Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

Discount pricing policies for inventories subject to declining demand

Until only recently, the mechanism behind determining item price has been ignored and the discount price taken as a given in quantity-discount inventory decision problems. Inventory subject to declining demand further complicates both pricing and replenishment decisions. This article provides the vendor with the means for optimally determining both the discount price and replenishment order frequency for all buyers in the system in an environment of declining demand. In the multiple-buyer case, we provide an efficient algorithm for classifying buyers into homogeneous subgroups to further enhance joint cost savings among all system participants.     

Performance of N machine centers of K-out-of-M: G type maintained by a single repairman

We consider a system of N (nonsymmetric) machine centers of the K-out-of-M : G type that are maintained by a single repairman. [A machine center functions if and only if at least K of the M machines belonging to the center are good (G).] Such systems are commonly found in various manufacturing and service industries. A stochastic model is developed that accommodates generally distributed repair times and repairman walk times, and most repair scheduling disciplines. K-out-of-M : G type systems also appear as a modeling paradigm in reliability analysis and polling systems performance analysis. Several performance measures are derived for machine-repair systems having K-out-of-M-type centers. A simple example system is developed in detail that exposes the computations involved in modeling applications. © 1992 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Twittering for talent: Private military and security companies between business and military branding

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) play an increasingly important role in the provision of security-related services. In their attempts to win new clients and find suitable personnel, they take on different identities by presenting themselves as conventional businesses, military actors, and humanitarians. In this article, we examine how PMSCs deploy these identities when they recruit new personnel through social media. Our computer-assisted content analysis of Twitter messages posted by two major United States-based companies—CACI and DynCorp International—shows that while both PMSCs amplify their business and military identities to attract the most talented personnel, they construct and communicate these identities in different ways with CACI branding itself as a sophisticated, modern, and patriotic business and DynCorp as a home-grown, traditional military provider. In addition, our analysis lends force to scholars suggesting that state militaries and the private security sector compete increasingly for prospective employees using similar strategies.     

Norms,Military Utility,and the Use/Non-use of Weapons: The Case of Anti-plant and Irritant Agents in the Vietnam War

The role of norms and military utility in the use of weapons is disputed by constructivist and realist scholars. Through an examination of US decision-making regarding anti-plant and irritant agents in the Vietnam War, I advance this debate in three key ways. First, I develop structural realism’s expectations regarding the role of military utility. Second, I demonstrate that social and material factors are at play in our understandings of both ‘norms’ and ‘military utility’, and that both played a role in US decisions. Third, I find that the dominant role – as structural realism expects – was played by military utility.