模糊多属性群决策与潜艇作战方案优选

分析了潜艇作战方案的优选实质是一个模糊多属性的群决策过程,建立了模糊多属性群决策的一般模型,介绍了一种以模糊理想解与模糊负理想解同时作为参照基准,以海明距离作为测度工具,以相对贴近度作为衡量标准的模糊折衷型多属性群决策方法,应用实例表明此方法可行有效。     

具有吞吐量和时延约束的软件无线电波形部署决策算法

针对当前具有吞吐量和时延约束的软件无线电波形部署决策算法在内存开销方面考虑的不足,提出一个更为通用的波形部署决策系统模型,将波形的处理开销、内存开销和通信带宽开销都纳入到波形部署决策过程中,并设计了一种基于动态规划的波形部署决策算法以最小化波形对平台各种计算资源的占用总和。仿真结果表明,内存对波形部署决策具有重要影响,与未考虑内存开销的解决方案相比,平台支持的平均最大波形数目和平均处理资源利用率均下降40%左右。     

电子防空作战中雷达对抗目标威胁分析与评估

针对电子防空作战雷达对抗力量在指挥与运用中面临的目标威胁评定问题,首先从技术、战术、动态和静态等方面全面分析了雷达对抗目标的威胁因素,其次,运用可拓学的多目标优化理论和运筹学中的理想决策法的原理和方法,提出了一种新的基于物元矩阵的理想决策模型,最后,实例验证表明该模型可行、有效,便于计算机辅助决策,为雷达对抗目标威胁评估提供一种新途径,可为指挥员对空情威胁做出正确判断提供支持。     

Counter-Insurgency in Pakistan: The Role of Legitimacy

The Pakistani security forces have won their fight against the insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban, though terrorism will remain a serious problem for the foreseeable future. Victory was won not chiefly on the basis of new tactics, but of the recovery of legitimacy for the campaign among the population and the armed forces. This occurred when the war came to be seen as one waged not in the interests of the USA, but for the defence of Pakistan. In Balochistan, the nationalist insurgency has been different from and weaker than that of the Taliban—but may prove longer lasting. Military tactics in Balochistan have closely resembled those of the British Raj, and have been based with some success on fomenting tribal divisions and co-opting tribal elites.     

基于兰切斯特方程的网络中心战模型

为了更全面、客观地评价信息优势和决策优势对网络中心战进程的影响,在分析经典兰切斯特方程的基础上,引入信息?决策概率,提出了基于兰切斯特方程的网络中心战模型,仿真实验表明该模型能够有效地描述信息?决策概率在网络中心战进程中发挥的作用,为研究分析网络中心作战过程提供了理论参考。     

基于优化蚁群算法的装备调拨决策系统研究与设计

将蚁群算法和遗传算法应用于装备调拨决策系统,实现了装备调拨决策信息的生成.同时利用遗传算法对蚁群算法的参数进行了优化,实验证明优化后的蚁群算法在平均路径长度、算法平均执行时间和总执行时间上较传统蚁群算法都有一定程度的改进.     

The 1907 Naval War Plans and the second Hague peace conference: A case of propaganda 1

The phenomenon of mutual sea denial had rendered offensive naval actions such as commercial blockade impossible in the narrow seas around Europe. Consequently, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, abandoned commercial blockade for the safer option of interdicting enemy commerce on the high seas where the Royal Navy could control communications. The proposal to extend immunity to all private property at sea at the 1907 Hague Conference threatened this strategy. As part of a wider campaign to convince the British establishment to oppose immunity, Fisher created the 1907 Naval War Plans to directly influence Cabinet decision-making. Fisher's close involvement in the creation of the ‘Plans’ indicates that they are an expression of Fisher's strategic vision. Moreover, Fisher's attempt to influence the Cabinet asks questions of the bureaucratic decision-making process within the British establishment before 1914.     

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency

Focusing on British involvement in the 1960s Yemen Civil War, this article examines the centralised mechanisms developed in Whitehall to coordinate covert action interdepartmentally. It therefore sheds new light on London's security and intelligence machine and its input into clandestine operations. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews, it uncovers various important but secretive actors, which have been overlooked or misunderstood in the existing literature, and outlines their functions in the most detail yet available. In doing so, it considers how these bodies evolved in relation to competing threat assessments of the local situation and the impact they had on Britain's covert intervention in the theatre. This article assesses the utility of the system and argues that it provided an effective means to ensure that any covert action sanctioned was properly scrutinised so as to reduce risks and best meet national interests.     

New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Drawing on evidence collected from eyewitness interviews, new Russian secondary sources, as well as recently declassified documents from both sides, the author significantly widens the academic understanding of the maritime dimension of this gravest crisis of the Cold War. Most significant is her conclusion that Soviet commanders were led by complex and challenging tactical circumstances, including unreliable communications and malfunctioning equipment, which might have prompted them to contemplate a resort to tactical nuclear weapons on more than one occasion. Almost as disturbing is the revelation that US forces were not aware of this particular threat. This research reveals how a chain of inadvertent developments at sea could have precipitated global nuclear war, underlining the extreme danger of the crisis.