Book Reviews

Strategic Geography. By Hugh Faringdon. Routledge, London (1989), ISBN 0-415-00980-4, £40.00

Field Artillery and Firepower. By J. B. A. Bailey. The Military Press, Oxford (1989), ISBN 0-85066-810-7, £25.00 (hardback), ISBN 0-85066-811-5, £14.50 (paperback)

U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation. Edited by Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin. Oxford University Press, New York (1988), ISBN 0-19-505397-4, £30.00 (hardback), $19.95 (paperback)

Non-production by Industry of Chemical-warfare Agents: Technical Verification under a Chemical Weapons Convention. Edited by S. J. Lundin. SIPRI/Oxford University Press, Oxford (1988), ISBN 0-19-829129-9, £19.50

Ireland's Terrorist Trauma: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Edited by Alan O'Day and Yonah Alexander. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead (1989), ISBN 7450-049003, £27.50 ($48.65)

Pilots and Rebels: the Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988. By P. A. Towle. Brassey's (UK), London (1989), ISBN 0-08-036712-7, £29.95 ($53.95)     

HEU FUEL CYCLE INVENTORIES AND PROGRESS ON GLOBAL MINIMIZATION

In 2007, 334 nuclear reactors (including for naval propulsion) and isotope production facilities employed highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel or target material. One year of operations at these reactors and facilities required more than 3,100 kilograms (kg) of HEU for naval propulsion, more than 750 kg for research reactors, and 40?–50 kg for isotope production in civilian facilities—in addition to several tons used in other types of reactors. Material with high enrichment levels and low radiation barriers stored or handled in large batches, such as HEU target waste and certain types of fuel from isotope production, research reactors/critical assemblies, and naval fuel, presents serious safety and security concerns. Forty-eight civilian research reactors have converted to low-enriched uranium as a result of a three-decade international effort to minimize HEU use, resulting in a decrease in HEU consumption of 278 kg per year. This article's establishment of baseline measurements for assessing the results of HEU minimization efforts calls for additional focus on the scope and methodology of HEU minimization. Facility decommissioning and dismantling should play a larger role in the future HEU minimization effort, materials with specific weapons-relevant properties should be given higher priority compared to bulk HEU material, and the use of large quantities of weapon-grade HEU fuel for naval propulsion should be reconsidered.     

RUSSIAN NAVAL NUCLEAR FUEL AND REACTORS

Russian naval nuclear fuel and reactors pose both proliferation and environmental threats, ranging from the possible theft of highly enriched uranium fuel to the radioactive contamination of the environment, whether due to accident, neglect, or sabotage. Current conditions at Russian naval bases, together with a history of accidents and incidents involving Russia's nuclear fleet, make a convincing case for the large-scale assistance that the G8 is now providing to improve the safety and security of Russian naval reactors and fuel. However, virtually no data has been released to allow accurate, reliable, and independent analysis of reactor and fuel properties, risking misguided international efforts to assist in the areas of nuclear cleanup, nonproliferation, and security. This article identifies and assesses relevant properties and developments related to reactor and fuel design, provides a comprehensive presentation of Russian nuclear naval technologies, and examines technological trends in the context of proliferation and environmental security.