Military expenditure and economic growth: peru 1970–1996

The present study examines the effects of military expenditure on growth in Peru in the period from 1970 to 1996. By using a Deger‐type Simultaneous Equations Model it is possible to break up the net effect into supply‐ and demand‐side influences. The former consist of positive externalities of defence activities on the other sectors of the economy, while the latter can be described as crowding‐out of civilian investment. Estimations find the supply‐side effects to be insignificantly different from zero, while the crowding‐out effect of defence spending is significant and substantial. It is thereby established that defence expenditure has a negative overall effect on economic growth in Peru. Although several caveats – including specification problems of the Deger model, the quality of the data used, a relatively small sample and the presence of autocorrelation in the estimations – must be considered, these results turn out to be quite robust with respect to estimation methods (3SLS, 2SLS, OLS) and slight modifications to the model. They are also consistent with previous empirical findings from other countries and cross sectional studies.     

TERRORISM: FACTS FROM FIGURES 1

If international terrorism is on a rising trend, an important source of confirmation or refutation of this is time‐series data on terrorist activity. Using chiefly data collected by the RAND/MIPT consortium we show using basic statistical analysis that in the period 1968–2005 the yearly number of all international terrorist incidents shows no trend over time, but fluctuates year on year in a random manner. On the other hand some indicators do show a definite trend over time, principally the steady rise in the number of incidents that are death‐dealing in nature. A further conclusion is drawn, showing that the proportion of these incidents leading to deaths above a given level is virtually fixed.     

Colonizing military history: A millennial view on the economics of war

We briefly illustrate the application of fundamental principles of economics to three episodes of military history for the second millennium AD. The periods, principles, and cases examined are, first, the European Middle Ages (1000-1300; opportunity cost; siege warfare); second, the Enlightenment and the Age of Battle (1618-1814; expected marginal costs/benefits; the decision to engage in battle); and third, the Cold War (1945-1989; substitution; France's nuclear force de frappe).     

Defense spending and economic growth: Extended empirical analysis for the European Union

Previous empirical studies on the defense spending-economic growth nexus such as Kollias et al. (2007 Kollias, C., N. Mylonidis, and S. Paleologou. 2007. “A panel data analysis of the nexus between defense spending and growth in the European Union.” Defense and Peace Economics 18 (1): 75–85.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), Mylonidis (2008 Mylonidis, N. 2008. “Revisiting the nexus between military spending and growth in the European Union.” Defense and Peace Economics 19 (4): 265–272.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), Dunne and Nikolaidou (2012 Dunne, J. P., and E. Nikolaidou. 2012. “Defense spending and economic growth in the EU15.” Defense and Peace Economics 23 (6): 537–548.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) analyzed this relationship in the case of the EU15. This study extends the analysis with the inclusion of more EU members and investigates the long run causal ordering between the two variables. Findings reported herein are not uniformed across all EU members. It is also found that end of Cold War has significant negative impact on defense expenditures of former east-European countries.     

Performance measurement in military operations: information versus incentives

We explore the impact of strategic assessment efforts on military organizations at war. To do so, we construct a model to explore the impact of a principal’s choice among imperfect performance metrics for a military operation. In doing so, the principal must consider both the incentivizing and informational properties of the metric. We show the conditions under which uncertainty regarding the nature of the agent, as well as uncertainty regarding the operational environment, drives a metric choice that induces pathological behavior from the agent. More specifically, a poor metric choice can create an overly optimistic assessment and end up prolonging the conflict. We illustrate the model’s insights in the cases of World War II and the Vietnam War.     

Military Spending and Economic Growth in South Asia: A Panel Data Analysis

Despite the large number and variety of studies addressing the relationship between military spending and economic growth, a consensus regarding the exact nature of any relationship between the two has proven elusive. This study uses a panel co-integration approach to examine the relationship between military spending and economic growth in the five South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh over the period of 1988–2007. It finds that a 1% increase in military spending increases real GDP by only 0.04%, suggesting that the substantial amount of public expenditure that is currently directed towards military purposes in these countries has a negligible impact upon economic growth.     

Playing dirty to survive: the vulnerability of civilian targets within U.S. military aid recipient states

ABSTRACT

U.S. military aid provides recipient governments the fighting capability they require to undermine domestic militant groups, which can undermine groups’ leadership structures and trigger group splintering. In this environment, brutal attacks against non-combatants become an effective mechanism for targeted groups to signal their resolve and outbid competitors. A large-n analysis of U.S. military aid between 1989 -2011 links higher levels of military aid with higher levels of rebel-perpetrated civilian killings, and deaths due to explosive attacks on non-combatant targets. A closer examination of the case of Pakistan sheds further light on the underlying causal mechanisms.     

Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs

The roots of the information technology Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be traced to the mid-1970s, when the West capitalized on scientific-technological developments to neutralize the threat posed by Soviet second echelons. However, the cultivation of the technological seeds of the American RMA preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones. Although it was the US that was laying the technological groundwork for the RMA, Soviet, rather than the American military theorists, were the first to argue that the new range of technological innovations constituted a fundamental discontinuity in the nature of war, which they dubbed the ‘Military-Technical Revolution’ (MTR). About a decade later, this fundamental Soviet approach to the transformations in military affairs was analyzed, adapted and adopted by the US, and designated the RMA. This article deals with the intellectual history of the Soviet MTR and the American RMA.     

‘Pounding Their Feet’: Israeli Military Culture as Reflected in Early IDF Combat History

Abstract

How did the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) organisational and military culture shape their understanding of security threats, perceptions of warfare, and instinctive responses to security challenges? Israel's early military history is marked by the stubborn persistence of accepted patterns of thought and action. In the first twenty years of its existence, the IDF habitually came to sacrifice both political and military long-term and medium-term considerations in favour of the superficial, short-term satisfaction of its drive for action. The Israeli Army as an institution separated military actions from their political implications, and all too often, granted itself freedom of action at all levels of command. That myopic pattern led to recurring raids and minor operations during the 1950s, and contributed notably to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967.     

Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A Case Study of the French Army in Algeria 1954–1960

This article proposes a case study to illustrate the usefulness of sociological institutional analysis as a method to uncover ‘blue force’ challenges to deal with irregular warfare. The French Army's adaptation to revolutionary warfare in Algeria, starting in 1954, is used to illustrate both the application of the methodology and how institutional forces can hinder as well as overwhelm transformation for irregular warfare. The analysis emphasizes three key dimensions of the French Army's institutional adaptation: the regulative, normative and cognitive. These empirical elements are used to show how they interacted and influenced the institutional implementation of the French COIN structures.