Excess procurement strategies by a dominant buyer under constrained supply

Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.     

如何增强专业报刊的可读性

结合消防报刊的实际 ,从报刊的思想性、可信性、知识性、贴近性、短捷性、趣味性等方面论述了如何更新观念 ,大胆创新 ,增强专业报刊的可读性 ,以便在激烈竞争的报刊界吸引和赢得更多的读者。     

Free riding in a multi‐channel supply chain

Free riding in a multichannel supply chain occurs when one retail channel engages in the customer service activities necessary to sell a product, while another channel benefits from those activities by making the final sale. Although free riding is, in general, considered to have a negative impact on supply chain performance, certain recent industry practices suggest an opposite view: a manufacturer may purposely induce free riding by setting up a high‐cost, customer service‐oriented direct store to allow consumers to experience the product, anticipating their purchase at a retail store. This article examines how the free riding phenomenon affects a manufacturer's supply chain structure decision when there are fixed plus incremental variable costs for operating the direct store. We consider factors such as the effort required to find and buy the product at a retail store after visiting the direct store, the existence of competing products in the market, and the extent of consumer need to obtain direct‐store service. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Traffic channeling under uncertain conversion rates on e-commerce platforms

Traffic is the lifeblood of every e-commerce platform. The question of how to channel traffic to merchants operating on a platform lies at the heart of platform management. We consider a platform on which two independent merchants sell their products. Merchants compete on inventory in the sense that some of the unmet demand at one merchant will spill over to the other. The platform channels traffic based on products' conversion rates to maximize the total sale on the platform. We show that traffic channeling plays three roles. First, it allows more efficient allocation of traffic; that is, the merchant with a high conversion rate is given a higher priority in receiving traffic. Second, it allows the platform to control demand spillover between the merchants to maximize total sales. The platform either facilitates or prevents demand spillover, depending on product substitutability. Third, traffic channeling intensifies competition between the merchants and hence increases the total inventory. More efficient allocation of traffic and the increase in inventory increase sales inequality between the merchants. In contrast, demand spillover decreases sales inequality. While the platform always benefits from traffic channeling, the merchants do not benefit when their products are moderately substitutable. Interestingly, when the two products are owned and sold by the same merchant, the opposite happens–traffic channeling always benefits the merchant but may hurt the platform. Our study provides a basis for informed discussions on how platforms should channel traffic in response to conversion rates, and how traffic channeling affects the welfare of merchants and platforms.     

How to deal with consumers who group to request a discount?

We investigate operations impacts of consumer‐initiated group buying (CGB), whereby consumers voluntarily form buying groups to negotiate bulk deals with retailers. This differs from regular purchasing whereby consumers visit retailers individually and pay posted prices. Upon the visit by group consumers, a retailer decides to forgo or satisfy their demand in its entirety. Turned down by a retailer, group consumers continue to visit other retailers. In the case where their group effort fails to conclude a deal, some group consumers switch to individual purchasing provided they receive a non‐negative utility by doing so. Even after a successful group event, the group consumers who forgo the event out of utility concern may switch to individual purchasing as well. Retailer competition, group size, and the chance that group consumers switch to individual purchasing upon unsatisfaction are crucial to how retailers adjust operations to deal with CGB. With retailer competition, the rise of CGB results in every consumer paying the same reduced price when group size is small but makes group consumers pay more than by purchasing individually when group size is large. This has mixed consequences on the profits for retailers in both absolute and relative terms.     

Stability in a general oligopoly model

We analyze a general but parsimonious price competition model for an oligopoly in which each firm offers any number of products. The demand volumes are general piecewise affine functions of the full price vector, generated as the “regular” extension of a base set of affine functions. The model specifies a product assortment, along with their prices and demand volumes, in contrast to most commonly used demand models. We identify a fully best response operator which is monotonically increasing so that the market converges to a Nash equilibrium, when firms dynamically adjust their prices, as best responses to their competitors' prices, at least when starting in one of two price regions. Moreover, geometrically fast convergence to a common equilibrium can be guaranteed for an arbitrary starting point, under an additional condition for the price sensitivity matrix.     

What U.S. Navy strategists and defense planners should think about in the era of maritime great power competition

ABSTRACT

For the first time in a generation, the US Navy finds itself in an era of great power competition. As US naval strategists and defense planners begin to organise materially and conceptually to confront the strategic and operational-level challenges posed by China and Russia, what should they keep in mind? What should frame their thinking? Absorbed with the day-to-day tasks associated with managing how the fleet is being built, operated, and rationalised, these busy officers and civilians seldom can step back and gain some perspective on fundamental aspects of the security environment and relate those to naval purpose. To that end, this article provides a primer on what to keep in mind and how to think in an era of maritime great power competition.     

基于科学计量的机器学习技术发展评估分析

机器学习是通过数据训练使机器获取新的知识和技能的计算机技术，是人工智能技术的核心和前沿领域之一。本文以Web of Science?核心合集收录的机器学习领域相关SCI论文和incoPat全球专利数据库收录的机器学习领域相关专利为数据源，运用科学计量方法对文献数据和专利数据进行时间、地域和机构分布分析，展示了机器学习领域研究实力的分布情况，并对机器学习的发展趋势进行了分析；然后利用主题聚类分析方法及可视化软件VOSviewer，挖掘出机器学习领域的关键技术、技术热点；最后对结果进行了总结分析，以期为我国机器学习发展布局提供参考和借鉴。     

基于兵棋推演的赛事设计与组织

为了将基于兵棋推演的各类赛事活动组织的更加合理、规范和标准化，首先简述了组织兵棋推演活动所需的基本条件，而后通过大量实践经验，就如何组织赛事活动中所涉及的主要内容进行逐一的过程化设计描述，最后从推演准备、推演实施和复盘总结三个方面阐述了赛事活动的组织与实施，为今后从事相关工作的组织和人员提供一种可靠方法。