Conflict management in the Central African Republic: making genocide prevention work

This commentary analyses the international response to the crisis that struck the Central African Republic (CAR) in early December 2013. It examines three intertwined dimensions defining the courses of action available to policymakers dealing with pre-genocidal crises: the politics and institutional manoeuvring shaping the United Nations (UN) Security Council's decision to authorise an enforcement mission without deploying ‘blue helmets’ on the ground; the operational complexities involved in launching rapid reaction forces; and the interdependent logics between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention. The author argues that there are three ways for the UN Secretariat to ensure a more effective response to CAR-type situations: generating political will to respond swiftly to deteriorating crises leading to widespread abuses of human rights by advancing the concept of Responsibility to Protect as a core component of states' national interests; developing strategic frameworks for the deployment of multi-plural missions equipped to avert the actual or potential threat of atrocities; and developing joint early warning and scenario planning between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention agencies.     

A Proliferation of Royal Air Forces

Australia's interest in nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s is usually explained in terms of high politics and grand strategy. This proliferation case study explores, in greater detail than hitherto, the important part played by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in pressing for a nuclear capability. It seeks to understand the reasons behind the RAAF's lobbying, in particular its previous experience with air power, its visceral desire for advanced manned bomber aircraft, and its strong institutional link to the British Royal Air Force. The decision in 1963 to acquire the supersonic US F-111 strike aircraft, instead of rivals including the British TSR.2, is also considered. Once the RAAF's bomber ambitions were satisfied, interest in nuclear weapons was greatly reduced. Finally, some comments are included on the nuclear interests of other air forces in the British Commonwealth.     

论陈毅在黄桥决战中的统战艺术

1940年,黄桥事变爆发。为了赢得这场反顽战斗的胜利,陈毅在分析了苏北的局势后,展开了成功有效的统战工作。首先,针对苏北的战略态势,陈毅提出“联李、击敌、反韩”的斗争策略;其次,让出吴家桥地区,争取“二李”协助新四军东进;再次,命令新四军撤出姜堰,争取“二李一陈”严守中立。陈毅以高超的统战艺术为新四军取得这次反顽胜利奠定了基础。同时,陈毅的统战艺术对当前武警部队遂行多样化任务,也有着极重大的现实启示。     

美国海岸警卫队“综合深水系统”现状及启示

综合深水系统是美国海岸警卫队20世纪90年代提出构想并逐步实施的其在21世纪的装备系统,它具有系统性、兼容性、互动性和先进性,是美国海岸警卫队历史上最大的最具革新性的装备系统。由于我国分散执法的海上执法体制等原因,我国海上执法队伍整体装备存在重复建设、兼容性差、技术水平落后、整体效能差等问题。美国海岸警卫队“综合深水系统”对我国未来海上执法队伍装备建设具有一定的借鉴意义。     

From one exceptionalism to another: France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era

ABSTRACT

The failed expedition of Suez in 1956 and France’s subsequent strategic ‘divorce’ from the United Kingdom and the United States lies at the heart of a policy paradigm that has dictated France’s defence posture from de Gaulle’s presidency to the end of the Cold War. Some crucial features of the Gaullist posture remain today enduring references for French presidents in the definition of France’s exceptionalism. While it is so, there have been significant changes since the 1990s when it comes to France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. This article demonstrates the extent and mechanisms of this rapprochement by analysing it through three dimensions of policy change: modes of action, institutional commitments and discourses. The article demonstrates the dimensions’ mutually reinforcing effects and argues that France’s exceptional posture has de facto been reversed.     

论联合国综合发展观中国本土化的实现——基于科学发展观的提出引发的思考

联合国综合发展观以联合国千年发展目标为具体实施方案,是一种对全球发展实践具有普遍指导意义和实际应用价值的综合发展思想。科学发展观是在科学判断我国国情,充分借鉴联合国综合发展观以及参照联合国千年发展目标的指标与要求的基础上提出的。科学发展观的提出使联合国综合发展观实现了中国的本土化,同时它也是我国从事理性化发展实践的理论起点。     

AFRICOM: hard or soft power initiative?

The United States (US) Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched in 2007, ostensibly to foster African security. Rather than focusing on traditional military operations, AFRICOM also embraces non-military activities such as humanitarian aid and African development. This begs the question as to what type of power (hard or soft) the US intends to wield through AFRICOM. Several US official statements have emphasised the soft power attributes of this military project. To this end, this article seeks to respond to two fundamental questions. First, is AFRICOM a soft power project? Second, how, if at all, has AFRICOM enhanced perceptions of the US in Africa? The article concludes that sceptical and negative perceptions of AFRICOM inhibit its soft-power objective of winning the hearts and minds of the African people.     

US–China military relations: competition and cooperation

ABSTRACT

China’s efforts to build a ‘new type of great power relations’ and a ‘new type of military-to-military relations’ do not constitute a major turning point in relations with the United States. Political relations set limits on military cooperation, and the two sides have been unable to construct a sustainable strategic basis for relations. This has contributed to an ‘on-again, off-again’ pattern in military ties. Trends show a pattern of frequent disruptions in military-to-military relations from 2000 to 2010, followed by an increase in interactions beginning in 2012. Nevertheless, obstacles on both sides are likely to limit mutual trust and constrain future development of military-to-military relations.     

Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation

ABSTRACT

To an observer, Japan’s approach to nuclear weapons can appear confused and contradictory. The only country to have been attacked with nuclear weapons is variously described as a pacifist and non-nuclear nation and as a proliferation threat. These widely varied and conflicting conclusions are understandable given that conflicting messages are sent by senior figures. However Japan’s stance is in fact a coherent, if not uncomplicated, response both to its security needs and to domestic public opinion. However, the security provided by US extended nuclear deterrence underlines and enables this approach. The key policies and decisions were taken in both Washington and Tokyo between China’s first nuclear test (1964) and Japan’s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1976). How the United States came to offer this additional security guarantee to Japan and how Japan came to rely upon it underscore this complex stance and are crucial to understanding a longstanding and ongoing security arrangement and source of stability and security in northeast Asia.