埋入式抗滑桩支护边坡稳定性分析

为研究埋入式抗滑桩在滑坡治理中的适用性,总结前人经验并经大量现场调查研究,提出埋入式抗滑桩支护的3种失效模式,即桩后滑体整体失稳、桩顶滑体越顶失稳和桩前滑体滑移失稳;并从失效模式入手,简化埋入式抗滑桩支护边坡稳定性分析模型。结合定点剪出的破坏假定,用传递系数法分别验算桩周3部分土体即桩后土体、桩顶土体和桩前土体的稳定性。最后在埋入式抗滑桩支护边坡稳定性分析模型的基础上,围绕滑体几何形态、滑面倾角、滑带及滑体力学性质等关键因素,对埋入式抗滑桩的适用条件进行探讨。研究表明:埋入式抗滑桩置于平缓段有利于其阻隔作用的发挥,保证桩前滑体的稳定性;置于滑体强度大于滑带强度的滑坡,有利于利用滑体较高的土工参数;置于坡面平缓的滑坡,有利于桩顶滑体的稳定。     

列车用复合材料阻燃性能研究

不同类别的阻燃剂配合使用能产生协效作用,大大提高阻燃效果。在甲基丙烯酸类不饱和聚酯树脂9001基体中,添加微囊化红磷/氢氧化铝/三氧化二锑/甲基膦酸二甲酯(MRP/Al(OH)3/Sb2O3/DMMP)阻燃剂体系,对其树脂体系固化物及玻璃纤维织物复合材料的力学性能和阻燃性能进行了实验研究,提出了一种有望用于列车复合材料大尺寸构件制造的性能优异、价格低廉的新体系。结果表明,当质量添加比例分别为12%MRP、50%Al(OH)3、2%Sb2O3时,树脂体系室温粘度100mPa.s左右,凝胶时间超过80min,适用于RTM和VIMP等大尺寸构件成型工艺;复合材料拉伸强度215.4MPa,弯曲强度177.15MPa,拉伸模量13.85GPa,弯曲模量13.36GPa,氧指数39.7。     

无人机配载弹射式导弹静稳定性分析

通过刚体飞行六自由度动力学方程建立弹射式导弹初始段无控飞行模型,并结合弹射装置动力模型和导弹发动机推力模型进行仿真计算。基于无控飞行模型和仿真结果分析了无人机配载弹射式导弹发射特性,在导弹初始飞行段对机弹分离安全性和导弹姿态控制要求进行了研究。对导弹不同静稳定度下的运动特性对比分析,分别给出了满足各种安全和控制要求的导弹静稳定度范围。进一步综合所有安全和姿态控制要求,得到了满足所有要求的最佳静稳定度。经过一个实例的仿真研究,结果表明建立的模型与所用到的方法是合理有效的。     

基于对偶四元数的航天器六自由度相对运动输入有界控制

利用对偶四元数的理论来分析航天器六自由度的相对运动,设计了一种考虑输入有界的姿轨一体化控制器。在介绍对偶数和对偶四元数的基础上推导六自由度相对运动的姿轨耦合模型;利用双曲正切函数绝对值小于1的特性来显式地构造有界控制器,分别设计两个相互耦合的自适应调节律来动态地改变控制器的输出,并基于李雅普诺夫稳定性理论严格证明了闭环系统的全局渐近稳定性;利用数学仿真实验来验证该控制器和控制力满足给定的约束条件,能够实现航天器六自由度相对运动的精确稳定控制,并且对模型参数不确定性和外界扰动具有鲁棒性。与其他方法相比,由该控制器计算得到的控制力矩器的收敛速度更快,输出的控制力矩和控制力的最大幅值更小,且消耗的能量也更少。     

带挠性附件双自旋卫星的 Liapunov 稳定准则

本文研究了带挠性附件双自旋卫星的姿态稳定性问题。假定挠性双自旋卫星由无内部活动部件的半刚性平台、半刚性转子以及固连于平台的挠性附件构成,选择姿态角和模态坐标表示的相对能量函数为Liapunov 函数,建立了挠性双自旋卫星姿态稳定性判据。     

湍流射流火焰中煤粉颗粒尺寸和结构的变化

采用湍流煤粉射流火焰模拟实际工业煤粉燃烧中的迅速热解,取样分析实验研究煤粉热解过程中颗粒尺寸和内部结构的变化。结果表明：在热解过程中煤粉颗粒体积发生了明显的膨胀,膨胀程度强烈地依赖于颗粒的初始尺寸和加热速率;热解时挥发份的迅速释放及煤的热塑性导致了颗粒内部的空心结构,这种结构有效地提高炭粒的燃烧速率。     

At war with social theory: Instrumental and communicative action in US military doctrine during the War on Terror

As US counterinsurgency campaigns draw to a close, doctrine for asymmetric warfare written during the War on Terror has come under heavy criticism. While many have argued that this shift to ‘winning hearts and minds’ is evidence that the United States is taking humanitarianism and nation-building seriously, others argue that a wide gap exists between US counterinsurgency doctrine and the protection of civilians afflicted by conflict. In this article, I show that the latter is true by comparing theories of instrumental and communicative action to US doctrine for operational design, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. I argue that these texts treat the people as an object to be manipulated for the achievement of pre-determined self-interested strategic goals rather than members of a community that jointly designs operations to fulfill shared objectives. However, US doctrine does contain communicative elements that, if prioritized, would better support humanitarian and state-building objectives otherwise subordinated in the War on Terror.     

EDITOR'S NOTE

This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to “low numbers” (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing “launch-on-warning” strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.