US warfare in Somalia and the trade-off between casualty-aversion and civilian protection

This article examines the ways in which the two normative concerns of casualty-aversion and civilian protection influenced US military strategy in the particular context of the asymmetric conflict in Somalia in the early 1990s. The article critically evaluates US military operations through the prism of international humanitarian law and examines whether American forces started prioritizing casualty-aversion over the safeguarding of Somali civilians. Finally, by drawing on emerging moral guidelines (such as Michael Walzer's idea of ‘due care’), the article examines whether lower numbers of Somali civilian deaths could have been achieved if marginal increases to the risks faced by US soldiers had been accepted.     

Convoys to combat Somali piracy

As the world becomes increasingly globalized, interruptions to international trade cannot be permitted. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has hampered international trade in the region and poses significant risks to the sailors required to navigate those waters. Over the past three years the global community has attempted, through a number of different naval tactics, to stop these acts of piracy; however, these tactics have proven ineffective. This article looks at historical precedence and military theory to support the concept of using convoys to protect the thousands of cargo vessels traveling round the Horn of Africa every year. This tactic will greatly decrease the number of successful pirate attacks and save countless lives in the process.     

The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik)

The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of mission command. It argues that it was heavily influenced by corporate management practices which inherently contradict mission command approach. It continues and investigates how the US Army endeavored to emulate the approach in its doctrine and in major operations.

While it has officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine, it has been less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. This state of affairs has to do with the cultural legacy of the managerial approach to command that still persist. Despite the partial success, the US Army has recently reaffirmed its commitment to this approach.     

Local defence forces and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: learning from the CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam

Some scholars would have us believe that the distinctions between military and policing roles, methods and objectives have become increasingly blurred by the security demands of a post-Cold War and post-11 September global and domestic order. This article explores the current state of the police–military divide through a conceptual and case study analysis. It concludes that, in this case, there is some conflation occurring at a macro-level as international and domestic affairs have become increasingly indistinct, but the article also demonstrates that the actual ethos and practice of these agencies still differs strongly. Most importantly, the article argues that this distinction is in fact a very useful one in planning for future peace support operations     

美国军方科研基金资助策略研究(2010—2020年)

美国能够保持军事技术的长期领先与其稳定的军事科研投入和科学的资助策略密不可分,但以往研究存在切入角度单一、关注领域有限、缺少长时间跨领域研究等不足。本文基于Web of Science数据库收录的2010年至2020年美国军方机构参与资助的科研项目文献数据,分析了美军长期关注的主要研究方向和重点研究领域以及美军主要资助机构及其各自的侧重领域。研究结果表明,美国军方以国防战略目标为根本,超前谋划军事科研资助,坚持基础研究和颠覆性技术研究的平衡,军方主要资助机构重视前沿科技领域,积极开展跨部门跨领域以及跨国合作。该研究对了解美国军事科研资助策略提供了新的视角,对促进我国军事科技发展有一定借鉴意义。     

美军语言智能处理技术的发展策略与启示

发展语言智能处理技术是全球新军事科技研发的重要趋势。美军在几十年的发展过程中,不遗余力地推进新的语言智能技术的研发与应用。在人工智能宏观政策和举措的带动下,美国政府与军方在语言智能领域采取了较为清晰的战略路线:明确需求方向,注重长远规划;重视军民融合,调动地方研发活力;创新技术研发资金的管理模式,提高发展效率;推动技术在关键领域的应用,加快美军战斗力的形成。本文认为,面对这一趋势,我们需要深度布局国防语言智能处理技术战略,重视面向未来需求的长远规划;充分调动语言智能处理技术研发的"民间力量",注重军产学研的协同创新;建立科学适度的项目研发机制,加快颠覆性技术的战斗力转化。     

台湾海军C3I系统装备现状和发展特点

自20世纪70年代以来,台湾在美国的支持下致力于C3I系统的建设,现已初具规模.台湾为了实现其"台独"的目的,更是极力推进海军C3I系统建设.在当前我军迫切需要了解和分析台湾指挥自动化系统的现状与发展.在简要介绍了台湾的衡山防务C3I系统之后,重点讨论了台湾海军C3I系统发展及其部分系统功能特点,分析了台湾海军C3I系统特点及其发展趋势.对台湾海军C3I系统的分析在当前对抗斗争中和加强我军C3I系统建设上具有重要的理论与现实意义.     

数字化技术及数字化战场综述

介绍了四种数字化技术设备,并综述了美军数字化战场与数字化部队发展的动向,以期引起我军的高度重视.     

The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.     

Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948–1960

This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the ‘Long War’.