Asymmetric information and third-party intervention in civil wars

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party’s expected intervention causes her ally’s enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict.     

Evolutionary determinants of war

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use the concept of evolutionary stability in finite populations. We find that players’ evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.     

The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict

This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions.     

Conditions for Successful Multiparty Mediation in Separatist Armed Conflicts: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis

Contemporary international mediation is often multiparty and involves a number of states and multilateral organisations. What are the conditions that account for successful multiparty mediation in conflict resolution? To address this question, I use qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and focus on individual dimensions of mediation, namely internal cohesion of the mediating coalition, the use of reward and coercive power, and the presence of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS). I posit that the presence of a cohesive mediating coalition is a necessary condition for conflict resolution, whereas the provision of security guarantees, the imposition of sanctions and the presence of an MHS play a causal role in conflict resolution only in conjunction with other conditions. I test these conditions using a fuzzy-set approach and data from 20 mediated agreements over separatist conflicts in the post-cold war era. Empirical findings provide support for some of these propositions and challenge relevant theories of international mediation. More specifically, this research shows that a high convergence of interests among mediators is the only necessary – albeit not sufficient condition – for conflict resolution. Second, the analysis highlights the presence of two main sufficient paths for mediation success.     

Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia

China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight.     

Market reactions to regulations on minerals from the democratic republic of the Congo

Using an event study approach to analyze stock market data from the United States, I investigate how regulations on conflict minerals sourced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were perceived by investors. I find that for a subset of mining companies, stock returns were abnormally high when regulations in the US became more likely. I also find that returns were higher for communications equipment manufacturing companies when strong regulations in the DRC were announced. I argue that these responses were due to the competitive environments faced by each of these company types. These findings relate to debates surrounding the effects of the conflict mineral regulations. While some critics argue that reporting requirements were tantamount to a ban on minerals from the DRC, I find that stock returns for a subset of companies were sensitive to legislation in the DRC after legislation became law in the US, suggesting that market participants did not expect a complete trade ban on regulated mining and trading activities.     

War,vagueness and hybrid war

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as “war” and “peace” and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts.     

Conflict dynamics and costs in the Greek Civil War 1946–1949

Using a new set of data from Greek Army sources, US military archives, and Communist Party documents, the paper provides a quantitative analysis of the armed confrontation that took place in Greece during 1946–1949. A dynamic Lotka–Volterra model is estimated, pointing to the existence of a conflict trap that explains the prolongation of the civil war and its dire consequences for the country. A regional analysis finds that the mobilization of guerrilla forces was crucially affected by morphology and the local persecutions of political rivals. Using neoclassical growth-accounting, the economic cost of the conflict is estimated to surpass an annual GDP, in line with similar findings in contemporary civil wars. The same framework is employed to assess the outcome in counterfactual situations discussed in this paper.     

The Underlying Causes of Violent Conflict in the North Waziristan Tribal Areas of Pakistan

ABSTRACT

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan and the merged Tribal Districts, particularly the North Waziristan Tribal District (NWTD), experienced increasing violent conflict. This paper examines the causes of conflict in North Waziristan from the perspective of local communities. The study is based on qualitative primary data collected in NWTD. The study identifies deep-rooted internal factors such as poor socio-economic conditions, political exclusion, degradation of local institutions and culture, introduction and promotion of Jihadi culture and militancy as the main drivers of conflict in NWTD. External factors, like the USSR and US invasions in Afghanistan, a porous border and unseen international actors, have contributed to the start and even escalation of the more recent conflict, but mainly through exacerbating internal factors. The study recommends that policies aiming to reduce violent conflict in this region pay due attention to the significance of addressing the underlying internal drivers of conflict.     

Civil Wars and Contemporary State Building: Rebellion,Conflict Duration,and Lootable Resources

Regardless of the outcome, civil wars are destructive events. They not only devastate the physical and human capital of a society, but also have a direct effect on state capacity. The capacity of the state is critical as it attempts to rebuild society and minimize the risk of a new civil conflict; yet, it is still not clear how civil war precisely affects state capacity. In general, we argue that incumbent victors are more likely to end with a stronger state when the conflict is short and the victory is decisive. In contrast, rebel victors require more time to build their internal capacity and thus have stronger states after a longer conflict, especially when they had access to lootable resources.     

Uncultured: Civil War and Cultural Policy

How does cultural policy affect violence? While cultural discrimination is frequently cited as a potential grievance motivating political violence, the relationship remains under-theorised and largely untested. I weave theoretical literatures with interviews and secondary sources on the experience of Kurds in Turkey to understand the socio-economic and psychological pathways through which cultural policies impact intrastate conflict. I then analyse cross-national data on political violence, demonstrating that cultural grievances increase support for violence, raise the chance and severity of conflict and prolong violent conflicts. In short, policy matters: cultural restrictions exacerbate violence through multiple pathways.     

