On the theory of semi-infinite programming and a generalization of the kuhn-tucker saddle point theorem for arbitrary convex functions

We first present a survey on the theory of semi-infinite programming as a generalization of linear programming and convex duality theory. By the pairing of a finite dimensional vector space over an arbitrarily ordered field with a generalized finite sequence space, the major theorems of linear programming are generalized. When applied to Euclidean spaces, semi-infinite programming theory yields a dual theorem associating as dual problems minimization of an arbitrary convex function over an arbitrary convex set in n-space with maximization of a linear function in non-negative variables of a generalized finite sequence space subject to a finite system of linear equations. We then present a new generalization of the Kuhn-Tucker saddle-point equivalence theorem for arbitrary convex functions in n-space where differentiability is no longer assumed.     

Interception in a network

This paper presents an algorithm for determining where to place intercepting units in order to maximize the probability of preventing an opposing force from proceeding from one particular node in an undirected network to another. The usual gaming assumptions are invoked; namely, the strategy for placing the units is known to the opponent and he will choose a path through the network which, based on this knowledge, maximizes his probability of successful traverse. As given quantities, the model requires a list of the arcs and nodes of the network, the number of intercepting units available to stop the opposing force, and the probabilities for stopping the opposition at the arcs and nodes as functions of the number of intercepting units placed there. From these quantities, the algorithm calculates the probabilities for placing the unit at the arcs and nodes when one intercepting unit is available, and the expected numbers of units to place at the arcs and nodes when multiple intercepting units are available.     

Optimal interdiction of a supply network

Under certain conditions, the re-supply capability of a combatant force may be limited by the characteristics of the transportation network over which supplies must flow. Interdiction by an opposing force may be used to reduce the capacity of that network. The effects of such efforts vary for differing missions and targets. With only a limited total budget available, the interdictor must decide which targets to hit, and with how much effort. An algorithm is presented for determining the optimum interdiction plan for minimizing network flow capacity when the minimum capacity on an arc is positive and the cost of interdiction is a linear function of arc capacity reduction.     

A solution for queues with instantaneous jockeying and other customer selection rules

This paper presents a general solution for the M/M/r queue with instantaneous jockeying and r > 1 servers. The solution is obtained in matrices in closed form without recourse to the generating function arguments usually used. The solution requires the inversion of two (Z^r?1) × (2^r?1) matrices. The method proposed is extended to allow different queue selection preferences of arriving customers, balking of arrivals, jockeying preference rules, and queue dependent selection along with jockeying. To illustrate the results, a problem previously published is studied to show how known results are obtained from the proposed general solution.     

On some stocxastic tactical antisubmarine games

Mathematical models of tactical problems in Hntisubmarine Warfare (ASW) are developed. Specifically, a game of pursuit between a hunter-killer force. player 1, and a possible submarine, player 2 is considered. The game consists of a sequence of moves and terminates when player 2 is tcaught or evades player 1. When the players move they observe the actual tactical configuration of the forces (state) and each player choosa-s a tactical plan from a finite collection. This joint choice of tactical plans determines an immediate payoff and a transition probability distribution over the states. Hence an expected payoff function is defined, Formally this game is a Terminating Stochastic Game (TSG). Shapley demonstrated the existence of a value and optimal strategies (solution), An iterative technique to approximate the solution to within desired accuracy is proposed. Each iteration of the technique is obtained by solving a set of linear programs. To introduce more realism into the game several variations of the TSG are also considered. One variation is a finite TSG and linear programming techniques are employed to find the solution.