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71.
Michael Robillard 《Journal of Military Ethics》2017,16(3-4):205-219
The profession of arms is distinct from other professions for many reasons. One reason which is not so obvious is that, unlike members of other professions, soldiers may go their entire careers preparing for a day that never arrives. All things considered, we should think this to be a very good thing. For soldiers, however, this can feel somewhat odd, since there is a natural desire to want to feel useful and to see one’s role and purpose find realization. Accordingly, the common soldier is forced to adopt a rather paradoxical mindset, one of longing for peace, and therefore for uselessness, while at the same time longing to be useful, which would entail that there be a war. This latter desire to be useful and to vindicate one’s identity as a soldier can sometimes take on an unhealthy life of its own. The pull of wanting too strongly to live up to a warrior identity, I argue, can sometimes skew a soldier’s ability to assess risk rationally. This article will therefore investigate how a soldier’s concept of self influences his or her overall capacity to evaluate risk in war and when such influence might become morally problematic. 相似文献
72.
Michael Kluth 《African Security Review》2013,22(1):19-29
This article argues that aspirations of maintaining a dominant influence over sub-Saharan security issues has spurred the French and British leadership of European Union (EU) foreign and security policy integration, just as it has informed military capability expansions by the armed forces of the main EU powers. While Europe's initial African focus was on stabilising a continent marred by state failure, civil wars and genocides, changes in the global security context, especially the shift towards multipolarity manifest in China's growing engagement, has prompted a complementary focus on deterring other powers from making military inroads into the subcontinent. Hence Europe's sub-Saharan security focus is shifting from stabilisation towards deterrence. This helps explain recent military procurements which, in spite of the extremely challenging fiscal position of most EU member states, feature large-scale investments in long-range deterrence capabilities. 相似文献
73.
Michael Clarke 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):311-334
This article explores the challenges that Australia faces in reconciling its commitments to nonproliferation and uranium exports during a time when the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is under major stress and the world uranium market is bullish. The “grand bargain” that has framed Australian participation in the nonproliferation regime and the nuclear fuel market since the 1970s was only tenable in an era of stagnant uranium demand and a stable nuclear balance. However, contemporary nuclear proliferation dynamics and the revival of interest in nuclear energy have accentuated the incompatibility between Australia's commitment to nonproliferation and the desire to profit from uranium exports. The contemporary international strategic environment, international nonproliferation regime, and nuclear energy market are characterized by developments that not only undermine the basis of Australia's grand bargain, but also present challenges and opportunities for the refashioning of Australian policy. 相似文献
74.
Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Pentagon rhetoric has increasingly articulated a more robust vision of space as a future battlefield. This analysis details some of the ongoing spending for research and development programs identified in current U.S. Air Force, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Defense Advanced Research and Planning Agency (DARPA) planning and budget documents related to “space control” and “space force projection.” This analysis finds that current support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical—with little actual budgetary support. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. We conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer micro satellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes. 相似文献
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77.
Michael Barletta Clay Bowen Kimber Cramer R. Adam Moody 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):132-145
The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ nuclear and missile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according o the recipient country. Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place. 相似文献
78.
Michael Barletta Clay Bowen Kent Jamison Gaurav Kampani 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):134-151
The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies' nuclear and missile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according to the recipient country. Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place. 相似文献
79.
Paul Jackson 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):131-150
Warlord is a label that currently besets us on all fronts. The 2001–2002 military action in Afghanistan is illustrative of the West's ambivalent view of armed factions in the developing world in general. The demonisation of the Taliban and the elevation of the former ‘warlords’ of the opposition to the rather more grandiose sounding ‘Northern Alliance’, at once formalising the hitherto informal nature of the warlord system, implies that the term ‘warlord’ is synonymous with anarchy, violence and a breakdown in civilised values. ‘Warlord’ has become an ugly, detrimental expression, evoking brutality, racketeering and terrorism. Analysts referring to violence across developing countries routinely refer to ‘new wars’ and ‘post-modern’ conflict, and yet the language used to describe these phenomena is usually pre-modern (medievalism, baronial rule, new feudalism). This article outlines some examples of historical warlords and draws out the common issues. In particular it emphasises the fact that warlords have been present for centuries and have periodically emerged whenever centralised political-military control has broken down. All that has changed through history is the technology available to each generation and the relative economic base. The article concludes with a series of implications for policy-makers currently considering intervention in warlord-based economies. 相似文献
80.