Buying Peace? Civil War Peace Duration and Private Military & Security Companies

Do Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) impact peace duration after civil war? I argue that the role these organisations play in a conflict can impact post-conflict stability. Specifically, I suggest that variance in services provided by PMSCs can influence rebels’ calculations about relative capabilities. These calculations then contribute to the probability for civil war recurrence. Building on the bargaining framework, with a focus on information and commitment problems, this article demonstrates that PMSCs participating in armed combat operations can jeopardise the stability of peace following civil war. Three case narratives (Angola, Sierra Leone and Croatia) are used to probe the theoretical argument and results are illustrative – PMSCs serving as force multipliers contribute to an increase in the probability for conflict recurrence.     

Precision cyber weapon systems: An important component of a responsible national security strategy?

Given the advances made in conventional weapon capabilities, precision should by now be the accepted and expected norm in cyberspace as well. In this article I argue that developing precision cyber weapon systems, to be used during a lawful conflict, can be an important part of a responsible national security strategy to reduce the amount of violence and physical destruction in conflicts. I first describe a precision cyber weapon system in a military context. I then present three compelling rationales for the development of precision cyber weapon systems based on ethical, operational, and financial considerations. To support the position, I address several arguments that have been levied against their development. Thereafter I present several recommendations for a way ahead.     

航母编队特点及对策研究

为了打赢未来可能发生的高技术局部战争,必须深入研究航母编队特点,积极探索能有效克制航母编队的战法。从航母编队的作战编成、攻防体系和队形以及C3I系统的结构及功能等方面分析了航母编队的特点,重点研究了航母编队C3I系统的特点。针对其特点,提出了几点抗击航母编队的对策。     

INTRA‐GROUP COMPETITION AND INTER‐GROUP CONFLICT: AN APPLICATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The ‘credibility rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The ‘bargaining rationale’ predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post‐conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The ‘social psychological rationale’ captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post‐conflict. Finally, the ‘expressive rationale’ predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision‐making in rendering individual decision makers non‐decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.     

Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times

This article analyzes a class of stochastic contests among multiple players under risk‐averse exponential utility. In these contests, players compete over the completion of a task by simultaneously deciding on their investment, which determines how fast they complete the task. The completion time of the task for each player is assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable with rate linear in the player's investment and the completion times of different players are assumed to be stochastically independent. The player that completes the task first earns a prize whereas the remaining players earn nothing. The article establishes a one‐to‐one correspondence between the Nash equilibrium of this contest with respect to risk‐averse exponential utilities and the nonnegative solution of a nonlinear equation. Using the properties of the latter, it proves the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and provides an efficient method to compute it. It exploits the resulting representation of the equilibrium investments to determine the effects of risk aversion and the differences between the outcome of the Nash equilibrium and that of a centralized version.© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 66:4–14, 2019     

公安边防部队处置无直接利益冲突群体性事件对策研究

无直接利益冲突群体性事件有5个特点,即间接性、特定性、辐射性、关联性、暴力性.引发无直接利益冲突群体性事件的原因主要有4个方面：一是我国正处于社会转型期,贫富差距突出,矛盾多发;二是基层公共权力机关公信力下降和利益诉求渠道阻塞;三是法律意识淡薄和社会认同感降低;四是心理匿名感和信息的快速传播.研究应对无直接利益冲突群体性事件对策具有重要的现实意义.     

Preventing conflict upstream: impunity and illicit governance across Colombia’s borders

This article explores how transnational borderlands matter for conflict prevention and, in particular, so-called upstream engagement, which aims to reduce threats to global stability and security that arise from the world’s increasing interconnectedness. Accounting for transnational borderlands in vulnerable regions is crucial for conflict prevention as pursued by the defence and security sector because borderlands are catalysts of the negative side of global interconnectedness: they are business hubs for transnational organised crime, sites of retreat for conflict actors, and safe havens for terrorists. The border areas’ proneness to impunity and the ability of violent non-state actors to govern these spaces illicitly contribute to the emergence of these characteristics. I therefore argue that upstream conflict prevention needs to do two things to address these risks: first, to overcome a national security approach centred on the borderline and instead acknowledge transnational security dynamics in borderlands on both sides of the border; second, to overcome the state-centred governance lens to also consider governance exerted by non-state actors. The article draws on empirical data from a six-year study including over a year of fieldwork in and on Colombia’s borderlands.     

THE HUMAN CAPITAL PEACE: DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

This paper explores the relationship between human capital and international conflict. In theory, human capital may increase the opportunity cost of military service and the economic cost of injury and loss of life in combat; it may decrease the benefits of conflict as human capital cannot be easily appropriated or transferred; it may affect societal norms toward peace and war; and it may alter military productivity through new technology and complementarities between military technology and personnel. Using a panel of politically relevant dyads, I find robust empirical evidence that human capital may significantly decrease the likelihood of militarized conflict between nations. In short, the findings suggest that promoting human capital‐oriented development may help to increase peace in the world.     

CONTRIBUTORS

Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities.