India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.     

The Zimbabwe people’s revolutionary army military operations in Makonde district and the attack on Salisbury’s fuel storage tanks, 1965-1979

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army operations in Mashonaland West province with particular reference to Makonde District during the country’s war of liberation. Despite the growing literature on ZAPU and ZPRA in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation there is little that has been written concerning the operations of ZPRA guerrillas in Mashonaland provinces. Guided by evidence drawn from secondary and primary sources the article further asserts that ZPRA adopted a four pronged strategy in Makonde District. This strategy in part was hinged on the politicization of the population on the one hand and annihilation of the enemy forces, attrition and manoeuvre warfare on the other. Again, the article argues that ZPRA guerrillas attempted to capture Salisbury (Harare) in order to conquer the Rhodesian Security Forces’ centre of gravity. It was hoped that the capture of the capital city would Makoni District was of strategic significance to the conduct of ZPRA operations and arguably hastened Ian Smith’s decision to attend the Lancaster House Conference negotiations that led to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.     

British operations among the people and civilian risk

ABSTRACT

Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.     

Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations

This article analyzes the assumptions of US and Peruvian military personnel regarding insurgent susceptibilities to psychological operations in 1988. The discussion is based on both archival material and the experiences of the author, who was a member of the joint US-Peruvian team. The paper provides insight into the workings of US Army psychological operations as they were conducted in the 1980s and outlines both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken.     

Operation ‘enduring freedom’: a victory for a conventional force fighting an unconventional war

The track record of the US military in unconventional wars has not been good and there were fears that Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ might suffer the same fate as previous campaigns. This contribution explores why the Taliban were defeated so easily by the US in 2001. It challenges the view that America's victory was due solely to changes in its modus operandi or that the outcome heralds a change in the fortunes of the US when fighting unconventional war. It also questions the idea that America's victory was a consequence of Taliban incompetence. Instead, it explains the defeat of the Taliban in terms of the prevailing political conditions within Afghanistan, which made them vulnerable to attack. The essay concludes that current political circumstances could, in the long run, permit the resurrection of the Taliban and undermine the US-led coalition's victory.     

Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.     

The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate

This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

近期美国陆军旅战斗队建设发展

美军认为,近年来中俄等大国的军事实力不断增强,成为美国的主要安全威胁,长期的反叛乱作战也使美国陆军应对正规战争的能力有所下降,必须推进面向大国竞争的转型建设以适应未来的作战环境。随着美国陆军转型建设的大幕拉开,提升大规模作战能力成为其建设发展的焦点。本文认为,旅战斗队作为美国陆军的主要合成兵种部队与实施近距离地面作战的主要梯队之一,其建设发展必将服务于美国陆军的战略目标。据此,美国陆军旅战斗队围绕“跨域、集中、持续、聚合”四个指导原则,重点采取各种举措提升其指挥机构生存力、火力集中打击力、空中威胁防护力、战术网络杀伤力四项基本能力。总结分析美国陆军旅战斗队发展建设的举措,对军队未来作战能力建设具有一定的启示作用。     

陆军部队未来夜战场管理面临的挑战

陆军部队夜战场管理今非昔比,前瞻陆军部队未来夜战场管理面临的挑战,是实现习主席"努力建设一支强大的现代化新型陆军"指示的具体举措,是实现管理服务作战的必然之举。本文从"夜战由单一军种向多军种联合作战转变,传统的以陆军为主的夜战场管理难以适应管理联合化发展趋势;传统的以陆战场为主的夜战场管理难以适应管理多维化发展趋势、夜战由慢节奏向快节奏转变;传统的以人力为主的粗放式夜战场管理难以适应管理快捷、精确化发展趋势;夜战由充满迷雾向空前透明转变,传统的以天然夜幕掩护为主的夜战场管理难以适应管理技战术一体化发展趋势等四个方面,预测了陆军部队未来夜战场管理面临的挑战。