Exploiting the Challenges to Bioweapons Development

ABSTRACT

Widespread and often exaggerated generalizations about the global spread weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have proven to be not only misleading and technologically naïve, but also unhelpful in formulating effective policies to counter their threat. The new book by George Mason University's Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley dispels the popular narrative that governments and terror groups can easily—and inevitably will—develop WMDs, particularly biological weapons, by exploring the complex external and internal conditions that such programs require, as demonstrated by the Cold War-era biological weapon programs of the superpowers. This empirically grounded and realistic assessment of how states try—and often fail—to develop such programs offers a more reliable basis to craft realistic counterproliferation policies that can elicit international support.     

THE NUCLEAR TABOO: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1945

Uranium: War, Energy and the Rock That Shaped the World, by Tom Zoellner. VikingPenguin, 2009. 337 pages, $26.95.

Plutonium: A History of the World's Most Dangerous Element, by Jeremy Bernstein.Joseph Henry Press, 2007. 194 pages, $27.95.     

Systems analysis and planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS) for defense decision making

Systems analysis office titles have permeated both government and business organization charts in recent years. Systems analysis as a discipline, however, even though increasingly accepted, has eluded precise definition. For the most part, it has been loosely described as “quantitative common sense” and “the general application of the scientific method.” Emphasis is placed upon the application of eclectic disciplines to a wide variety of problems. Concepts and techniques have been drawn heavily from economics, mathematics, and political science. In the Department of Defense, systems analysis has been used extensively in the evaluation of weapon systems during the last 9 years. During the 1960's, it provided the underlying concepts for the control system PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting System). This article traces the origins of systems analysis within the Department of Defense and describes and analyzes the application of the technique. Although there always exists disagreement, it is generally accepted that the origin of systems analysis coincided with the inception of R. S. McNamara's administration of the Department of Defense. McNamara organized the Systems Analysis office under Mr. Charles Hitch, who had previously developed many basic systems analysis concepts at project RAND. From Hitch's basic concepts, the approach became increasingly sophisticated in evaluating complex weapons systems. Coincidently, the organizational procedures for implementing systems analysis also evolved. Under the current Department of Defense administration, the new organizational procedures emerging are contrasted with the old.     

Troubled triangle: Russia,Ukraine and the United States

A potentially productive triangular arrangement among Russia, Ukraine, and the United States emerged in 1994 from efforts to constrain nuclear weapons diffusion. By 2001, this promising initiative was nearly moribund, owing to the inability or unwillingness of the parties to fulfill the commitments of subsequent agreements. The domestic and external causes of this failure are many and clear. Yet the advantages to each of reengaging in a trilateral relationship are also plain. This means fulfilling their unfinished agenda by learning from past mistakes, adopting realistic premises and goals, and pursuing ‘bottom up’ as well as ‘top down’ strategies.     

Productivity estimates of the strategic airlift system by the use of simulation

Although the strategic airlift system is under continuous analysis, C-5A problems provided impetus to analyze the airlift system productivity function by using a large-scale simulation model. Development of the simulation model (Simulation of Airlift Resources - SOAR) was initiated by the Office of Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) in 1966. SOAR had barely become operational in time for the study in November 1968. Since limited verification and validation tests had been performed on the simulation model, the design of experiments was of critical importance. The experimental design had to be flexible enough to salvage the maximum amount of information possible upon the discovery of either a verification or validation error. In addition, the experimental design was required to accommodate the estimation of a large number of possibly changing independent variables. The experimental design developed for the analysis was full factorial design sets for a finite number of factors. Initial analysis began with aggregated sets of factors at two levels, and information gained from experiment execution was used to parse the sets. The process was sequential and parsing continued until the major explanatory independent variables were identified or enough information was obtained to eliminate the factor from further direct analysis. This design permitted the overlapping of simulation runs to fill out the factorial design sets. In addition to estimating the airlift productivity function, several other findings are reported which tended to disprove previous assumptions about the nature of the strategic airlift system.