Swords,sandals, and insurgencies: Ancient history goes to the movies

This article explores the question of why so few insurgencies from the ancient world have ever made it onto the big screen. Many of these stories have been made into documentaries, but have been ignored by Hollywood. Even those events that have been made into Hollywood films, like the uprising of Spartacus, do not show any of the successful uprisings, only the defeats. Among the possible reasons may be Hollywood's fascination with big wars and big battles rather than small wars because they are more cinematic. Another reason is that American movies are reluctant to show successful slave uprisings or insurgencies against great powers. In the end, all movies are about the present, not the past, and thus Western bias will side with the imperial power, not the terrorist.     

Comparing rational choice and prospect theory analyses: The US decision to launch operation ‘desert storm’, January 1991

The purpose of this article is to compare an expected utility rational actor model of decision making with a Prospect theory psychological model of decision making. Each theory is presented and then applied to the well known case surrounding the United States’ decision to launch Operation ‘Desert Storm’ in January 1991 at the outset of the Gulf War. Our goal is not to present new findings concerning the origins or outcomes of the Gulf conflict so much as to use the case to compare and illuminate the similarities and differences of these two theoretical approaches. Our approach does not assume that these two models are necessarily mutually incompatible alternatives. Our goal is to analyze this case in order to discover the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each model, and to determine how much analytic purchase can be gained by combining them. Finally, we offer some conclusions concerning this contrast.     

Determination of the optimal investment in end products and repair resources

This paper demonstrates how to determine the minimal cost combination of end products and repair service capability in order to maintain a given level of operating end products. It is shown that the general rule for optimal resource allocation requires simply that the absolute value of the marginal factor cost of repair services divided by the marginal factor cost of end products be equal to the arrival rate of end products to repair. The model is applied to the problem of determining the resources required to support an operating level of Navy F-4 aircraft.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943–1944

This article compares the philosophy and practice of command in the British and US Armies during the Italian Campaign of 1943–44. It assesses pre-war influences on the command approach adopted by each army, and shows how refinements derived from wartime experience enabled British and American commanders to successfully utilise mission command principles to outfight the German Army in the latter years of World War II. This examination directly challenges the historical consensus that Allied commanders were disadvantaged by an inability to exploit the advantages of mission command, and that the German Army retained superior command practices, despite its other failings, throughout the fighting between 1939 and 1945. These conclusions hold additional relevance to modern military organisations which have emphasised mission command as the optimal solution to effective command in battle since the 1980s, but from an inaccurate understanding of German, British and American command traditions and experience that persists to this day.