The Royal Navy's Polaris lobby, 1955–62

This article examines the background to the Royal Navy's acquisition of Polaris. The conventional wisdom is that the Navy had little interest in Polaris, which was foisted on it upon the cancellation of Skybolt. Extensive use of files in the Public Record Office is made to mount the contrary argument, that the Admiralty had been interested in the submarine-launched ballistic missile since at least 1955, that there was widespread support for it among the Naval Staff, that a substantial amount of preparatory work was undertaken with the assistance of the US Navy, and that the naval staff were prepared to accept the deterrent role. Naval tactics – to play a waiting game and feign indifference – have contributed to the establishment of the orthodox interpretation, as has the view that the Navy was handicapped by the lack of a body of doctrine within which the deterrent role could be accommodated. The article shows that the orthodox account cannot be sustained by the evidence, which points to a naval triumph in terms of Whitehall politics and inter-service competition.     

One more push: Forcing the Dardanelles in March 1915

The historiography of the Gallipoli campaign suggests that the Turks were critically short of ammunition for the Dardanelles coastal defences in March 1915. This theme, established by Winston Churchill, became the basis for a widespread belief that the Royal Navy, after its failure to carry the Dardanelles on 18 March 1915, simply needed one more determined naval push to breakthrough the narrows. The presumed consequence was that the Ottoman Empire, with Constantinople under the guns of the Royal Navy, would have withdrawn from the war. Using modern Turkish sources, the author examines the available quantities, placement, and expenditure of ammunition, and challenges the premise that the Turks were desperately short of heavy shells. The author concludes that the Turks had sufficient remaining ammunition to fiercely contest control of the straits.     

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.     

‘Winston has gone mad’: Churchill,the British Admiralty,and the Rise of Japanese Naval Power

As Chancellor of the Exchequer during the late 1920s, Winston Churchill was at the center of British strategic decision making about how to respond to the naval challenge posed by Japan's rise as a rival sea power. Churchill downplayed the likelihood of war with Japan. The leadership of the Royal Navy disagreed: they saw Japan as a dangerous threat to the security of the British Empire. Examining this dispute between Churchill and the Admiralty highlights the awkward political, economic, and strategic tradeoffs confronting British leaders between the world wars.     

Russian Reactions to Reagan's ‘Maritime Strategy’

The US Navy's audacious Maritime Strategy of the 1980s is often credited with acting as a key catalyst to the demise of the USSR. In assessing the role of strategic missile submarine “bastions” in the country's overall military strategy, the authors are skeptical of the above thesis, explaining that Moscow actually viewed deployments of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles on to US submarines (versus direct threats against the Soviet Navy itself) as the most alarming threat. The authors concede that the arms race played a role in the collapse of the USSR, but deny a direct connection with Soviet naval development citing the relatively minor naval proportion of overall defense spending. For the difficulties facing the fleet at the end of the Cold War, they instead blame deep systemic problems internal to the Soviet Navy.     

Mind over matter? Multinational naval interoperability during Operation Iraqi Freedom

ABSTRACT

The increasing frequency of multinational operations has heightened the importance of interoperability. While human and cultural factors are only two pieces of the interoperability jigsaw they are of enduring significance. The cohesiveness of the relationship amongst the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Navy and the United States Navy during the 2003 Iraq War was underpinned by high levels of perceptive interoperability, which manifested itself in effective working relationships. That conflict demonstrated that while historical ties provided a foundation for cooperation, a number of multinational initiatives were undertaken to further enhance interoperability. This article addresses how such a high level of perceptive interoperability was achieved by examining the conduct of multinational exercises, the importance of personnel exchanges and the role of liaison officers, before considering the effect it had on the conduct of operations. The Iraq War demonstrated that cultural factors are at least as important as other facets of interoperability.     

ANALYSING DEFENCE DEPENDENCY: THE IMPACT OF THE ROYAL NAVY ON A SUB‐REGIONAL ECONOMY

This paper provides a methodology for estimating the economic impact of defence spending at a sub‐regional level. It does so by calculating the income and employment generated by Britain’s Royal Navy and associated defence activities in the City of Portsmouth and its surrounding area, during the financial year 2003–2004. In an era of military consolidation, the paper offers an insight into the multifaceted impact of defence‐related expenditure. Hence, it presents a generic framework that could prove useful to other researchers when seeking to measure the sub‐regional impact of naval, airforce and army facilities in other national contexts.     

Maritime Airpower in the Interwar Period: The Information Dimension

The impact of airpower on the conduct of naval operations was considerable. It affected the roles, perceived importance and composition of the battle fleet, but its transformational effect was gradual rather than instantaneous. Airpower played a crucial role in the information war that underlay maritime operations. Access to, and the exploitation of, information greatly influenced the way in which the Royal Navy managed the actual process of change, as institutional, cultural and political norms adapted to the new technological reality. The Admiralty's incomplete control of all aspects of maritime power does much to explain deficiencies in this process.     

