Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb

This article argues that the perceived need by NATO to nurture political cohesion within the Alliance during the 1950s resulted in the adoption of strategic concepts that were out-of-step with the military environment in which it was operating. It maintains that the Alliance acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues which led to the development of tactical nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional war-fighting capabilities for the defence of the European Central Front. This resulted in a strategic concept that enhanced political cohesion but was militarily unviable.     

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITALY: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations

Despite the fact that Italy hosts almost half of the remaining estimated 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) that are currently deployed in Europe, case studies of Italy have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill that gap by outlining the key elements of Italy's position regarding the presence, role, and future of TNW in Italy. By considering both the military and political-symbolic dimensions of TNW, the author argues that Italy has largely embraced the process of the devaluation of nuclear weapons; however, this is offset by the country's determination to preserve the principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security. By making the alliance's cohesion a priority, Italy appears willing to postpone the complete elimination of TNW from its territory if necessary; despite this, Italy otherwise considers TNW to be not only weapons of little intrinsic value but also obstacles to the global nuclear disarmament program that it strongly supports.     

Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition.     

A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.     

The Chinese and Asian impact on Russian nuclear policy

Asia, where nuclear powers already interact (including North Korea), exerts a growing influence on the thinking and policy underlying Russia's current and future nuclear (and overall defense) posture. China's rise is forcing Russia into a greater reliance on strategic offensive weapons and tactical nuclear weapons. These in turn will reinforce its opposition to US missile defenses, not only in Europe but also in Asia. Russia must now entertain the possibility of nuclear use in regional conflicts that would otherwise remain purely conventional. It cannot be postulated blindly that nuclear weapons serve no discernible purpose other than to deter nuclear attacks by other nuclear powers. The strategic equation in Asia and in the Russian Far East convincingly demonstrates the falsity of this approach. Nuclear weapons will be the essential component of Russia's regional defense policy if not of its overall policies – and this also includes contingencies in Europe.     

Next steps in the creation of an accidental nuclear war prevention center

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.‐U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large‐scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident ‐ or the misperceptions that might result from one ‐ could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.’ Those elements of the research covering the technical and ‘mechanization’ requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).     

潜艇水声对抗及水声对抗器材的应用

依据装备的发展,在论述潜艇水声对抗的地位和战术特点的基础上,从水声对抗器材作用原理的角度,把目前国内外水声对抗器材归为噪声干扰、气幕屏蔽、声学诱骗三种类型。通过剖析这些水声对抗器材的对抗机理,深入分析了它们适宜的应用时机和可能实现的战术目的。进而,提出了各类水声对抗器材在使用时机方面对潜艇作战效果所具有的两面性,以及潜艇使用水声对抗器材后自身的机动策略是达成其战术目的的重要环节。     

Morale and Battlefield Performance at Caporetto, 1917

Abstract

How does morale relate to tactical and operational failure? Is it a cause or an effect? Using the Italian Army at Caporetto as a case study, this article explores the cyclical relationship between battlefield performance and morale. Combining quantitative analysis of army statistics with qualitative analysis of various official and private sources, this article analyses morale before the battle and during its opening phase. Italian morale appears surprisingly resilient and decisions to surrender or desert frequently relied on objective assessment of events rather than demoralisation. In this case it was battlefield defeat which turned disaffection into a full- scale morale crisis.     

谈侦检车在处置核泄漏灾害事故中的应用

因海啸而引起的日本福岛核电站核泄漏危机,充分警示人类必须做好有效应对核泄漏事故的准备工作。核生化侦检车具有快速标定核辐射物质、确定辐射边界的功能,消防部队应研究、掌握和应用核生化侦检技术,积极做好应对今后有可能发生的核生化灾害事故的准备工作。     

对房地产策划的理性思考

随着房地产业的迅速发展,房地产策划在观念、专业化、组织、创新、协作和信息等方面存在着一些与发展不和谐的因素,通过对房地产策划的危机进行理性思考,以寻找战胜危机的可靠途径。在全面分析房地产策划危机的基础上,从贯穿市场意识、主动创造效益、强化整合功能、塑造品牌、引进管理等方面寻找形成房地产策划核心竞争力的源泉,以战胜暂时的危机。其结果证明了房地产策划仍然具有强大的生命力,暂时的危机一定能被克服。     

