全文获取类型
收费全文 | 328篇 |
免费 | 71篇 |
国内免费 | 71篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 3篇 |
2022年 | 6篇 |
2021年 | 6篇 |
2020年 | 10篇 |
2019年 | 5篇 |
2018年 | 7篇 |
2017年 | 15篇 |
2016年 | 26篇 |
2015年 | 9篇 |
2014年 | 21篇 |
2013年 | 22篇 |
2012年 | 24篇 |
2011年 | 24篇 |
2010年 | 20篇 |
2009年 | 39篇 |
2008年 | 27篇 |
2007年 | 30篇 |
2006年 | 33篇 |
2005年 | 34篇 |
2004年 | 25篇 |
2003年 | 8篇 |
2002年 | 7篇 |
2001年 | 11篇 |
2000年 | 9篇 |
1999年 | 9篇 |
1998年 | 6篇 |
1997年 | 7篇 |
1996年 | 4篇 |
1995年 | 4篇 |
1994年 | 3篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 6篇 |
1991年 | 4篇 |
1990年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有470条查询结果,搜索用时 14 毫秒
81.
前景理论(Prospect Theory,PT)描述了个体在不确定条件下的决策规律,较好地刻画了决策者的风险偏好。分析表明,PT在作战决策建模中具有一定的适用性和可行性。提出了一种基于PT的计算机生成兵力(Computer Generated Forces,CGF)Agent决策建模方法,给出了CGF Agent的建模框架,对CGF Agent决策过程中方案选择的具体步骤和算法进行了详细阐述。实验表明,所提出的方法在一定程度上提高了CGF Agent决策行为的真实性,证明了所提出方法的有效性。 相似文献
82.
Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009 相似文献
83.
We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs. 相似文献
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
为探索信息化作战中指挥控制关键因素,提出改进作战指挥体制的对策措施,采用系统动力学理论,对协同决策的结构、参与者和信息反馈关系等关键因素进行了分析,在此基础上构建了基于系统动力学的协同决策模型并进行了模拟仿真。结果表明,增加指挥控制机构之间的信息共享可以有效提升协同决策的效率,为建立协同决策指挥控制体制提供了借鉴意义。 相似文献
89.
We seek dynamic server assignment policies in finite‐capacity queueing systems with flexible and collaborative servers, which involve an assembly and/or a disassembly operation. The objective is to maximize the steady‐state throughput. We completely characterize the optimal policy for a Markovian system with two servers, two feeder stations, and instantaneous assembly and disassembly operations. This optimal policy allocates one server per station unless one of the stations is blocked, in which case both servers work at the unblocked station. For Markovian systems with three stations and instantaneous assembly and/or disassembly operations, we consider similar policies that move a server away from his/her “primary” station only when that station is blocked or starving. We determine the optimal assignment of each server whose primary station is blocked or starving in systems with three stations and zero buffers, by formulating the problem as a Markov decision process. Using this optimal assignment, we develop heuristic policies for systems with three or more stations and positive buffers, and show by means of a numerical study that these policies provide near‐optimal throughput. Furthermore, our numerical study shows that these policies developed for assembly‐type systems also work well in tandem systems. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008 相似文献
90.