Note: Two rendezvous search problems on the line

A new upper bound is obtained for the two‐person symmetric rendezvous value on the real line when the distribution function of their initial distance apart is bounded. A second result shows that if three players are placed randomly on adjacent integers on the real line facing in random directions and able to move at a speed of at most 1, then they can ensure a three‐way meeting time of at most 7/2; the fact that 7/2 is a best possible result follows from work already in the literature. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 335–340, 1999     

Rendezvous search when marks are left at the starting points

Leaving marks at the starting points in a rendezvous search problem may provide the players with important information. Many of the standard rendezvous search problems are investigated under this new framework which we call markstart rendezvous search. Somewhat surprisingly, the relative difficulties of analysing problems in the two scenarios differ from problem to problem. Symmetric rendezvous on the line seems to be more tractable in the new setting whereas asymmetric rendezvous on the line when the initial distance is chosen by means of a convex distribution appears easier to analyse in the original setting. Results are also obtained for markstart rendezvous on complete graphs and on the line when the players' initial distance is given by an unknown probability distribution. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 722–731, 2001     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000