestic mobilisation, the PLA managed to build the material foundation for positional warfare and rapidly improved its logistics. Operationally, on the defensive, the PLA developed combined operations integrating infantry, artillery, and armoured forces. The PLA learned the lessons of the Korean War and strengthened its ties with the Soviet armed forces in order to modernise itself. The Korean War thus transformed the PLA from Civil War victor to Cold War guard.     

作战分队武器系统的作战效能

战斗分队是未来联合作战中系统对抗的基本单元,以仿生学原理和系统工程理论为指导,建立了分队武器系统作战效能指标体系,并运用层次分析法建立了相应评估模型.最后以两组装甲步兵分队为例,分别评估了其在进攻(对峙)和防御中的作战效能,验证了该指标体系和评估模型的科学性和实用性.为指导员进行科学决策提供了理论依据.     

Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: the Impact of the Communications Revolution1

The Fisher naval revolution of 1904–10 represented a deliberate attempt to achieve defense transformation to bolster Britain's pretensions to global naval supremacy. The vision called for smaller, more capable forces to do the work of larger, more expensive conventional formations. It consisted of three main elements. First, the replacement of the traditional station fleet system for protecting overseas interests by rapid deployment forces comprised of battlecruisers that could be ‘maneuvered’ by wireless to combat specific enemy threats. Second, at home, instead of a sea control strategy based upon a superior battle-fleet, a sea denial strategy based on flotilla defense commanded and controlled from London via wireless. The third element of the Fisher revolution depended upon ‘plunging’, or shaping and directing technological change through a special relationship with armaments firms. A sophisticated information-communications network was integral to the revolution.     

Managing Global Counterinsurgency: The Special Group (CI) 1962–1966

The contemporary American counterinsurgency discourse has emphasised a particular historical narrative of Vietnam to justify large-scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this narrative is any reference to the broader Cold War context in which Vietnam existed alongside numerous other small-scale counterinsurgencies and was therefore the exception, not the rule. This article seeks to redress this shortcoming by examining the way counterinsurgency was conceived and managed at the level of ‘grand strategy.’ Specifically, it focuses on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to demonstrate that senior policymakers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson understood ‘counterinsurgency’ as involving ‘indirect’ assistance to foreign governments, rather than taking ‘direct’ military action with American ground forces.     

Women and the military

Debates about the relationship between women and the military have become common within Western societies. These debates primarily centre on the issue of the place, fitness and desirability of a female presence within institutions designed for national war making. There are those who claim that equality betwen the sexes demands the full integration of women into national militaries, including in combat roles, others however argue that women are ill‐equipped for the traditional tasks required of ‘warriors’. This article argues that these debates are increasingly irrelevant. Future wars are increasingly less likely to be fought only by clearly defined national combat forces and more likely to be ‘virtual’ wars involving the deployment of Western technologies against militarily inferior opponents. This too is an age in which Western states will be engaged not just in virtual wars but in ‘humanitarian intervention’, peacekeeping, enforcement and postwar reconstruction. This allows, even encourages, a rethinking of traditional notions and debates over the place of women within the military sphere.     

Combating Islamist radicalisation in South Africa

Is radical Islamism spreading in South Africa? The answer has to be an emphatic ‘yes’. When discussing issues of radicalisation in Africa, commentators often examine the case of Somalia's al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda's North African franchise, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Very little attention is paid to radicalisation amongst South Africa's Muslim population. Yet, there is growing evidence that South Africa has come to play an important role in global jihadi networks, from the provision of safehouses and identity documents to the movement of funds and the existence of paramilitary camps for local and foreign jihadis. This paper aims to briefly examine radicalisation and its attendant sources in the country, as well as seeking ways to combat it utilising lessons learned from other countries. ‘Institutional socialisation’ by means of the sources of radicalisation, as well as the concept of what could be termed ‘the democratisation of jihad’ are discussed. The author also proposes ways to combat radicalisation in South Africa utilising lessons learned from other countries, concluding that issues of radicalisation and deradicalisation have to be dealt with on the part of both government and the South African Muslim community.