Dynamic pricing under first order Markovian competition

We evaluate the effect of competition on prices, profits, and consumers' surplus in multiperiod, finite horizon, dynamic pricing settings. In our base model, a single myopic consumer visits two competing retailers, who offer identical goods, in a (first order Markovian) probabilistic fashion—if the posted price exceeds the consumer's valuation for the good, he returns to the same store in the following period with a certain probability. We find that even a small reduction in the return probability from one—which corresponds to the monopoly case at which prices decline linearly—is sufficient to revert the price decline from a linear into an exponential shape. Each retailer's profit is particularly sensitive to changes in his return probability when it is relatively high, and is maximized under complete loyalty behavior (i.e., return probability is one). On the other hand, consumer surplus is maximized under complete switching behavior (i.e., return probability is zero). In the presence of many similar consumers, the insights remain valid. We further focus on the extreme scenario where all consumers follow a complete switching behavior, to derive sharp bounds, and also consider the instance where, in this setting, myopic consumers are replaced with strategic consumers. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Alleviating time inconsistent behaviors via a competition scheme

Under quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, the valuation of a payoff falls relatively rapidly for earlier delay periods, but then falls more slowly for longer delay periods. When the salespersons with quasi‐hyperbolic discounting consider the product sale problem, they would exert less effort than their early plan, thus resulting in losses of future profit. We propose a winner‐takes‐all competition to alleviate the above time inconsistent behaviors of the salespersons, and allow the company to maximize its revenue by choosing an optimal bonus. To evaluate the effects of the competition scheme, we define the group time inconsistency degree of the salespersons, which measures the consequence of time inconsistent behaviors, and two welfare measures, the group welfare of the salespersons and the company revenue. We show that the competition always improves the group welfare and the company revenue as long as the company chooses to run the competition in the first place. However, the effect on group time inconsistency degree is mixed. When the optimal bonus is moderate (extreme high), the competition motivates (over‐motivates) the salesperson to work hard, thus alleviates (worsens) the time inconsistent behaviors. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 357–372, 2017     

未来30年太空安全发展趋势及影响

“太空安全战略”专题编者按 组稿专家：杨乐平（国防科技大学空天科学学院教授、博士生导师） 近年来,以美国重建太空司令部与天军独立为标志,国际太空领域战略竞争与军事对抗日益加剧,太空前所未有地应用于军事与安全,太空安全也受到了前所未有的挑战。为了解未来太空安全发展和主要国家太空安全战略动向,深化太空安全战略研究,《国防科技》编辑部于2021年6月启动“太空安全战略”专题征文活动,国内相关学者积极投稿,经专家遴选,本期发表入选稿件6篇。来稿内容涵盖未来30年太空安全发展预测、美国太空安全最新发展、俄罗斯太空安全政策、欧盟太空安全政策、日本太空安全战略以及印度太空力量发展等主题,较为全面地反映了当前国际太空安全领域的最新发展与战略动向。从长远看,随着地球以外人类活动的增加、太空新经济蓬勃发展和太空创造财富规模不断扩大,水平大幅提升,太空将超越陆、海、空成为国家安全最重要的领域。从这个意义上讲,太空安全战略研究学术价值与影响较大,值得高度关注。     

中美网络空间的博弈与竞争

随着中美实力差距不断缩小和信息技术的发展与扩散,网络安全成为中美新的竞争点和摩擦点,中美在网络安全问题上展开新一轮的博弈,具体体现为网络空间治理权之争、中美网络安全战略博弈和网络技术优势的夺取。     

搞好数学建模 促进数学教学

分析我校数学建模工作中的成功经验 ,找出不足 ,探索新路 ,使我校数学教学工作更上一层楼。     

一种改进的指纹图像局部方向场匹配方法

指纹方向场真实地反映了指纹图像中本质的纹理特征,包括了指纹的基本形状、结构和走势。定义了局部方向场图像的描述方法,可以根据纹理信息有效地描述并区分不同的细节点。在低质量指纹图像,特别是存在较严重非线性形变的指纹图像中,细节点方向属性不够可靠,使得以细节点对作为参考对齐局部方向场图像的方法效果不佳。提出一种改进的局部方向场图像对齐和匹配方法,能够明显改善局部对齐效果,提高局部匹配的准确性,从而更加有效地区分对应和不对应细节点。实验结果验证了提出方法的有效性。     

“法条竞合”若干问题研究

"法条竞合"在我国刑事立法中普遍存在,其理论比较复杂.法条竞合的概念与种类、法律性质以及法条竞合的适用原则等问题,目前在我国刑法理论界尚无统一定论.理论上对这些问题进行深入研究、探讨,有助于在司法实践中准确选择适用法条.     

浅谈《孙子兵法》与竞争智慧

孙子有备无患的军事思想，早已成为现代竞争领域的指导原则之一。每个人都有非常强烈的成功欲望，这样的人生，是一个永不停息的决策过程。从事什么样的工作，怎样做才能使自己在竞争中立于不败之地。《孙子兵法》告诉我们：人生竞争有策略。     

缩小国民收入分配差距和深化分配公平探析

国民收入分配公平是发展社会主义市场经济,建设和谐社会、小康社会的内在要求,而不合理的户籍制度、市场竞争体制以及监管制度缺陷,导致了贫富差距日益扩大。要实现共同富裕的基本目标,就必须加大改革力度,促进社会公平竞争,不断缩小收入分配差距,让全体人民共享发展成果。     

Strategic outsourcing under technology spillovers

We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM) compete in the finished goods market. The OEM can decide whether to outsource the intermediate good, a critical component for producing the finished good, from the CM or make in‐house production. Technology transition improves the CM's production efficiency, and it can take two different forms: a direct technology transfer from the OEM to the CM or technology spillovers through outsourcing from the OEM to the CM. We document the possibility of strategic outsourcing, that is, the CM supplies the intermediate good to the OEM when she is less efficient than the OEM's in‐house production. We find that technology spillovers can strengthen the incentive for strategic outsourcing. Furthermore, compared with direct technology transfers, outsourcing coupled with technology spillovers may generate more technology transition. Outsourcing is a particularly appropriate channel for implicit collusion when the OEM is not very efficient with the production of the intermediate good. Our results suggest that ex post competition on the finished goods can create room for ex ante collaboration and provide some implications on the OEM's outsourcing strategies when facing a competitive CM.© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 501–514, 2014