Does military expenditure increase external debt? Evidence from Asia

This article empirically explores the effect of military spending on external debt, using a sample of ten Asian countries over the years from 1990 to 2011. The Hausman’s test suggests that the random-effects model is preferable; however, both random-effects and fixed-effects models are used in this research. The empirical results show that the effect of military spending on external debt is positive, while the effects of foreign exchange reserves and of economic growth on external debt are negative. For developing countries caught in security dilemma, military expenditure often requires an increase in external debt, which may affect economic development negatively.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

Jihad Against Palestinians? The Herostratos Syndrome and the Paradox of Targeting European Jews

Abstract

This paper addresses the waves of mass killings recently perpetrated by individuals with a weak or nonexistent ideological motivation, whose acts either appear to contradict their purported political cause or are admittedly driven by a quest for notoriety. Examples range from killers who have been waging jihad against European Jews to unattached mass killers such as the Germanwings pilot to the perpetrators of mass school shootings in America and worldwide. We argue that these phenomena can be understood as instances of the Herostratos syndrome, which has been known for thousands of years as characterizing the behavior of people who seek to survive in the collective memory by excelling in their infamous acts. We provide a model of hybrid killers which accommodates the Herostratic motive alongside a political motive and characterize a well-behaved Nash equilibrium where Herostratic killers are competing with one another with a view to make a name for themselves in infamy. The policy implications point towards reducing the publicity the killers enjoy, thus frustrating their quest for notoriety.