Zones of Control & Civilian Strategy in the Aceh Conflict

How do civilians respond to and shape civil war? Dominant approaches emphasise territorial control, while rival sociological explanations understand civilian behaviour as rooted in justice, pleasure, and social norms. This paper assesses these divergent sensibilities by examining rebel-controlled areas from Aceh, Indonesia. Many civilians provided the rebels with symbolic support, information and provisions, support that deepened over time as the rebels established control. By disaggregating ‘civilians’ into social groups, a more complex story appears. Only some civilian groups supported the dominant armed group, suggesting that control and sociological approaches can be complementary in explaining civilian behaviour.     

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

As the potential for the involvement of corporations in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has increased, particularly through dual-use technology, global regulation has failed to keep pace. Where regulation of private corporations does exist, in the form of treaties, UN resolutions, or more informal arrangements, the obligations fall only on states. This state of affairs is a result of international law's traditional deference to state sovereignty; yet, it has led to significant shortcomings in the global regulatory regime, where states are unwilling or unable to meet their obligations. While radical departures from the traditional model of international law might remove the regulatory gaps caused by noncompliant states, such changes are unrealistic in the current political climate. More realistic changes must be focused on, offering greater recognition of the role of private corporations in nuclear proliferation and increasing state compliance with existing regulation.     

How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations.     

Disaster management in case of CBRNe events: an innovative methodology to improve the safety knowledge of advisors and first responders

Nowadays, Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear-explosive (CBRNe) risks are one of the world's main safety concerns. The radiological disasters of Fukushima and Chernobyl, the chemical events of Seveso or the release of Sarin in the Tokyo Subway, the biological emergencies such as the H1N1 flu or the recent Ebola outbreak, and recent news about the availability of non-conventional weapons acquired by fundamentalist organisations represent evidence of potential future threats. CBRNe risks are a real and global threat. The University of Rome, Tor Vergata, in collaboration with the most important Italian and international bodies working in the field of CBRNe safety and security, and supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, organises International Masters Courses on the Protection against CBRNe events. Within this framework, a Table-Top Exercise was planned, in collaboration with the Italian Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence. The scenario, the logistic organisation, on-going adjustments during the exercise and the outcomes are presented here and analysed.     

Delusion of Defeat: The United States and Iraq, 1990–1998

This article challenges the widely held belief that that the United States ‘won the war but lost the peace’ following the war with Iraq in 1991. Fears of a resurgent Iraq grew throughout the decade, despite abundant evidence that Iraq was becoming desperately weak and was no longer a threat to regional security. In fact, the United States won the war as well as the peace by any meaningful definition of the term. The article also discusses the reasons why US policymakers and observers convinced themselves that they had lost. The final section considers implications for strategy and policy in wars of limited objectives.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia

China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight.