THE NPT

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.     

WHILE WAITING FOR THE PROTOCOL

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.     

BUSTING OUT

This report explores Iranian popular opinion on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the determinants of Iranian attitudes. Using data from a 2008 survey of 710 Iranians administered by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, we find that that a significant minority of Iranians (10 percent in 2006 and 14 percent in 2008) would prefer that Iran withdraw from the NPT. Our statistical analysis shows that Iranians who fear a US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and distrust the International Atomic Energy Agency are more likely to want to quit the NPT. We therefore argue that those who do not trust other nations are most likely to oppose the NPT.     

Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul of Containment. by William Inboden

This article predicts that the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected. This delegitimation of nuclear weapons is due to five factors whose importance has grown since the mid-1990s: nuclear proliferation, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the nuclear taboo, missile defence, and the increased importance of international law. The article starts with categorizing nuclear weapons policies: nuclear primacy, maximum deterrence, minimum deterrence, existential deterrence, and post-existential deterrence. The nuclear weapon states will probably shift their policies from nuclear primacy (US), maximum deterrence (Russia), minimum or existential deterrence (UK, France, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) to post-existential deterrence (or elimination), taking one step at a time.     

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

This article examines the nuclear command and control (C²) system implemented in Pakistan since 1998, and discusses its potential consequences for the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. I argue that troubled civil-military relations and Pakistan's doctrine of ‘asymmetric escalation’ account for the creation of a command and control system with different characteristics during peacetime and military crises. Although the key characteristics of Pakistan's nuclear C² system allow relatively safe nuclear operations during peacetime, operational deployment of nuclear weapons during military standoffs is likely to include only rudimentary protections against inadvertent or unauthorised nuclear release. The implication of this study is that any shift from peacetime to wartime command and control procedures is likely to further destabilise Indo-Pakistani relations during the early stages of a diplomatic or military standoff, and introduce a non-trivial risk of accidental escalation to the nuclear level.     

Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.     

Home Defence and the Sandys Defence White Paper, 1957

Long understood as the key document in Britain's Cold War history, the Duncan Sandys Defence White Paper of 1957 nevertheless has a largely forgotten context: home defence. This article argues that understanding this context allows important new conclusions to be drawn concerning the drafting, presentation and the reception of the document and the deterrent strategy it expounded. It argues that the Paper failed to establish a new doctrine for civil defence which reconciled the policy with the wider deterrent strategy. In doing this, the Paper presented a muddled policy to the public: one which failed to justify the reductions in civil defence provision but which stressed the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons. This had the effect of encouraging the critics of the government's nuclear strategy to flag up the absence of adequate civil defence measures and highlight the ‘admission’ that there was no defence against the hydrogen bomb.     

Britain and Hiroshima

Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential.     

《禁止化学武器公约》生效十年履约评述

简要回顾了《禁止化学武器公约》生效10年来化学武器的宣布、销毁、核查等履约进展情况。分析了履行《禁止化学武器公约》需要注意的几个问题,包括公约的普遍性、化学武器威胁的长时间存在,以及科学技术发展对《禁止化学武器公约》的影响等。     

Africa and the 2015 NPT Review Conference

African states' attendance at and participation in the preparations for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has produced mixed results, with the continent acting as both agent and bystander in respect of certain issues. African agency is evident in, for example, its position as a member of groupings on Iran's nuclear weapons programme and the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Less agency is evident in states' individual actions. This underscores the importance of African states' preference for multilateralism. However, African agency is also less evident in African multilateral efforts at the NPT preparatory meetings. The impact of these developments on the 2015 NPT Review Conference is too soon to tell but may bode ill for African agency.