基于ELECTRE方法的模糊多属性决策

针对传统ELECTRE法的弱点,将ELECTRE法拓展到了模糊环境下,得到一种解决模糊多属性决策问题的新方法,决策评估中涉及到的属性值与属性权重值等模糊信息以三角模糊数形式给出。首先集结决策者对各方案属性的评价,确定出模糊决策矩阵;其次根据信息熵原理,求解出三角模糊数型的属性权重向量;最后给出新的模糊ELECTRE方法的决策步骤。新方法既具有统一的表达形式,又克服了传统方法中和谐性与不和谐性之间具有一定相关性的缺陷。新方法计算简单,给出的实例验证了此方法的可行性和有效性。     

再生分辨矩阵与决策熵的不完备决策系统属性约简

为了有效地解决不完备决策系统的属性约简问题,提高属性约简的效率,提出了基于再生分辨矩阵与决策熵的不完备属性约简算法。该算法利用基于容差关系的分辨矩阵来计算相对核,通过再生分辨矩阵计算再生集和再生集属性来缩小加入约简集的条件属性选择范围,以再生集属性的分辨度和决策熵为依据,选择加入约简集的条件属性,并通过实例进行验证分析。结果表明,该算法适用于协调不完备决策系统与不协调不完备决策系统,能够有效地降低时间复杂度,并得到最优属性约简。     

基于空域相关滤波的雷达回波信号降噪方法

对雷达探测来说,如何有效地增强真实目标回波信号、提高信噪比水平是非常重要的。传统的降噪方法如平滑滤波、傅立叶降噪很难有效地降低与目标频谱相重叠的噪声。空域相关滤波算法是小波滤波算法中的一种,能够有效地解决这个问题。该算法是利用真实信号与噪声在尺度间的不同表现来实现的,能够在保留信号细节的同时,有效地降低噪声。仿真表明,该算法在雷达回波的降噪中取得了较好效果,有效地降低了噪声。     

一种自适应方向性技术在生命探测仪中的应用

基于声波／振动探测原理的地震生命探测系统的研制在我国灾害生命搜索救助领域中占有重要位置。提出了一种有效的自适应噪声抵消方法,该方法通过自适应的改变增益值代替改变部分样本的时延值而使系统零点自适应的移动。当信号和噪声同时存在时,能保证零点总是朝向噪声方向。该自适应算法能在硬件中实时实现,在声波／振动生命探测仪中可作为噪声削减和信号增强的实际工具。     

高校科研团队科技创新能力评价研究

科技创新能力是体现高校综合办学实力的核心指标。以科研团队为视角对高校科技创新能力的评价问题进行了研究,分析了高校团队科技创新能力的要素构成、结构特征,在此基础上从人员队伍、条件基础、文化环境、科技投入、科技产出5个方面出发定义了一个可扩展的团队科技创新能力评价指标模型;提出了基于多属性决策的科技创新能力评价方法,为科研团队绩效管理提供了方法支撑。     

基于查表的空间填充曲线映射算法

空间填充曲线是进行数据降维处理的典型方法。首先给出对角线空间填充曲线的映射规则,该规则使得在高维情况下存在唯一曲线,并且每一维度上的格点数目不受限制。然后提出等势面的概念,推导出不同等势面上格点数量的递推关系。在此基础上,给出基于查表的对角线空间填充曲线映射算法,该算法执行快、可扩展性好,其时间复杂度随维度的增加呈线性增长。     

基于粗糙集理论的定性推理结果的约束

从分析定性推理结果存在的问题出发,提出定性约束的必要性.总结了几种现有的定性约束,提出一种新的定性约束-粗糙定性约束,利用粗糙集属性约简算法对定性推理结果进行约简.简要介绍了粗糙定性推理软件的总体设计思路流程和功能模块划分.以物资供应保障过程定性推理结果为例,对所得推理结果进行粗糙定性约束,得到重要推理结果,为物资供应保障决策提供参考意见.     

COURTING THE GLOBAL SOUTH WITH “DUAL-BENEFIT” NONPROLIFERATION ENGAGEMENT

President Barack Obama and an array of other Western leaders continue to assert that the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors is one of most pressing challenges to global security today. Yet, Western efforts to engage governments—particularly governments across the global South—in a practical nonproliferation dialogue have largely yielded disappointing results. This viewpoint examines the need for a new strategy to engage the developing world in nonproliferation programs. It argues that strategies focused strictly on WMD nonproliferation are unsustainable, and ultimately are destined for failure. An alternative “dual-benefit” nonproliferation engagement strategy utilizes the enlightened self-interest of partner governments needed to achieve broad-based buy-in among all partners. In a concluding section, we recommend that the “Group of 8” Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction standardize this model of nonproliferation engagement as it sets out to identify and fund WMD nonproliferation capacity-building initiatives beyond the states of the former Soviet Union.     

HEU FUEL CYCLE INVENTORIES AND PROGRESS ON GLOBAL MINIMIZATION

In 2007, 334 nuclear reactors (including for naval propulsion) and isotope production facilities employed highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel or target material. One year of operations at these reactors and facilities required more than 3,100 kilograms (kg) of HEU for naval propulsion, more than 750 kg for research reactors, and 40?–50 kg for isotope production in civilian facilities—in addition to several tons used in other types of reactors. Material with high enrichment levels and low radiation barriers stored or handled in large batches, such as HEU target waste and certain types of fuel from isotope production, research reactors/critical assemblies, and naval fuel, presents serious safety and security concerns. Forty-eight civilian research reactors have converted to low-enriched uranium as a result of a three-decade international effort to minimize HEU use, resulting in a decrease in HEU consumption of 278 kg per year. This article's establishment of baseline measurements for assessing the results of HEU minimization efforts calls for additional focus on the scope and methodology of HEU minimization. Facility decommissioning and dismantling should play a larger role in the future HEU minimization effort, materials with specific weapons-relevant properties should be given higher priority compared to bulk HEU material, and the use of large quantities of weapon-grade HEU fuel for naval propulsion should be reconsidered.     

Deterrence of Nuclear Terror

Nuclear proliferation, lax security standards in the storage of fissile materials, and international apathy in the prosecution of terrorists make nuclear terror a serious threat to the United States and its allies, yet no doctrine of retaliation has been established. To decrease the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, a doctrine of retaliation—a negligence doctrine—should be considered. If the United States can distinguish whose fissile material was used for a nuclear terror event, a negligence doctrine would prescribe retaliation against that state. Where the proximate cause—terrorists—is unavailable for deterrent retaliation, deterring an accessible mediate cause—a state that has failed to adequately secure its fissile material—is one of a few effective alternatives. In the absence of such a negligence doctrine, the United States and its allies are increasingly vulnerable to a nuclear terror attack and the ensuing negative consequences.