微信:网络舆论战的新利器

微信以惊人的速度发展,成为时下最热门的社交信息平台和绝大多数手机用户的一种生活方式。微信是舆论生成和扩散的重要平台,其多元化的信息、多渠道的传播以及创新的特点,为网络舆论战带来了全新的机遇。把握微信的信息传播特点,有效针对特定对象人群,采取积极主动的方式开展网络舆论宣传与自我防御,使微信成为舆论战发展的有力工具,是新时期开展网络舆论战的必然选择。     

The German wars of liberation 1807–1815: The restrained insurgency

In the Age of Napoleon, ‘small wars’ and ‘revolutionary war’ were closely connected. There were, however, different strands of this phenomenon: speaking professionally, conservative officers condemned small wars as an irregular regression to previous less disciplined forms of warfare. The Prussian state continually tried to discipline and regulate spontaneous risings. Yet the irregular character of small wars offered the opportunities for a less complex way of fighting, thus enabling the arming of the ‘people’ to fight. Individual undertakings, such as Ferdinand von Schill's doomed campaign in 1809, were designed to spark off a general popular uprising. But they were cheered by many and supported by few. Meanwhile, Neidhardt von Gneisenau conceived guerrilla-style Landsturm home-defence forces, which were designed for an irregular people's war. These concepts were put into practice in the ‘war of freedom’ – or ‘war of liberation’ – in 1813. Eventually both the mobilisation and the tactics remained regular, however, despite the emphatic appeal to a national ‘people's war’.     

Beyond balancing? Intrastate conflict and US grand strategy

Grand strategic theorists share an historical emphasis on interstate conflict, yet in contrast to the more frequent intrastate conflicts, these represent only 7 of the some 273 US military deployments since 1900. We argue that these intrastate conflicts limit the utility of regional balances of power in mitigating forms of conflict that the US may consider inimical to its national security interests. When considering potential changes to US force posture and grand strategy, American coercive statecraft should be theorised along a broader strategic continuum encompassing the full range of conflict.     

基于蝙蝠算法的多目标战备物资调运决策优化

战备物资的调运是部队后勤工作中十分重要的一环,面对复杂多变的战场环境,战备物资调运必须进行科学合理的决策优化。然而现有战备物资调运模型的优化模型较为复杂,如果涉及较多供应点和目标要求则不易实现。针对涉及多个调运点的多目标战备物资调运问题,提出一种新的决策优化模型,利用启发式蝙蝠算法进行优化计算,发挥出蝙蝠算法易于实现、性能优越的特点,较好地解决了涉及较多供应点的多目标战备物资调运决策优化问题,并结合一个仿真算例,证明该方法相对于其他方法更具简易性和有效性。     

关于高技术力量平战一体国防动员的思考

坚持向科技创新要战斗力,落实到国防动员建设领域,就是要紧紧围绕党在新形势下的强军目标,积极适应现代战争形态新变化、世界军事变革新趋势、总体国家安全新要求和军队使命任务新拓展,加强高技术力量平战一体国防动员,搭建起高技术力量在经济与军事、地方与军队、潜力与实力、平时与战时的桥梁和纽带,全面提升国防动员战时应战、急时应急、平时服务能力,为保障军队能打仗、打胜仗提供强大科技支撑。     

The subversion of the Bulgarian defence system – the Russian way

Russia has long been pursuing an intended and calculated policy of keeping enough influence in Bulgaria in order to have control over national decisions. Together with the economic, energy, political and information tools used by Russia in its hybrid war against Bulgaria and in its bid to achieve an enduring “state capture,” defence is also a distinct target of Russian subversion now. A list of noticeable subversive actions with tangible effects can be summarised, ranging from fuelling division and manipulating public opinion, preventing the strengthening of the NATO position in the Black Sea, sabotaging defence reform to various options of subverting the modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and seeking new ways to keep legacy Soviet military equipment in operation as long as possible. This issue must be urgently addressed both nationally and in NATO.     

分兵集火、凡船皆战——浅析美军“分布式杀伤”概念

通过梳理美军"分布式杀伤"概念的提出背景、提出过程、内涵意义,阐述了"分布式杀伤"的三条制胜之道,即符合海战客观环境、符合科技进步方向、符合战争演变趋势。此外,文章还分析了"分布式杀伤"实际执行过程中的几大难点和缺陷,包括指挥控制问题、舰船能力问题、成本和后勤补给问题、防御有效性问题。     

Approximations and empirics for stochastic war equations

The article develops a theorem which shows that the Lanchester linear war equations are not in general equal to the Kolmogorov linear war equations. The latter are time‐consuming to solve, and speed is important when a large number of simulations must be run to examine a large parameter space. Run times are provided, where time is a scarce factor in warfare. Four time efficient approximations are presented in the form of ordinary differential equations for the expected sizes and variances of each group, and the covariance, accounting for reinforcement and withdrawal of forces. The approximations are compared with “exact” Monte Carlo simulations and empirics from the WWII Ardennes campaign. The band spanned out by plus versus minus the incremented standard deviations captures some of the scatter in the empirics, but not all. With stochastically varying combat effectiveness coefficients, a substantial part of the scatter in the empirics is contained. The model is used to forecast possible futures. The implications of increasing the combat effectiveness coefficient governing the size of the Allied force, and injecting reinforcement to the German force during the Campaign, are evaluated, with variance assessments. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Size Still Matters: Explaining Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency Victory over the Tamil Tigers

The military effectiveness literature has largely dismissed the role of material preponderance in favor of strategic interaction theories. The study of counterinsurgency, in which incumbent victory is increasingly rare despite material superiority, has also turned to other strategic dynamics explanations like force employment, leadership, and insurgent/adversary attributes. Challenging these two trends, this paper contends that even in cases of counterinsurgency, material preponderance remains an essential—and at times the most important—factor in explaining battlefield outcomes and effectiveness. To test this, the paper turns to the case of the Sri Lankan state’s fight against the Tamil Tiger insurgency, a conflict which offers rich variation over time across six periods and over 25 years. Drawing on evidence from historical and journalistic accounts, interviews, memoirs, and field research, the paper demonstrates that material preponderance accounts for variation in military effectiveness and campaign outcomes (including military victory in the final campaign) better than strategic explanations. Additionally, a new quantitative data-set assembled on annual loss-exchange ratios demonstrates the superiority of materialist explanations above those of skill, human capital, and regime type.     

Brinkmanship,not COIN,in Pakistan’s post-9/11 Internal War

Politics is critical to making sense of Pakistani successes and failures in dealing with non-state armed groups. This includes domestic political currents; regional political currents; and the global impetus of the post-9/11 era. How these currents overlap renders to any reading of insurgency in Pakistan real complexity. This article engages with this complexity rather than shirking from it. Its hypothesis is that while the insurgency bordering Afghanistan has been an epicentre of Pakistani military efforts to fight the Taliban, this theatre is in of itself insufficiently inclusive to grasp the nature of Pakistan’s security challenges and its consequent responses.