光电火控系统模块化设计初探

对模块、模块化标准进行了概述,阐述了光电火控系统模块化设计的步骤和内容,并提出了光电火控系统模块化设计的方案。     

一类马尔可夫人才系统中的工龄和职龄

用马尔可夫模型研究人才系统中工龄和职龄问题的一般方法都要按职务等级、工龄或职龄来划分系统状态。本文在只以职务等级划分系统状态的一类无降级且逐级晋升的齐次马尔可夫人才系统中讨论了工龄和职龄问题,得到直观描述工龄和职龄的计算结果,并通过一实例说明了本方法的应用价值。     

封锁航道火力运用的对策论方法

炮兵封锁航道射击运用兵力和火力时,可以使用对策论的思想和方法,由此可以把传统的定性分析型经验决策转变为数量分析型的运筹决策,从而达到优化兵力、火力运用之目的。首先分析了炮兵封锁航道射击时,对抗双方可能使用的策略,并从便于作战指挥的角度对多种策略进行了必要的归纳。在此基础上建立了对策模型,重点给出了赢得值的定义和计算方法,并结合示例演算了最佳混合策略的求解过程,最后对最佳混合策略作出了对策论意义上的解释。     

The impact of exponential smoothing forecasts on the bullwhip effect

An important phenomenon often observed in supply chain management, known as the bullwhip effect, implies that demand variability increases as one moves up the supply chain, i.e., as one moves away from customer demand. In this paper we quantify this effect for simple, two‐stage, supply chains consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer. We demonstrate that the use of an exponential smoothing forecast by the retailer can cause the bullwhip effect and contrast these results with the increase in variability due to the use of a moving average forecast. We consider two types of demand processes, a correlated demand process and a demand process with a linear trend. We then discuss several important managerial insights that can be drawn from this research. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 269–286, 2000     

A single‐period inventory placement problem for a serial supply chain

This article addresses the inventory placement problem in a serial supply chain facing a stochastic demand for a single planning period. All customer demand is served from stage 1, where the product is stored in its final form. If the demand exceeds the supply at stage 1, then stage 1 is resupplied from stocks held at the upstream stages 2 through N, where the product may be stored in finished form or as raw materials or subassemblies. All stocking decisions are made before the demand occurs. The demand is nonnegative and continuous with a known probability distribution, and the purchasing, holding, shipping, processing, and shortage costs are proportional. There are no fixed costs. All unsatisfied demand is lost. The objective is to select the stock quantities that should be placed different stages so as to maximize the expected profit. Under reasonable cost assumptions, this leads to a convex constrained optimization problem. We characterize the properties of the optimal solution and propose an effective algorithm for its computation. For the case of normal demands, the calculations can be done on a spreadsheet. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:506–517, 2001     

一种双参数批更换系统的优化问题

研究了一种在更换时间有限的情况下 ,基于交替更新过程的双参数批更换系统的优化问题 ,这一问题的目标是平均费用率的极小化。给出了一种特殊情况的讨论结果。     

基于马尔科夫链的一种评价方法

应用了数理统计与随机过程理论,从分析动态系统的状态以及状态转移情况给出了一种合理的评价方法,经过实例验证,该方法效果较好.     

网络数据加密方法及应用策略

针对目前网络在人们的日常生活中的应用越来越广泛这种实际情况，介绍一些与网络数据安全有关的知识，对数据加密模型、对称（私用密钥）加密体制、非对称（公开密钥）加密体制等概念及常用算法进行了介绍。通过列举的方法介绍了加密应用中常用的几种技术，得出了XML加密技术在网络加密技术应用中有不可比拟的优势的结论。     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008