A platform for initial testing of multiple camouflage patterns

The human visual system is still an important factor in military warfare; military personnel receive training on effective search strategies, and camouflage that can effectively conceal objects and personnel is a key component of a successful integrated survivability strategy. Previous methods of camouflage assessment have, amongst others, used psychophysics to generate distinctiveness metrics. However, the population from which the human observers are drawn is often not well defined, or necessarily appropriate. In this experiment we designed a new platform for testing multiple patterns based on a camouflaged object detection task, and investigate whether trained military observers perform better than civilians. We use a two-alternative forced choice paradigm, with participants searching images of woodland for a replica military helmet displaying Olive Green, Multi Terrain Pattern, US Marine Pattern or, as a conspicuous control, UN Peacekeeper Blue. Our data show that there is no difference in detection performance between the two observer groups but that there are clear differences in the effectiveness of the different helmet colour patterns in a temperate woodland environment. We conclude that when tasks involve very short stimulus presentation times, task-specific training has little effect on the success of target detection and thus this paradigm is particularly suitable for robust estimates of camouflage efficacy.     

On the normality and abnormality of offsets obligations

Defence offsets have often been described as government‐to‐business compensation arrangements or contracts involving “reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market exchange”. This paper argues that it is irrelevant and misleading to use this notion as a criterion for defining offsets.

The paper also explores the apparent inconsistency between the maximising efficiency in defence procurement and the application of offsets requirements. It is shown that defence offsets are a subset of all the price‐quality‐quantity trade‐offs which in general characterise negotiations surrounding complex transactions.

It is argued that although reciprocal or offsetting arrangements are a normal aspect of commercial transacting, the operation of certain offsets schemes namely mandatory offsets obligations, may inhibit the buyer's flexibility in negotiating deals and result in inefficient procurement. This leads us to ask why these offsets schemes have persisted for so long.     

The German arms industry in a European context: A study in successful downsizing

Defence offsets rank as one of the most important and controversial topics within the broad field of defence economics. Arms vendors are likely to view offsetting investment as a distraction, fearful of its potential to hurt the bottom line. By contrast, policymakers in the arms purchasing countries see offsets as an opportunity to extract technology transfer, as well as employment, investment and export sales opportunities. Establishing the actual impact of offsets, however, is not easy. The subject is shrouded in secrecy and myth, with anecdote and generalisation pervading even the intellectual press. This paper seeks to break the mould by offering an empirical case study of the role of offsets in Malaysian defence industrialisation.     

CIVIL SOCIETY AND VIOLENCE—HOW TO MANAGE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WITHOUT THE ARMY

This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS.     

The British army,information management and the First World War revolution in military affairs

Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies.     

Security sector stabilisation in counterinsurgency operations: the case of Afghanistan

This article argues that the debate on security sector reform (SSR) needs to be taken further by taking into consideration the fact that, even though the SSR concept was not originally developed as an element in stabilising states undergoing an insurgency, it is very much being used for exactly that. When conducting counterinsurgency with a focus on the creation of stability, the baseline will ultimately have to be security sector stabilisation (SSS) as a precondition for complete SSR implementation. However, the two must be connected to avoid them undermining each other. This is important if a comprehensive approach to programme implementation and especially sustainability is to guide the programme, and not just isolated ‘train and equip’ stand-alone projects that do not solve either the initial need for stabilisation or the long-term need for accountable security forces. Currently, in Afghanistan the surge for security by the international military is in danger of overtaking the other elements of the SSR, thereby undermining the primary end state and thus risking laying the wrong foundation for the long-term process of SSR.