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51.
ABSTRACTThe paper compares political territoriality of selected jihadist violent non-state actors. Looking at selected groups that attempted to control territory (Afghan Taliban, Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State), it attempts to establish a generalization regarding the use of territory by this type of violent non-state actors. To this end, it analyses connection of territory to groups´ security provision, economic activity, and identity. Despite many differences among the groups, it concludes that these groups often utilize both territorial and personal characteristics. Territoriality of these actors is reactive as they are unable to present a sustained control in contested regions. 相似文献
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Martin Thomas 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):172-198
Unlike France, Britain viewed the Algerian conflict from 1958 to 1962 primarily as a colonial war. The British government regarded Algérie française as an anachronism, which France would have to relinquish one day. Though Britain was no stranger to ‘dirty’ colonial wars, as simultaneous operations against EOKA nationalists in Cyprus continued to prove, it was not averse to displaying a certain smugness at having averted the kind of mess Algeria seemed to represent. Britain's interest in the latter stages of the Algerian conflict centred on four major areas: Perceptions of colonial warfare; de Gaulle's Algeria policy; Algeria and Britain's view of France in Europe and NATO; Negotiating the ceasefire and ending the conflict. 相似文献
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Martin van Creveld Professor 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(3):449-452
Observers of United States (US) interventions have almost universally characterized the 1994 Haiti intervention as multilateral, a model for how international cooperation can achieve common security goals. A closer analysis of the intervention reveals that the planning and execution of the intervention were almost entirely unilateral and therefore cost the US few if any of the theoretical costs of coalition warfare, including interoperability and policy compromise. Mapped onto the unilateral strategy and operation of the intervention, however, was a multilateral diplomatic effort that secured United Nations Security Council authorization and provided a cover for an intervention that the US had already planned and intended to execute with or without that authorization. That the US sought a multilateral cover for an intervention that it could easily accomplish unilaterally shows the importance of two factors: A domestic audience that opposed unilateral peacekeeping but would accept using US resources as part of a broader multilateral operation, and a local population that would be more responsive to a multilateral coalition than a use of force that was perceived to be unilateral. The Haiti intervention shows that the determinants of success in operations other than war are as much political as military. When the US already has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its adversary, building military coalitions becomes as much about enlisting political support as aggregating material capability. 相似文献
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Martin Edmonds 《Defense & Security Analysis》2003,19(3):301-304
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In an integrated telecommunications network, voice and data traffic compete for the same transmission facilities. Assuming Poisson arrivals and exponential service with different rates, analytic expressions are obtained for measures of performance such as blocking probability and average delay under the following operating rule: class 1 traffic behaves as a loss system while class 2 traffic is buffered when all channels are busy. In view of the inordinate amount of computational effort needed when the number of channels is large, simple approximations have been suggested. 相似文献
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