瞄准式战斗部瞄准策略研究

对不同的瞄准点,瞄准式战斗部对目标毁伤效果不同,为此提出了适用于瞄准式战斗部的瞄准策略,保证了对目标较高的毁伤概率和较好的毁伤效果,解决了起爆之前战斗部的定位问题。     

非相参三点源有源诱偏下ARM弹着点研究

非相参多点源诱偏技术是对抗反辐射导弹(ARM)的有效手段。以ARM目标分辨的二分组理论和双点源诱偏的仿真结果为依据,对等功率三点源诱偏的2种经典布局的ARM落点整体分布进行预测。通过对ARM落点和系统被击中概率曲线的分析及拟合处理,验证了预测的正确性及系统被击中概率与占地面积的相关性,为通信辐射源抗ARM的布设提供一定的参考。     

基于灰色神经网络的装甲部队油料消耗预测

油料消耗量的精确预测直接影响装甲部队后勤保障能力的提升,而传统预测模型精度不高,应用范围也有一定的局限,难以满足信息化战争精确保障的需要。提出一种装甲部队油料消耗预测的组合模型,对历史油料消耗数据和油耗影响因素进行统计分析,求出各影响因素与油耗量的关联度作为权重系数;通过改进GM(1,1)模型预测某部队下一次军事行动的油耗量;用GM(1,1)模型的预测值、加权后的各影响因素值和油耗实际值训练网络,对下一次想定的军事行动油耗量进行预测。通过平均相对误差计算表明,组合预测模型比单一的GM(1,1)模型预测精度高,能够较好地指导部队进行下一步的油料供管工作。     

威布尔分布的战术导弹可靠性试验信息融合方法

针对战术导弹可靠性试验小子样问题,提出了基于威布尔分布,利用小概率原理,针对不同试验环境下试验数据的融合方法。该方法扩大了战术导弹可靠性试验的统计子样,提高了可靠性评定的可信度。     

Landau相变中的自由能

Landau用序参量的幂级数展开来表示相变温度附近的自由能,强调对称性与序参量在相变中的作用.正确书写自由能形式,可以计算可能相的温度曲线,得到关于序参量的方程,从而推知系统的结构.     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues

This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.