缩小国民收入分配差距和深化分配公平探析

国民收入分配公平是发展社会主义市场经济,建设和谐社会、小康社会的内在要求,而不合理的户籍制度、市场竞争体制以及监管制度缺陷,导致了贫富差距日益扩大。要实现共同富裕的基本目标,就必须加大改革力度,促进社会公平竞争,不断缩小收入分配差距,让全体人民共享发展成果。     

Strategic outsourcing under technology spillovers

We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM) compete in the finished goods market. The OEM can decide whether to outsource the intermediate good, a critical component for producing the finished good, from the CM or make in‐house production. Technology transition improves the CM's production efficiency, and it can take two different forms: a direct technology transfer from the OEM to the CM or technology spillovers through outsourcing from the OEM to the CM. We document the possibility of strategic outsourcing, that is, the CM supplies the intermediate good to the OEM when she is less efficient than the OEM's in‐house production. We find that technology spillovers can strengthen the incentive for strategic outsourcing. Furthermore, compared with direct technology transfers, outsourcing coupled with technology spillovers may generate more technology transition. Outsourcing is a particularly appropriate channel for implicit collusion when the OEM is not very efficient with the production of the intermediate good. Our results suggest that ex post competition on the finished goods can create room for ex ante collaboration and provide some implications on the OEM's outsourcing strategies when facing a competitive CM.© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 501–514, 2014     

A rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances∗

This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent‐seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two‐country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three‐country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent‐seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies’ interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium is computed.     

Should competing firms reveal their capacity?

In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

红外图像中海天线的提取

针对海空背景红外图像中海天线的提取问题,利用直线检测的思想,提出了Hough变换方法.仿真实验表明,Hough变换具有较好的抗背景干扰的能力,可很好地解决强背景干扰下海天线的提取问题.     

半无限大海水空间中水平电流元产生的电磁场计算

提出一种根据经典的Summerfield赫兹矢量来计算空气和海水中水平直流电流元在半无限大海水空间中所产生的电磁场的简单方法,并用J．R．Wait, P．R．Bannister和R．L．Dube的方法验证了用该方法推导出的电磁场表达式是正确的。     

某型飞机平尾轴疲劳断裂失效分析

采用台架试验装置对某型飞机平尾轴进行了疲劳试验,通过断口的观察分析、断口部位的金相分析、硬度检测、有限元结构应力分析,确定了平尾轴的失效模式,并对其断裂失效原因进行了分析。结果表明：平尾轴的断裂性质为疲劳断裂,裂纹源均起源于大轴简体内壁加工刀痕形成的沟槽处,变截面圆弧造成的结构应力集中和粗糙加工刀痕形成的附加应力集中是造成大轴疲劳断裂的主要原因。关键词：平尾轴;疲劳断裂;失效分析;应力集中     

Resale price maintenance contracts with retailer sales effort: Effect of flexibility and competition

In Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, the manufacturer specifies the resale price that retailers must charge to consumers. We study the role of using a RPM contract in a market where demand is influenced by retailer sales effort. First, it is well known that RPM alone does not provide incentive for the retailer to use adequate sales effort and some form of quantity fixing may be needed to achieve channel coordination. However, when the market potential of the product is uncertain, RPM with quantity fixing is a rigid contract form. We propose and study a variety of RPM contracts with quantity fixing that offer different forms of flexibility including pricing flexibility and quantity flexibility. Second, we address a long‐time debate in both academia and practice on whether RPM is anti‐competitive in a market when two retailers compete on both price and sales effort. We show that depending on the relative intensity of price competition and sales effort competition, RPM may lead to higher or lower retail prices compared to a two‐part tariff contract, which specifies a wholesale price and a fixed fee. Further, the impact of RPM on price competition and sales effort competition is always opposite to each other. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements

When selling complementary products, manufacturers can often benefit from considering the resulting cross‐market interdependencies. Although using independent retailers makes it difficult to internalize these positive externalities, the ensuing double marginalization can mitigate within‐market competition. We use standard game theoretic analysis to determine optimal distribution channel strategies (through independent retailers or integrated) for competing manufacturers who participate in markets for complements. Our results suggest that a firm's optimal channel choice is highly dependent on its competitive positioning. A firm with a competitive advantage in terms of product characteristics (customer preferences) or production capabilities (cost) might benefit from selling through company‐controlled stores, allowing coordinated pricing across the two markets, whereas a less competitive firm might be better off using independent channel intermediaries to mitigate price competition. We consider two scenarios depending on whether the two firms make their distribution channel decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Although firms are unlikely to make such decisions at exactly the same instant, the simultaneous model also serves as a proxy for the scenario where firms decide sequentially, but where they cannot observe each other's strategic channel choices. For the sequential case, we find that the sequence of entry can have tremendous impact on the two firms'profits; whereas in some cases, the first mover can achieve substantially higher profits, we find that when the two markets are of sufficiently different size and only loosely related, a firm with a competitive advantage might be better off as a follower. Interestingly, our results suggest that, when the markets are of rather similar size, both firms are better off if they enter the industry sequentially. In those cases, the first entrant has incentive to reveal its planned channel strategies, and the follower has incentive to seek out and consider this information. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

自动喷水灭火系统喷头布置探讨

依据《自动喷水灭火系统设计规范》(GB50084-2001),结合实际工程设计经验,就规范对喷头布置的一般规定在具体工程设计中可能存在的矛盾和问题进行了分析,并提出了具体解决办法。