Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited

Policies to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have, for the most part, been modeled on strategies originally devised to counter the danger of nuclear proliferation. While useful in countering a traditional CBN (chemical/biological/nuclear)/WMD threat, current counter-proliferation and non-proliferation regimes are insufficient to meet the challenge of maritime terrorism. Maritime terrorism represents a new category of threat; one that partially overlaps with conventional WMD, but for which – due to the scope and nature of the maritime industry – traditional counter-proliferation policies may be inadequate and even inappropriate. This article outlines the means by which maritime shipping can be used as WMD and discusses the policies implemented to deal with these threats, in light of the challenges presented to traditional conceptualizations of WMD and counter-proliferation strategies.     

India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves?

India has increasingly high aspirations in the Indian Ocean, as enunciated by politicians, naval figures and the wider elite. These aspirations, its strategic discourse, are of pre-eminence and leadership. India's maritime strategy for such a self-confessed diplomatic, constabulary and benign role is primarily naval-focused; a sixfold strategy of increasing its naval spending, strengthening its infrastructure, increasing its naval capabilities, active maritime diplomacy, exercising in the Indian Ocean and keeping open the choke points. Through such strategy, and soft balancing with the United States, India hopes to secure its own position against a perceived growing Chinese challenge in the Indian Ocean.     

Information and the Air Defence Revolution, 1917–40

The Royal Air Force was successful in the Battle of Britain because of the elaborate and sophisticated air defence system of Fighter Command. This system had its foundations in the early warnings which radar provided. The process of collecting a huge amount of often inaccurate and contradictory data from radar stations, and then turning it into useful information which could direct fighters to their targets was a remarkable accomplishment. Information was the key to this revolution in military organisation, command and control procedures, and tactics. The origins of this information revolution predate radar, and can be traced back to World War I.     

The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency

This paper looks at the virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. It argues that the West is faltering in the ‘War of Ideas’ with global Jihad for the main reason that the messages that we wish to convey lack narrative coherence. This is a result of the fact that we misapprehend the nature of the virtual operational environment whereas our opponents possess an intuitive grasp of it as a result of which their structure and method of operations are better adapted and more effective than our own. There is no reason, beyond inertia, that this should remain the case.     

‘A Particularly exacting operation’: British Forces and the Battle of Surabaya,November 1945

In 1945, the Dutch government was not in a position to re‐impose its control upon its colonies in the East Indies after the surrender of Japan. In their stead, Allied forces were to take control of the islands, disarm Japanese troops and to maintain stability until the Dutch could return. The declaration of an independent Indonesia by nationalists left the British and Indian troops sent to re‐occupy the islands facing a complex situation. Increasing violence culminated in the murder of Brigadier A.W. S. Mallaby in Surabaya, which was followed by a major action by British forces to regain control. In extremely difficult circumstances, the British troops conducted a successful operation which held many lessons for the conduct of counter‐insurgency operations in the years that followed.     

United States special operations forces and the war on terrorism

Those leading the war on terrorism have emphasized from the beginning that this war would be unlike other wars. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are military forces unlike other military forces. The implication is that SOF and the war on terrorism are thus made for each other. This contribution examines this assumption, the war on terrorism and SOF in greater detail.