Inequalities involving the lifetime of series and parallel systems

Let {Xⁱ} be independent HNBUE (Harmonic New Better Than Used in Expectation) random variables and let {Yⁱ} be independent exponential random variables such that E{Xⁱ}=E{Yⁱ} It is shown that \documentclass{article}\pagestyle{empty}\begin{document}$ E\left[{u\left({\mathop {\min \,X_i}\limits_{l \le i \le n}} \right)} \right] \ge E\left[{u\left({\mathop {\min \,Y_i}\limits_{l \le i \le n}} \right)} \right] $\end{document} for all increasing and concave u. This generalizes a result of Kubat. When comparing two series systems with components of equal cost, one with lifetimes {Xⁱ} and the other with lifetimes {Yⁱ}, it is shown that a risk-averse decision-maker will prefer the HNBUE system. Similar results are obtained for parallel systems.     

Taboos and regional security regimes

A security regime is an uneasy compromise where the relationship among the parties is generally undefined, limited in scope, and transitional. The relationship is undefined, because the parties are usually former adversaries who, for the moment, do not think of war as a feasible or practical, or, under some conditions, even a possible instrument. Yet they are far from being allies. A security regime differs in important ways from an alliance or a security community. A security regime is also limited. What happens inside the regime is only a part of what happens in the larger relationship. Participation in a regime does not imply clear behavioral expectations outside the security arena. Finally, the parties to a security regime are usually in a transitional relationship; although the parties have moved away from a full-scale adversarial relationship, where they are going is less clear. Security regimes do not develop in a linear sequence to become ‘security communities’.     

Unraveling the violence in Kazakhstan

There were several high-profile violent incidents in 2011 in Kazakhstan, including several bombings, shootings that targeted police, and a protest turned clash that resulted in a number of deaths. Some of the perpetrators reportedly had links with radical religious groups. An overlooked aspect of the violence is how it is reported in Kazakhstan. There are active, competent media in Kazakhstan, which are largely unknown in the West. An examination of these incidents using the media in Kazakhstan can provide a unique insight into what took place. While Western sources quickly blamed radical religious groups with international connections, media in Kazakhstan have found that there are other reasons for the violence.     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016