基于储备模式选择的战备物资分类研究

对战备物资进行分类是选择储备模式的基础和重要前提。把战备物资分类问题抽象为战备物资的军事性和经济性评价问题,设计了物资分类评价指标体系,并对部分指标进行了说明;利用层次分析法确定各指标的权重,运用专家打分法完成指标打分,并对专家打分程序进行优化,增强战备物资分类的可操作性,由军事性和经济性两方面的得分确定战备物资所属类别;最后通过算例证明了分类方法的有效性。     

From Rebel to Quasi-State: Governance,Diplomacy and Legitimacy in the Midst of Afghanistan’s Wars (1979–2001)

Abstract

How do warlords build their legitimacy and eventually exert authority? The case of Afghan leader Ahmad Shah Massoud demonstrates that warlords do not only build legitimacy through the internal provision of goods and services to the population under their control, but also build their legitimacy by projecting authority externally, through the development of their own form of diplomacy. In this article, I show that warlords develop complex and complementary legitimisation strategies that extend beyond their territorial realms to include consequential relationships with foreign actors.     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance

Abstract

Terms like ‘support’ and ‘collaboration’ are often used interchangeably to denote a loose set of acts or attitudes that benefit non-state armed groups (NSAGs). However, these terms are seldom defined, and the alternatives available to civilians are rarely identified. Moreover, existing approaches overlook that the interaction between civilians and NSAGs is often one between ruler and ruled, which makes obedience and resistance central. This paper proposes to conceptualize the choices available to civilians as forms of cooperation and non-cooperation, offers a typology, and discusses the implications for theory building on civilian and NSAG behavior, and on the functioning of armed social orders.     

科学管理、精益管理与精确作战工程保障研究

设计是作战行动筹划的重要步骤,精确工程保障需要对工程保障行动进行精密的设计和精确管理与控制。科学管理采用科学实验的方法,通过劳动方法标准化和差别计件工资制度,有效提高了工作效率,其基本原理经过百余年的实际检验,被证明是一个成熟有效的管理方法。借鉴科学管理理论,需要对工程保障行动进行动作研究,进而研究工程保障行动的作业标准,以期提高其保障效率。精益管理是在科学管理在新的历史时期的发展与改进,它使用了准时制、零库存、均衡生产、持续改进等先进的管理理念和六西格玛管理、成组技术等先进技术,为基于信息系统体系作战的工程保障能力生成提供了有益的借鉴,可加深我们对精确工程保障的理解,促进精确工程保障研究的可操作性。     

中国近现代心理战历史沿革研究

信息技术的飞速发展和广泛运用为心理战的实施开辟了新的更加广阔的空间。当前,拓展深化军事斗争准备和完成多样化军事任务对军队心理战建设提出了新的任务和要求。研究中国近现代心理战的历史沿革发展,特别是辛亥革命时期、土地革命时期、抗日战争时期、解放战争时期、抗美援朝时期中心理战的演变过程,总结经验教训,对于提高信息时代军队心理作战能力有重要启示作用。     

战争制胜机理何以发生变化

信息化战争已经登上了当今世界的舞台,这是军事领域发生的革命性变化。在信息化战争条件下,传统的战争制胜机理发生的新的变化。     

The essence of war: French armies and small war in the Low Countries (1672–1697)

In the late seventeenth century during the Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Nine Years War (1688–1697), French armies relied on small war for the accomplishment of essential tasks and as part of an overall strategy of exhausting their opponents in the Low Countries. The purposes of small war included the imposition of contributions on enemy populations, the destruction of the enemy base of operations, blockades of fortresses, and the general support of campaign armies. The expression ‘small war’ in the French language appeared with growing frequency in the 1690s. Small war can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the characteristics of these wars. The limited policy goals of Louis XIV the king of France required a strategy that minimised risk and accomplished the goal of reducing if not eliminating the Spanish presence in the Low Countries that bordered the north of France. As French armies increased in size during this period, the demand for specialists at small increased in order to provide security and ensure supply. Small war in the late seventeenth century was thus not ideologically motivated insurgency, but in the minds of French commanders an essential component of strategy and the nature of war.     

The insurgency of the Vendée

The insurrection in the Vendée combined open warfare with the methods of petite guerre, ambushing French republican soldiers and cutting their supply lines to Paris. These tactics, when combined with the hatreds generated by a civil war, go far to explain to the cruelty of the conflict in the west and the depth of the hatreds it engendered. In republican eyes the use of guerrilla tactics was unjust and illegitimate, and they denounced their adversaries as common criminals and brigands, portraying them as backward, superstitious, even as subhuman, and in the process justified the savage repression they unleashed against them.     

Initiating insurgencies abroad: French plans to ‘chouannise’ Britain and Ireland, 1793–1798

Secret French plans to launch guerrilla-style raids on the British Isles devised in the spring of 1796 were referred to as ‘chouanneries’. The name and concept behind these small-war operations were modelled on the irregular tactics used by the Chouan rebels in the Vendée, which the French state army had brutally quashed, but some wished to transfer into their institutional practice. Part of France's ongoing military strategy in the war against Britain, which included fomenting insurrection in Ireland, these irregular operations were to be manned partially by pardoned deserters and released convicts and prisoners of war. Of these, only Tate's brief invasion of Wales in 1797 was realised, but the surviving plans provide insightful historical lessons into an Anglophobic mindset shared by a small network of practitioners and policy deciders on the effectiveness of such shock and awe tactics. Largely motivated by the desire to take revenge for Britain's support of counter-revolutionaries in the Vendée, these plans could more aptly be referred to as counter-‘chouanneries’.