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Martin Edmonds 《Defense & Security Analysis》1988,4(2):195-196
Deterrence and strategy. By Andre Beaufre (translated by Maj Gen R. H. Barry CB). Faber & Faber, London (1965) 相似文献
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We consider the integrated problem of optimally maintaining an imperfect, deteriorating sensor and the safety‐critical system it monitors. The sensor's costless observations of the binary state of the system become less informative over time. A costly full inspection may be conducted to perfectly discern the state of the system, after which the system is replaced if it is in the out‐of‐control state. In addition, a full inspection provides the opportunity to replace the sensor. We formulate the problem of adaptively scheduling full inspections and sensor replacements using a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) model. The objective is to minimize the total expected discounted costs associated with system operation, full inspection, system replacement, and sensor replacement. We show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure and demonstrate the value of coordinating system and sensor maintenance via numerical examples. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 399–417, 2017 相似文献
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We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation. 相似文献
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