Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

Two-characteristic markov-type manpower flow models

A two-dimensional state space Markov Model of a Manpower System with special structure is analyzed. Examples are given from the military services. The probabilistic properties are discussed in detail with emphasis on computation. The basic equations of manpower stocks and flows are analyzed.     

Structural models of award fee contracts

This paper describes the construction of a mathematical model structure in a particular area of management. In addition it is intended as an illustration of how appropriate levels of mathematics can be utilized in management research when original formulations lack sufficient precision for conducting quantitative analyses. The specific area studied deals with the formulation and analysis of contract types. In particular the award fee type contract is treated. At present mathematical structure models for other contract types have received considerable attention, but award fee types have not been structured in mathematical terms. The paper provides a discussion of model formulation for award fee contracts, develops a detailed example of such a structure, and illustrates that model by numerical examples indicating the application of such models to the formulation and analysis of award fee contracts.     

Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943–1944

This article compares the philosophy and practice of command in the British and US Armies during the Italian Campaign of 1943–44. It assesses pre-war influences on the command approach adopted by each army, and shows how refinements derived from wartime experience enabled British and American commanders to successfully utilise mission command principles to outfight the German Army in the latter years of World War II. This examination directly challenges the historical consensus that Allied commanders were disadvantaged by an inability to exploit the advantages of mission command, and that the German Army retained superior command practices, despite its other failings, throughout the fighting between 1939 and 1945. These conclusions hold additional relevance to modern military organisations which have emphasised mission command as the optimal solution to effective command in battle since the 1980s, but from an inaccurate understanding of German, British and American command traditions and experience that persists to this day.     

Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction

Perhaps surprisingly, given the availability of new Russian memoir material, some excellent individual monographs, and a large variety of declassified documents, a full operational–political account of the Soviet Union's withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan has yet to be written. This article, utilising openly published yet neglected sources, attempts to fill that gap. The final fate of the Najibullah regime, and the contradictory effect of the National Reconciliation Policy in Afghanistan itself, suggests four key lessons for international forces today as disengagement from both Iraq and Afghanistan again becomes a pressing issue, and as questions around re-creating stability within a failed state scenario again occupy the international community.