朝核问题对中国边境安全的影响

朝核问题一直是困扰东北亚地区安全的核心问题，自20世纪90年代第一次朝核危机至今．朝核问题不但没有得到妥善解决，反而更加复杂。2006年10月9日，朝鲜宣布成功进行了地下核试验，朝鲜半岛再一次成为全球关注的焦点。在前人研究的基础上，就朝核问题产生的背景，朝核问题对中国边境地区经济、地区稳定以及生态环境等方面产生的影响进行分析和探讨。     

Pakistan’s nuclear future: continued dependence on asymmetric escalation

ABSTRACT

In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.     

海军诸兵种综合战术训练仿真系统构建研究

如何构建诸军兵种综合战术训练仿真系统,是当前全军训练仿真领域内的研究热点。基于HLA技术框架及分层式RTI,搭建了海军诸兵种综合战术训练仿真系统的体系结构。并采用面向对象的建模与仿真方法,提出了系统公共参考FOM模型的设计思路,定义了实体类、交互类及路径空间,有效规范并减少了系统间网络传输的数据流量。最后,给出了系统仿真实现的流程图和一个仿真实例。实践证明,使用HLA仿真框架实现的海军诸兵种综合战术训练仿真系统能够满足当前海军战术训练的需求。     

WHAT ARE THE ODDS?

Nuclear optimists and pessimists disagree on whether the odds of nuclear war are low or high. This viewpoint assesses the odds of nuclear war over the past sixty-six years, exploring three pathways to nuclear war: an international crisis leading directly to nuclear war, an accident or misperception leading to nuclear escalation or nuclear retaliation against an imaginary attack, and a general conventional war leading to nuclear war. The assessment is based on the application of Bayes's theorem and other statistical reasoning and finds that the expected probability of nuclear war during this historical period was greater than 50 percent. This level of risk is unacceptably high. It is therefore urgent that effective measures be taken to substantially reduce the risk of nuclear war.     

CONTRIBUTORS

Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities.     

Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO's ACE Mobile Force,Flexible Response and the Cold War

During the Cold War, NATO planners created the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) to implement proto-flexible response strategies. Originally conceived as a means to plug gaps in the NATO Central Region "Shield" forces with portable tactical nuclear weapons, ACE Mobile Force evolved into a signalling device intended to forestall an escalatory situation with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces on NATO's northern and southern flanks. The story of ACE Mobile Force is a lens from which to view the implementation of Flexible Response, particularly in the mature period of the 1970s and 1980s.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.     

Schlieffen and the Avoidance of Tactics: A Reinvestigation

This article challenges the view that Schlieffen tried to evade the tactical conundrum of the modern battlefield by resorting to the operational level of war. On that view, the outflanking strategy of the Schlieffen Plan, with its supposed avoidance of frontal attack, betokened a failure to come to terms with the firepower revolution that had so enormously strengthened the tactical defensive. But Schlieffen did in fact engage directly with this problem by creating a mobile heavy artillery to improve the offensive tactical capability of the German army. Moreover, the Schlieffen Plan was not based exclusively on the outflanking principle. Schlieffen reckoned that the envelopment of Paris could succeed only in conjunction with a frontal assault on the whole line between Paris and Verdun, an immense tactical undertaking crucially supported by the mobile heavy artillery.     

The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail

Some scholars counter-intuitively argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases international security by substantially reducing the chances for inter-state armed conflict. This school of thought draws heavily on the history of the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry to inform its analysis. The security dilemmas in the contemporary Middle East and South Asia where numerous states have or want nuclear weapons, however, are profoundly different than the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. States in the Middle East and South Asia today may see nuclear weapons as usable instruments of warfare in contrast to conventional wisdom in the West that views them as weapons of deterrence and last resort. As common sense would have it, American and Allied policy designed to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons is prudent. American diplomatic intervention, moreover, in regional crises as a third party may be needed in the future in the Middle East and South Asia to lessen the risks of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, American policy-makers are likely in the future to find themselves facing a nuclear-armed nation-state-or soon to be nuclear weapons-capable state-in a crisis and will have to grapple with the risks of pre-emptive or preventive military action.