Allocation with demand competition: Uniform,proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms

We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Dynamic capacity reservation and due date quoting in a make‐to‐order system

We consider a make‐to‐order manufacturer facing random demand from two classes of customers. We develop an integrated model for reserving capacity in anticipation of future order arrivals from high priority customers and setting due dates for incoming orders. Our research exhibits two distinct features: (1) we explicitly model the manufacturer's uncertainty about the customers' due date preferences for future orders; and (2) we utilize a service level measure for reserving capacity rather than estimating short and long term implications of due date quoting with a penalty cost function. We identify an interesting effect (“t‐pooling”) that arises when the (partial) knowledge of customer due date preferences is utilized in making capacity reservation and order allocation decisions. We characterize the relationship between the customer due date preferences and the required reservation quantities and show that not considering the t‐pooling effect (as done in traditional capacity and inventory rationing literature) leads to excessive capacity reservations. Numerical analyses are conducted to investigate the behavior and performance of our capacity reservation and due date quoting approach in a dynamic setting with multiple planning horizons and roll‐overs. One interesting and seemingly counterintuitive finding of our analyses is that under certain conditions reserving capacity for high priority customers not only improves high priority fulfillment, but also increases the overall system fill rate. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Capacity games for partially complementary products under multivariate random demands

In this study, we consider n firms, each of which produces and sells a different product. The n firms face a common demand stream which requests all their products as a complete set. In addition to the common demand stream, each firm also faces a dedicated demand stream which requires only its own product. The common and dedicated demands are uncertain and follow a general, joint, continuous distribution. Before the demands are realized, each firm needs to determine its capacity or production quantity to maximize its own expected profit. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game. The sales price per unit for the common demand could be higher or lower than the unit price for the dedicated demand, which affects the firm's inventory rationing policy. Hence, the outcome of the game varies. All of the prices are first assumed to be exogenous. We characterize Nash equilibrium(s) of the game. At the end of the article, we also provide some results for the endogenous pricing. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 59: 146–159, 2012     

Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.     

The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

The impact of exponential smoothing forecasts on the bullwhip effect

An important phenomenon often observed in supply chain management, known as the bullwhip effect, implies that demand variability increases as one moves up the supply chain, i.e., as one moves away from customer demand. In this paper we quantify this effect for simple, two‐stage, supply chains consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer. We demonstrate that the use of an exponential smoothing forecast by the retailer can cause the bullwhip effect and contrast these results with the increase in variability due to the use of a moving average forecast. We consider two types of demand processes, a correlated demand process and a demand process with a linear trend. We then discuss several important managerial insights that can be drawn from this research. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 269–286, 2000     

Quantity discount pricing policies for heterogeneous retailers with price sensitive demand

Although quantity discount policies have been extensively analyzed, they are not well understood when there are many different buyers. This is especially the case when buyers face price‐sensitive demand. In this paper we study a supplier's optimal quantity discount policy for a group of independent and heterogeneous retailers, when each retailer faces a demand that is a decreasing function of its retail price. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game whereby the supplier acts as the leader and buyers act as followers. We show that a common quantity discount policy that is designed according to buyers' individual cost and demand structures and their rational economic behavior is able to significantly stimulate demand, improve channel efficiency, and substantially increase profits for both the supplier and buyers. Furthermore, we show that the selection of all‐units or incremental quantity discount policies has no effect on the benefits that can be obtained from quantity discounts. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers

We address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Single‐warehouse multi‐retailer inventory systems with full truckload shipments