The 1907 Naval War Plans and the second Hague peace conference: A case of propaganda 1

The phenomenon of mutual sea denial had rendered offensive naval actions such as commercial blockade impossible in the narrow seas around Europe. Consequently, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, abandoned commercial blockade for the safer option of interdicting enemy commerce on the high seas where the Royal Navy could control communications. The proposal to extend immunity to all private property at sea at the 1907 Hague Conference threatened this strategy. As part of a wider campaign to convince the British establishment to oppose immunity, Fisher created the 1907 Naval War Plans to directly influence Cabinet decision-making. Fisher's close involvement in the creation of the ‘Plans’ indicates that they are an expression of Fisher's strategic vision. Moreover, Fisher's attempt to influence the Cabinet asks questions of the bureaucratic decision-making process within the British establishment before 1914.     

舰艇编队综合作战能力评估的模糊聚类分析

评估舰艇编队综合作战能力强弱的模糊聚类分析涉及编队对海作战能力、编队反潜作战能力、编队防空作战能力、编队电子战能力、编队指挥控制能力和编队战场适应能力等因素.以若干舰艇编队为研究对象,对因素指标进行标准量化.据标准化数据用指数相似系数法计算样本间的相似关系,最后根据各样本与基准样本相聚类或分离进行量化分析,判断各舰艇编队综合作战能力的强弱次序.     

海湾战争与舰船维修

在论述舰船战时雏修保障重要作用的基础上,总结了美海军在海湾战争中实施战前检修及战时抢修的基本活动和经验,提出了我军舰船战时维修保障建设的基本思路及措施。     

Linking a throughput simulation to a systems dynamics simulation to assess the utility of a US Navy foreign humanitarian aid mission

The success of any humanitarian aid mission is generally measured by the timeliness of critical supplies that are delivered to the affected area. However, a more interesting analysis may be to determine the effect of the aid on the overall satisfaction of the local population. The authors' research focused on the delivery of humanitarian aid to a notional region that was decimated by flooding with ships, landing craft and security personnel provided by the US Navy and Marines. While the research effort addressed naval force structure, the focus of the research was: (1) to assess different delivery methods for the aid; and (2) to determine how the aid delivery impacted the overall satisfaction of the local population. To examine both concerns, two simulation models were developed, with one examining the throughput of aid delivered during the operation, and the other the satisfaction of the population based on the humanitarian aid effort.     

北斗卫星导航系统商业化发展策略

为应对海军在全球公域投送力量时面临的严重"反介入/区域拒止"(anti-access/areal denial,A2/AD)挑战,美国海军利用电磁作战方面的技术优势,率先提出并重点发展了"电磁机动战"。虽然该理论还处于进一步完善当中,但随着研究和实施的深入,将有助于提高美国海军在电磁领域的作战优势。     

作战实验在海军装备体系建设中的应用研究

结合国内外作战实验研究现状,详细分析了作战实验体系的应用领域和类别,描述了典型作战实验体系的构架,在此基础上重点对作战实验在海军装备体系建设中的应用需求进行了分析,最后提出了一种作战实验在海军装备体系建设中的典型应用模式。     

Gorshkov's Gambit

This article is a portrait of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander of the Soviet Navy for almost three decades, from 1956–85. The author, a retired US Navy admiral with a Harvard PhD in Russian studies who served as both defense and naval attaché in Moscow, draws on numerous face-to-face interactions with Gorshkov. He also explores Gorshkov's memoirs that were published recently in Russia but have not appeared in an English translation. The paper is not only a first-hand account of an important historical figure, but also a window into the world of military-to-military diplomacy and intelligence during the Cold War.     

The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942

It has become commonplace, especially in the post-Vietnam strategic environment, to quote Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. We are told that military operations are dictated by, and must serve, clear political ends. Such thinking has been invoked to support everything from punitive strikes, to peacekeeping missions, to the ‘Powell’ doctrine and its political ‘exit strategies’, but at times political policy and military operations do not mix. In 1942 the Royal Navy bowed to political pressure and, against its collective better judgement, continued the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. These military operations culminated in the destruction of convoy PQ 17 in early July. This conflict between political policy and military strategy provides an object lesson of why in war issues of means and priorities must outweigh the importance of any given political policy.     

美国舰载标准系列导弹对海军防空导弹发展的影响

美国海军现役的标准导弹是一个庞大的系列,主要型号从标准1一直到标准6,每个主要型号又在不同的时期发展出多种改进型。它不仅是美国海军当前的主力舰空导弹武器装备,还出口到多个国家和地区,是世界上装备量最大、应用最为广泛的舰空导弹系统。本文主要结合标准系列导弹的发展历程,分析了标准系列导弹对世界海军防空导弹装备发展的深远影响。     

小口径舰炮武器系统作战效能评估模型研究

通过对小口径舰炮武器系统的分析,建立小口径舰炮武器系统作战效能评估指标体系,得到基于"串/并联"模型框架的作战效能评估A.D.C扩展模型E=A.D.C.S.通过某型小口径舰炮武器系统的实例计算验证了模型的正确性,并得出分析结论.     

‘Immediate redress’: USS Potomac and the pirates of Quallah Batoo

Maritime interests in the twenty-first century are not immune to the growing number of irregular challenges and hybrid threats that have come to dominate land warfare. In order to better understand these challenges a study of naval history can help provide a vital foundation. In the early 1830s the United States Navy dispatched the frigate USS Potomac to Sumatra to investigate a pirate attack on the spice trader Friendship. Potomac's crew of sailors and Marines conducted a landing at the village Quallah Batoo and fought a pitched battle. As the navies of the world approach naval irregular warfare in the new century, studying past examples like Potomac's mission can help illuminate the principles of successful naval irregular warfare.