基于RBF网络的导弹攻击区解算及对比分析

研究了神经网络在空空导弹攻击区处理中的运用,在提出多层前馈(MF)网络和径向基函数(RBF)网络设计方案的基础上,着重对MF网络的BP算法、改进BP算法以及RBF网络的应用进行了仿真,并从收敛速度、逼近精度和实时性三个方面,对计算结果进行了对比分析,结论表明RBF网络在导弹攻击区处理中具有更高的可行性,更适用于快速高精度的火控解算。     

电流变液的光学特性及其应用研究

电流变液是一种极具发展前景的新型智能材料．文中介绍了目前国内外电流变液的光学特性研究动态,分析了其机理,并展望了应用前景．力求能准确反映电流变液光学特性研究的发展现状,旨在促进电流变液在光学领域的研究．     

多层吸波和多层透波材料阻抗匹配问题研究

本文使用多目标目标函数对一种特殊结构的电磁波吸收材料的电磁参数进行了优化计算,给出了5～15GHz 频带内的几组吸收率大于20db 的设计参数以及这些参数对应的垂直极化波、平行极化波入射角0°、20°、45°、60°情况下的吸收曲线。计算结果表明:只要优选各层参数,即使某些“夹层”不具有吸收性能仍可得到极好的吸波特性;单纯的电吸收或单纯的磁吸收都难以获得高的吸波效能;良好的阻抗匹配并不一定要在阻抗“渐变过程”情况下实现;对于出射波侧是自由空间的透波材料,用不具有吸收性能的材料,良好的匹配只在各层ε_(?)≈μ_(?)情况下得到。     

装备物资供应业务流程重组研究

为了适应信息化战争的需求，提高部队装备物资供应系统的敏捷性和可靠性，基于信息共享和业务流程的并行、同步化，建立了一个基于协调决策中心的物资供应系统模型，基于该模型对装备物资供应业务流程进行了重组，并提出了对装备物资供应系统业务流程进行重组应注意的一系列问题。重组后的装备物资供应系统可以有效地减少信息流经的环节和可能的信息失真，优化保障资源配置，提高物资供应的敏捷性，增强物资供应的主动性和针对性。     

基于响应面法的复合材料层合板平面应力强度可靠性分析

针对处于平面应力状态下的复合材料层合板，考虑其材料参数、强度参数、几何尺寸以及承受载荷等随机因素，用分支限界法识别结构系统的各重要失效序列，应用响应面法对某具体层合板的各失效事件进行计算，进而计算出整个系统的失效概率，并且利用MATLAB程序以及ANSYS中的APDL语言编写了JC法计算程序。计算结果表明，一般情况下层合板首先出现基体损伤失效，然后才会出现纤维断裂失效。这一结果与一些文献中的试验结果相一致，表明这种概率分析方法可以应用于实际复合材料层合板结构的可靠性分析。     

改进平衡计分卡在装备物资供应管理中的应用

基于装备物资供应的特点，对传统平衡记分卡进行了改进，建立了装备物资供应平衡记分卡，分为部队用户、业务流程、保障服务、训练与创新4部分。基于建立的装备物资供应平衡记分卡及其因果关系分析，可以有效的评价装备物资供应系统的整体运行情况，为装备物资供应系统优化提供依据。     

应用镁金属化学还原法制备多孔Si/Si-O-C负极材料机理研究

以二乙烯基苯和聚硅氧烷为原料经先驱体转化法制备Si-O-C材料,利用镁金属在惰性气氛保护下高温还原制备多孔的Si/Si-O-C负极材料。利用X射线衍射、能谱分析、元素分析和场发射扫描电镜分析多孔Si/Si-O-C负极材料的组成、结构、形貌,从而研究利用镁金属化学还原法制备多孔Si/Si-O-C负极材料的机理。结果表明,镁金属在还原过程中生成MgO和Mg_2SiO_4等产物,经HCl洗涤后可形成多孔的Si/Si-O-C负极材料。Si/Si-O-C材料中的单质硅分布于多孔的Si-O-C相中,一定程度上可缓解Si在循环过程中产生的体积效应。利用镁金属还原Si-O-C材料制备多孔Si/Si-O-C材料是一种可行的制备方法。     

离子束抛光加工矩形离轴非球面镜

采用一种简单的方法使用线性三轴离子束系统实现了矩形离轴非球面镜的抛光加工.根据离子束材料去除机理,分析了去除函数的法向材料去除特性,并且以去除函数束径、峰值去除速率和体积去除速率为指标,评价了入射角的小扰动鲁棒性.利用相关的分析和实验结果,对矩形离轴镜的抛光加工进行了合理的简化,并在自行研制的离子束抛光机床上进行了修形...     

POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION POINTERS FROM THE PAST: Lessons from the British Nuclear Weapons Program, 1952–69

Becoming a nuclear weapon state and sustaining a militarily credible nuclear weapons capability is far from trivial, especially for medium powers. Such a capability is demonstrated by much more than firing a first test or acquiring significant quantities of fissile material; capability is indicated by factors including weaponization, delivery of weapons, reliability and effectiveness of weapons and their delivery systems, fissile material availability, and nuclear and non-nuclear testing. Files in the British National Archives shed considerable light on the problems faced by the nuclear weapon program of the United Kingdom from 1952 through the late 1960s. The question is whether this experience is unique or if it instead offers insights into the potential problems faced by, or facing, other medium or aspiring nuclear weapon states. The proliferation-related topics highlighted include: fissile material production, nuclear testing, the first weapon, weapon delivery rates, non-nuclear testing, delivery platform problems, and long-term maintenance and capability sustainability. Further research could provide clearer insights.     

Deferred verification: the role of new verification technologies and approaches

ABSTRACT

Researchers have recently proposed a new approach to nuclear-arms-control verification, dubbed “deferred verification.” The concept forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and of nuclear weapons or components in classified form. To implement this concept, a state first divides its nuclear program into a closed segment and an open segment. The total fissile-material inventory in the closed segment, which includes the weapon complex, is known and declared with very high accuracy. Essentially no inspections take place in the closed segment. In contrast, inspectors have access to the open segment, which includes in particular the civilian nuclear sector. The fissile-material inventory in the open segment is known with less accuracy, but uncertainties can be reduced over time using nuclear-archaeology methods. Deferred verification relies primarily on established safeguards techniques and avoids many unresolved verification challenges, such as the need for information barriers for warhead confirmation measurements. At the same time, deferred verification faces some unique challenges. Here, we explore some of these challenges and offer possible solutions; to do so, we examine possible noncompliance strategies in which a state would seek to withhold a higher-than-declared inventory.