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In many practical multiserver queueing systems, servers not only serve randomly arriving customers but also work on the secondary jobs with infinite backlog during their idle time. In this paper, we propose a c‐server model with a two‐threshold policy, denoted by (e d), to evaluate the performance of this class of systems. With such a policy, when the number of idle servers has reached d (<c), then e (<d) idle agents will process secondary jobs. These e servers keep working on the secondary jobs until they find waiting customers exist in the system at a secondary job completion instant. Using the matrix analytic method, we obtain the stationary performance measures for evaluating different (e, d) policies. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007. 相似文献
63.
A. Garnaev 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):109-114
This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λi (μi) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that pi(1 ? exp(?λixi)) (pi(1 ? exp(?μiyi))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort xi (yi) applied at point i where pi ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q1 and Player 2 gets q2 where q1 + q2 ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
64.
In this paper we consider the capacitated multi‐facility Weber problem with the Euclidean, squared Euclidean, and ?p‐distances. This problem is concerned with locating m capacitated facilities in the Euclidean plane to satisfy the demand of n customers with the minimum total transportation cost. The demand and location of each customer are known a priori and the transportation cost between customers and facilities is proportional to the distance between them. We first present a mixed integer linear programming approximation of the problem. We then propose new heuristic solution methods based on this approximation. Computational results on benchmark instances indicate that the new methods are both accurate and efficient. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2006 相似文献
65.
Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
66.
针对软件构件可靠性和费用分配问题,给出一种可靠性和费用分配最优模型。文中将软件系统可靠性定义为软件构件失效密度、操作剖面、构件使用矩阵以及软件无失效运行时间的函数,描述了费用最优模型的建立和利用非线性规划理论求解模型的步骤,有效地处理了带有复杂计算的目标函数和约束条件的可靠性和费用最优分配问题。计算实例表明,利用该模型进行可靠性和费用分配是可行的。 相似文献
67.
机内测试虚警问题是影响系统完好性和使用保障费用的重要因素。针对环境因素导致的虚警问题,设计了时间环境应力测量装置,应用支持向量机的小样本学习优点,建立虚警与环境因素的关联关系,应用隐马尔可夫模型的连续动态信号处理能力,描述系统长期工作历程中虚警的发生规律,提出了基于时间环境应力测量装置-支持向量机-隐马尔可夫模型的机内测试智能降虚警方法。最后,在某型直升机航向姿态系统上进行了应用与验证,试验结果表明:该方法有效识别出了机内测试的虚警。 相似文献
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针对导弹防御中可能出现的有源假目标欺骗干扰,从雷达数据处理的层次上进行了真假目标鉴别研究。利用自由段有源假目标与实体目标在动力学模型上的本质差异,提出了动力学模型匹配系数的概念,推导出理想条件下的动力学模型匹配系数的解析表达式。在弹道目标跟踪的基础上设计了有源假目标鉴别算法。结合中程弹道,进行了真假目标鉴别的计算机仿真实验。实验结果表明,所提算法能有效鉴别有源假目标。 相似文献
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两点源诱偏系统是应用有源干扰的方式,利用反辐射导弹(ARM)本身的缺陷来对反辐射导弹的导引头进行干扰,从而达到保护主战雷达目的的一种有源干扰系统。主要从反辐射导弹的基本原理和有源诱偏的概念入手,对两点源诱偏系统进行理论推导、数学建模、布站设想,后引入毁伤概率指标对各种布站方式进行分类、仿真,对每一种仿真结果进行分析、评估,再把各种分析结果加以比较,从中找出最佳的布站方式。最后利用以上的分析结果,得出几点有用的结论。 相似文献