We consider a multi‐stage inventory system composed of a single warehouse that receives a single product from a single supplier and replenishes the inventory of n retailers through direct shipments. Fixed costs are incurred for each truck dispatched and all trucks have the same capacity limit. Costs are stationary, or more generally monotone as in Lippman (Management Sci 16, 1969, 118–138). Demands for the n retailers over a planning horizon of T periods are given. The objective is to find the shipment quantities over the planning horizon to satisfy all demands at minimum system‐wide inventory and transportation costs without backlogging. Using the structural properties of optimal solutions, we develop (1) an O(T²) algorithm for the single‐stage dynamic lot sizing problem; (2) an O(T³) algorithm for the case of a single‐warehouse single‐retailer system; and (3) a nested shortest‐path algorithm for the single‐warehouse multi‐retailer problem that runs in polynomial time for a given number of retailers. To overcome the computational burden when the number of retailers is large, we propose aggregated and disaggregated Lagrangian decomposition methods that make use of the structural properties and the efficient single‐stage algorithm. Computational experiments show the effectiveness of these algorithms and the gains associated with coordinated versus decentralized systems. Finally, we show that the decentralized solution is asymptotically optimal. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

On the polyhedral structure of two‐level lot‐sizing problems with supplier selection

In this article, we study a two‐level lot‐sizing problem with supplier selection (LSS), which is an NP‐hard problem arising in different production planning and supply chain management applications. After presenting various formulations for LSS, and computationally comparing their strengths, we explore the polyhedral structure of one of these formulations. For this formulation, we derive several families of strong valid inequalities, and provide conditions under which they are facet‐defining. We show numerically that incorporating these valid inequalities within a branch‐and‐cut framework leads to significant improvements in computation. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 647–666, 2017     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Effectiveness of (R,Q) policies in one‐warehouse multiretailer systems with deterministic demand and backlogging

Consider a distribution system with a central warehouse and multiple retailers. Customer demand arrives at each of the retailers continuously at a constant rate. The retailers replenish their inventories from the warehouse which in turn orders from an outside supplier with unlimited stock. There are economies of scale in replenishing the inventories at both the warehouse and the retail level. Stockouts at the retailers are backlogged. The system incurs holding and backorder costs. The objective is to minimize the long‐run average total cost in the system. This paper studies the cost effectiveness of (R, Q) policies in the above system. Under an (R, Q) policy, each facility orders a fixed quantity Q from its supplier every time its inventory position reaches a reorder point R. It is shown that (R, Q) policies are at least 76% effective. Numerical examples are provided to further illustrate the cost effectiveness of (R, Q) policies. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 422–439, 2000     

Optimal control policies for an inventory system with commitment lead time

We consider a firm which faces a Poisson customer demand and uses a base‐stock policy to replenish its inventories from an outside supplier with a fixed lead time. The firm can use a preorder strategy which allows the customers to place their orders before their actual need. The time from a customer's order until the date a product is actually needed is called commitment lead time. The firm pays a commitment cost which is strictly increasing and convex in the length of the commitment lead time. For such a system, we prove the optimality of bang‐bang and all‐or‐nothing policies for the commitment lead time and the base‐stock policy, respectively. We study the case where the commitment cost is linear in the length of the commitment lead time in detail. We show that there exists a unit commitment cost threshold which dictates the optimality of either a buy‐to‐order (BTO) or a buy‐to‐stock strategy. The unit commitment cost threshold is increasing in the unit holding and backordering costs and decreasing in the mean lead time demand. We determine the conditions on the unit commitment cost for profitability of the BTO strategy and study the case with a compound Poisson customer demand.     

A produce‐to‐stock system with advance demand information and secondary customers

We consider a manufacturer (i.e., a capacitated supplier) that produces to stock and has two classes of customers. The primary customer places orders at regular intervals of time for a random quantity, while the secondary customers request a single item at random times. At a predetermined time the manufacturer receives advance demand information regarding the order size of the primary customer. If the manufacturer is not able to fill the primary customer's demand, there is a penalty. On the other hand, serving the secondary customers results in additional profit; however, the manufacturer can refuse to serve the secondary customers in order to reserve inventory for the primary customer. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production and stock reservation policies that maximize the manufacturer's discounted profit and the average profit per unit time. We show that these policies are threshold‐type policies, and these thresholds are monotone with respect to the primary customer's order size. Using a numerical study we provide insights into how the value of information is affected by the relative demand size of the primary and secondary customers. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Fixed‐interval joint‐replenishment policies for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand

We consider a distribution system consisting of a central warehouse and a group of retailers facing independent stochastic demand. The retailers replenish from the warehouse, and the warehouse from an outside supplier with ample supply. Time is continuous. Most previous studies on inventory control policies for this system have considered stock‐based batch‐ordering policies. We develop a time‐based joint‐replenishment policy in this study. Let the warehouse set up a basic replenishment interval. The retailers are replenished through the warehouse in intervals that are integer multiples of the basic replenishment interval. No inventory is carried at the warehouse. We provide an exact evaluation of the long‐term average system costs under the assumption that stock can be balanced among the retailers. The structural properties of the inventory system are characterized. We show that, although it is well known that stock‐based inventory control policies dominate time‐based inventory control policies at a single facility, this dominance does not hold for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand. This is because the latter can provide a more efficient mechanism to streamline inventory flow and pool retailer demand, even though the former may be able to use more updated stock information to optimize system performance. The findings of the study provide insights about the key factors that drive the performance of a multiechelon inventory control system. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 637–651, 2013     

A partial characterization of the optimal ordering/rationing policy for a periodic review system with two demand classes and backordering

We consider a finite horizon periodic review, single product inventory system with a fixed setup cost and two stochastic demand classes that differ in their backordering costs. In each period, one must decide whether and how much to order, and how much demand of the lower class should be satisfied. We show that the optimal ordering policy can be characterized as a state dependent (s,S) policy, and the rationing structure is partially obtained based on the subconvexity of the cost function. We then propose a simple heuristic rationing policy, which is easy to implement and close to optimal for intensive numerical examples. We further study the case when the first demand class is deterministic and must be satisfied immediately. We show the optimality of the state dependent (s,S) ordering policy, and obtain additional rationing structural properties. Based on these properties, the optimal ordering and rationing policy for any state can be generated by finding the optimal policy of only a finite set of states, and for each state in this set, the optimal policy is obtained simply by choosing a policy from at most two alternatives. An efficient algorithm is then proposed. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Acceptance sampling,imperfect production,and the optimality of zero defects

Acceptance sampling is often used to monitor the quality of raw materials and components when product testing is destructive, time-consuming, or expensive. In this paper we consider the effect of a buyer-imposed acceptance sampling policy on the optimal batch size and optimal quality level delivered by an expected cost minimizing supplier. We define quality as the supplier's process capability, i.e., the probability that a unit conforms to all product specifications, and we assume that unit cost is an increasing function of the quality level. We also assume that the supplier faces a known and constant “pass-through” cost, i.e., a fixed cost per defective unit passed on to the buyer. We show that the acceptance sampling plan has a significant impact on the supplier's optimal quality level, and we derive the conditions under which zero defects (100% conformance) is the policy that minimizes the supplier's expected annual cost. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 515–530, 1997     

Production‐inventory systems with imperfect advance demand information and updating

We consider a supplier with finite production capacity and stochastic production times. Customers provide advance demand information (ADI) to the supplier by announcing orders ahead of their due dates. However, this information is not perfect, and customers may request an order be fulfilled prior to or later than the expected due date. Customers update the status of their orders, but the time between consecutive updates is random. We formulate the production‐control problem as a continuous‐time Markov decision process and prove there is an optimal state‐dependent base‐stock policy, where the base‐stock levels depend upon the numbers of orders at various stages of update. In addition, we derive results on the sensitivity of the state‐dependent base‐stock levels to the number of orders in each stage of update. In a numerical study, we examine the benefit of ADI, and find that it is most valuable to the supplier when the time between updates is moderate. We also consider the impact of holding and backorder costs, numbers of updates, and the fraction of customers that provide ADI. In addition, we find that while ADI is always beneficial to the supplier, this may not be the case for the customers who provide the ADI. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011