Note: Two rendezvous search problems on the line

A new upper bound is obtained for the two‐person symmetric rendezvous value on the real line when the distribution function of their initial distance apart is bounded. A second result shows that if three players are placed randomly on adjacent integers on the real line facing in random directions and able to move at a speed of at most 1, then they can ensure a three‐way meeting time of at most 7/2; the fact that 7/2 is a best possible result follows from work already in the literature. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 335–340, 1999     

A one-dimensional helicopter-submarine game

The article considers a two-person zero-sum game in which a searcher with b bombs wishes to destroy a mobile hider. The players are restricted to move on a straight line with maximum speeds v and u satisfying v > u > 0; neither player can see the other but each knows the other's initial position. The bombs all have destructive radius R and there is a time lag T between the release of a bomb and the bomb exploding. The searcher gets 1 unit if the hider is destroyed and 0 if he survives. A solution is given for b = 1, and extended to b > 1 when the time lag is small. Various applications of the game are discussed.     

A fast infiltration game on n arcs

Starting from a safe base, an Infiltrator tries to reach a sensitive zone within a given time limit without being detected by a Guard. The Infiltrator can move with speed at most u, while the Guard can only perform a restricted number of searches. A discrete variant of this zero-sum game played on a graph consisting of two vertices joined by n nonintersecting arcs is investigated. Optimal strategies and an explicit expression for its value are obtained. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Rendezvous search when marks are left at the starting points

Leaving marks at the starting points in a rendezvous search problem may provide the players with important information. Many of the standard rendezvous search problems are investigated under this new framework which we call markstart rendezvous search. Somewhat surprisingly, the relative difficulties of analysing problems in the two scenarios differ from problem to problem. Symmetric rendezvous on the line seems to be more tractable in the new setting whereas asymmetric rendezvous on the line when the initial distance is chosen by means of a convex distribution appears easier to analyse in the original setting. Results are also obtained for markstart rendezvous on complete graphs and on the line when the players' initial distance is given by an unknown probability distribution. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 722–731, 2001     

A generalized inspection game

The paper addresses the problem of a patrol trying to stop smugglers who are attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait in one of M time units. The situation was modeled as a two-person zero-sum game of exhaustion by Thomas and Nisgav and this article extends their results. The game has many characteristics in common with the Inspection Game in Owen's book on Game Theory; this Inspection Game is generalized and the relations between the two games are discussed.     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

A continuous game of ambush

The article considers a two-person competitive problem in which a traveller wishes to choose a path across a rectangle from left to right in such a way as to avoid being ambushed by his adversary who has placed obstacles within the rectangle. Our results supplement those that have already been obtained by Ruckle and they indicate that, under certain conditions, the players need to adopt rather sophisticated strategies if they are to act optimally. This suggests that a complete solution to the problem could be difficult.