Swords,sandals, and insurgencies: Ancient history goes to the movies

This article explores the question of why so few insurgencies from the ancient world have ever made it onto the big screen. Many of these stories have been made into documentaries, but have been ignored by Hollywood. Even those events that have been made into Hollywood films, like the uprising of Spartacus, do not show any of the successful uprisings, only the defeats. Among the possible reasons may be Hollywood's fascination with big wars and big battles rather than small wars because they are more cinematic. Another reason is that American movies are reluctant to show successful slave uprisings or insurgencies against great powers. In the end, all movies are about the present, not the past, and thus Western bias will side with the imperial power, not the terrorist.     

Comparing rational choice and prospect theory analyses: The US decision to launch operation ‘desert storm’, January 1991

The purpose of this article is to compare an expected utility rational actor model of decision making with a Prospect theory psychological model of decision making. Each theory is presented and then applied to the well known case surrounding the United States’ decision to launch Operation ‘Desert Storm’ in January 1991 at the outset of the Gulf War. Our goal is not to present new findings concerning the origins or outcomes of the Gulf conflict so much as to use the case to compare and illuminate the similarities and differences of these two theoretical approaches. Our approach does not assume that these two models are necessarily mutually incompatible alternatives. Our goal is to analyze this case in order to discover the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each model, and to determine how much analytic purchase can be gained by combining them. Finally, we offer some conclusions concerning this contrast.     

Determination of the optimal investment in end products and repair resources

This paper demonstrates how to determine the minimal cost combination of end products and repair service capability in order to maintain a given level of operating end products. It is shown that the general rule for optimal resource allocation requires simply that the absolute value of the marginal factor cost of repair services divided by the marginal factor cost of end products be equal to the arrival rate of end products to repair. The model is applied to the problem of determining the resources required to support an operating level of Navy F-4 aircraft.     

Quantification of contractor risk

This paper presents a quantitative index of the level of risk assumed by a contractor in various contract type situations. The definition includes expression of real world uncertainty and contractor's utility for money. Examples are given for the major contract types and special applications are discussed.     

A note on cycling in the simplex method

Although cycling in the simplex method has long been known, a number of theoretical questions concerning cycling have not been fully answered. One of these, stated in [3], is to find the smallest example of cycling, and Beale's example with three equations and seven variables is conjectured to be the smallest one. The exact bounds on dimensions of cycling examples are established in this paper. We show that Beale's example is the smallest one which cycles at a non-optimal solution, that a smaller one can cycle at the optimum, and that, in general (including the completely degenerate case), a cycling example must have at least two equations, at least six variables, and at least three non-basic variables. Examples and geometries are given for the extreme cases, showing that the bounds are sharp.     

Longitudinal manpower planning models

A manpower planning model is presented that exploits the longitudinal stability of manpower cohorts. The manpower planning process is described. An infinite horizon linear program for calculating minimum cost manpower input plans is presented and found to have a straightforward solution in a great many cases and to yield an easily implemented approximation technique in other cases.     

Imperial nostalgia,the liberal lie,and the perils of postmodern counterinsurgency

Since 9/11, counterinsurgency is back in fashion; the ‘war on terror’ has even been branded a ‘global counterinsurgency’. However the context within which counterinsurgency originally arose is critical to understanding the prospects for its present success; the radically changed environment in which it is currently being conducted casts into considerable doubt the validity of the doctrine's application by many national militaries currently ‘rediscovering’ this school of military thought today. Above all, classical counterinsurgency was a profoundly imperial, state-centric phenomenon; consequently it only rarely faced the thorny issue of sovereignty and legitimacy which bedevils and may doom these same efforts today.