水体富营养化危害、成因及防治

水体富营养化严重影响人类健康、可用水量、水体经济价值和水体寿命,而大量污水超标排放、农业面源污染、水产养殖业失当、周边环境恶化和底泥氮磷溶出是其形成主因。在治理和恢复富营养化水体的实践中,必须强化污染预防意识,从源头上削减污染负荷,同时选用切实可行、系统协调、针对性强的政策和措施并长期坚持实施,才能起到事半功倍的效果。     

逐步Ⅰ型混合截尾试验下Burr部件的可靠性分析

在逐步Ⅰ型混合截尾试验下,研究了Burr部件寿命参数及可靠性指标的极大似然估计和Bayes估计.利用简单迭代方法,给出了寿命参数和可靠性指标的极大似然估计的数值解.然后利用Lindely Bayes近似算法得到了平方损失下寿命参数以及可靠性指标的Bayes估计.最后,运用Monte-Carlo方法对各估计结果作了模拟比较,结果表明Bayes估计较极大似然估计的误差小.     

Design optimization for a launching system with novel structure

A launching system with novel structure using optimization method is investigated to improve the muzzle velocity of guns in this article. This system has two tandem chambers of which the front one is ignited first and the other is ignited after a while. The launching process of this novel system is modelled and a series of different schemes are simulated, to discover the interior ballistic performance of this novel launching system. In order to obtain the optimal loading conditions, an optimization model combined with the combustion model is established. The optimal schemes can improve the muzzle velocity by 20.6% without changing the parameters of barrel. It means that this novel launch system could improve the interior ballistics performance significantly and it still has considerable potential to be ameliorated.     

智能电子电路虚拟实验室

介绍了一种“电路分析平台”软件,可对模拟及数字电路进行仿真分析.与其他电路仿真软件相比,该软件具有非常好的可视化人机界面和易用性,可以象在实验室做实验那样在电脑上搭接虚拟电路,然后合上虚拟开关接通电源,观察虚拟仪表上的实时显示数据及分析结果,堪称个人电脑上的电子电路虚拟实验室,是电子工程师有力的计算机辅助分析工具.     

基于神经网络的超精密机床伺服进给非线性模型辨识

以双轴Ｔ型结构的超精密金刚石车床的伺服进给系统为研究对象,采用自构造神经网络技术,建立了系统的非线性动态数学模型,为系统非线性控制与补偿提供参考模型     

软件可靠性的过程仿真技术

以软件研制的生命周期为背景,探讨利用仿真模型对软件可靠性进行研究的方法．文章阐述了仿真模型分析方法与传统的模型分析方法的不同之处,通过对软件可靠性过程的分析,设计了一个基本的仿真器结构,由此考察引发失效行为的各种故障因素及其对软件可靠性的影响．     

水下缩比航行体热尾流的红外探测实验研究

根据缩比模型,建立了缩比红外成像实验测试系统,对水下航行体的体积、航行深度、运动速度、尾流排放等进行了缩比设计,设计了多种实验工况,可实现缩比目标模型红外尾流的静态和动态测试,一方面明确红外尾流的可探测性,另一方面掌握红外尾流可探测性的影响因素以及红外尾流的变化规律,为下一步工作奠定基础。     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

Global counterinsurgency and US army expansion: the case for recruiting foreign troops

Given the nature of global counterinsurgency operations, the demands of military expansion, and the need for cultural, linguistic, and regional expertise, the United States Army should evaluate the establishment of US-led foreign troop units for its evolving force structure. This article proposes the creation of an American foreign legion based upon the recruitment of US-led, ethnically homogeneous tribal force units to meet the grist mill of counterinsurgency operations. This structured approach would be more beneficial than the current reliance on a de facto American Foreign Legion, represented by private military contractors (PMCs), many of them comprised of foreigners. These PMCs carry a number of oversight, accountability, and legal risks not found in a fully integrated, and US-officered foreign legion. The British Brigade of Gurkhas, the South-West African Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (Koevoet), and the Kit Carson Scouts serve as relevant historical examples where foreign troops were used to supplement national manpower resources.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’