Taking advantage of insurgencies: effective policies of state-sponsorship

Taking insurgency sponsorship as an instrument states have available for achieving foreign policy objectives, I consider how state-sponsors could best manipulate their support to maximize control of the proxy group. Building on research that models the state-sponsor–insurgent relationship using a principal–agent framework, I identify two key vulnerabilities to which the state-sponsor is exposed: adverse selection and agency slack. As an original contribution to the literature on state-sponsorship of insurgency, I articulate reasons why certain forms of support would be most conducive to overcoming these problems and illustrate how South Africa and Iran used those kinds of support to influence the behavior of their proxies, RENAMO and Hezbollah. Additionally, I consider how this principal–agent analysis of insurgency sponsorship also could apply when the principal is an international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda. Finally, I address the relevance of these ideas to two contemporary conflicts taking place in Syria and the Congo.     

基于移动代理的电子商务安全方案

将移动代理技术引入电子商务具有很多的优势,同时也对电子商务的安全性问题提出了新的挑战。文中构建了一个基于移动代理的电子商务模型,分析了模型中存在的安全问题,提出了一个改进的电子商务安全方案.改进方案采取分层的结构,从不同的层次保证移动代理的安全和电子商务信息流和资金流的安全.实验结果表明,该方案是切实可行的。     

Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry

We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007     

基于信息粒化理论的主体间任务分配方法

有效的任务分配对于多主体系统通过主体间协作完成其使命任务是非常重要的。基于信息粒化理论提出了一种新的解决方法,任务分配过程包括两个阶段:主体和任务粒化阶段和粒内规划阶段。给出了主体和任务粒化阶段的数学表示和基于遗传算法的求解方法。案例分析和对比试验表明本文的方法具有较好的性能。     

面向战场的多通道人机交互模型

现代战场上的信息来源繁多、瞬息万变,这对战场指挥决策提出新的要求,而现有人机交互系统未能向指挥人员提供高效、自然、全面的人机交互。为解决该问题提出一种面向战场指挥决策的多通道多智能体交互模型,针对战场不同的领域,实现"以人为中心"的人机交互,使指挥人员能够自然、无障碍地将交互信息准确传递给系统,具有很好的可靠性和可扩展性。     

多Agent系统中Agent计算的能力理论

能力是规范Ａｇｅｎｔ的一个重要抽象概念。本文提出了规划树概念以刻划在动态、不确定的多Ａ－ｇｅｎｔ系统中Ａｇｅｎｔ如何通过对其规划进行合理、有效的组织来实现其任务、维护某些条件。基于规划树概念,本文给出了能力概念的形式化语义定义,获取和描述了它的一些重要属性。     

MAS中Agent属性冲突形式化描述及消解系统研究

由于多智能体系统(MAS)中各个Agent具有自治性、分布性和异构性等特征,导致MAS内部经常会出现冲突现象。首先,运用数学方法对MAS中存在的属性冲突进行形式化描述,并将其分为6类,针对每类冲突提出了相应的消解对策。其次,对属性冲突智能消解系统(AACIRS)流程框架进行了分析,并在此基础上建立了AACIRS系统,实现了MAS中属性冲突的消解。从而为解决MAS中Agent属性冲突提供了解决方案,为MAS的稳定运行提供了技术保证。     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

信息化战场中基于智能体聚类的信息处理

研究了信息战条件下信息的处理问题,通过分析信息化战场条件下战场环境和人员的特点,提出了一种基于智能体聚类的信息处理方法,通过该方法来实现战场信息的通信、传输、交换从而协助指挥员决策。该方法的特点是可以根据战场的环境进行聚类,降低了信息的复杂度从而保证及时有效地传递消息。该方法通过智能体平台实现,具有一定智能性并减少了指挥员的决策难度,对指挥自动化而言是一个很好的实例。     

低活性粉煤灰在混凝土中的应用研究

为提高低活性粉煤灰在混凝土中的利用，依据《水泥胶砂强度检验方法》和《普通混凝土力学性能试验方法标准》，通过复掺CaO、CaSO4及防水剂、减水剂等材料对低活性粉煤灰进行了活化实验研究和混凝土性能测试研究，试验结果表明：经过活化处理后的粉煤灰重新获得了活性，提高了混凝土的强度、降低了泌水率、减小了坍落度经时的损失，从而有助于低活性粉煤灰的开发利用。