Icons Off the Mark

In two landmark articles, longtime scholars Kenneth N. Waltz and Thomas C. Schelling have re-emphasized the utility of nuclear deterrence over nuclear nonproliferation (Waltz) and nuclear disarmament (Schelling). While the thrust of the articles is seemingly different, both are rooted in the same intellectual ground: an epistemology that assumes problem-free inferences, drawn from past experiences, are applicable in future scenarios; a foundational rooting in strategic rationality that entangles them in unsolvable contradictions concerning comparable risks of different nuclear constellations, namely deterrence versus proliferation and disarmament; and a bias in framing the empirical record that makes nuclear deterrence more conducive to security than nuclear disarmament. The common normative-practical denominator, then, is to let a nuclear weapon-free world appear both less desirable and less feasible than it might actually be.     

What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

Approximations to the reliability of phased missions

A system whose configuration (block diagram or fault tree) changes during consecutive time periods (phases) performs a “phased mission.” Recently, Esary and Ziehms have shown that any multiphase mission can be transformed into an equivalent, synthetic, single-phase system, and thus that the phased mission problem can in principle be solved by standard reliability methods. We employ these ideas here to study approximations to mission reliability and to develop an algorithm which may be of practical interest. In addition, we extend the reliability calculus of Rubinstein, and Esary and Hayne, based on an approximate hazard transform, to phased missions, and we show how this extended calculus can be used in situations where phases are not of known fixed duration.     

A decomposition algorithm applied to planning the interdiction of stochastic networks

We describe the application of a decomposition based solution method to a class of network interdiction problems. The problem of maximizing the probability of sufficient disruption of the flow of information or goods in a network whose characteristics are not certain is shown to be solved effectively by applying a scenario decomposition method developed by Riis and Schultz [Comput Optim Appl 24 (2003), 267–287]. Computational results demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm and design decisions that result in speed improvements. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

WHILE WAITING FOR THE PROTOCOL

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.