Optimal strategies in a game of economic survival

The games of economic survival introduced by Shubik and Thompson seem tailor-made for the analysis of some problems in insurance and have found many applications in this industry. The optimal strategy in such games may be a so-called “band strategy.” This result seems counter-intuitive and has caused some puzzlement. This paper gives sufficient conditions so that the optimal strategy will be of a simpler form, and it is argued that these conditions are satisfied in most applications to insurance.     

A platform for initial testing of multiple camouflage patterns

The human visual system is still an important factor in military warfare; military personnel receive training on effective search strategies, and camouflage that can effectively conceal objects and personnel is a key component of a successful integrated survivability strategy. Previous methods of camouflage assessment have, amongst others, used psychophysics to generate distinctiveness metrics. However, the population from which the human observers are drawn is often not well defined, or necessarily appropriate. In this experiment we designed a new platform for testing multiple patterns based on a camouflaged object detection task, and investigate whether trained military observers perform better than civilians. We use a two-alternative forced choice paradigm, with participants searching images of woodland for a replica military helmet displaying Olive Green, Multi Terrain Pattern, US Marine Pattern or, as a conspicuous control, UN Peacekeeper Blue. Our data show that there is no difference in detection performance between the two observer groups but that there are clear differences in the effectiveness of the different helmet colour patterns in a temperate woodland environment. We conclude that when tasks involve very short stimulus presentation times, task-specific training has little effect on the success of target detection and thus this paradigm is particularly suitable for robust estimates of camouflage efficacy.     

Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited

Policies to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have, for the most part, been modeled on strategies originally devised to counter the danger of nuclear proliferation. While useful in countering a traditional CBN (chemical/biological/nuclear)/WMD threat, current counter-proliferation and non-proliferation regimes are insufficient to meet the challenge of maritime terrorism. Maritime terrorism represents a new category of threat; one that partially overlaps with conventional WMD, but for which – due to the scope and nature of the maritime industry – traditional counter-proliferation policies may be inadequate and even inappropriate. This article outlines the means by which maritime shipping can be used as WMD and discusses the policies implemented to deal with these threats, in light of the challenges presented to traditional conceptualizations of WMD and counter-proliferation strategies.     

Defence budgets in the post-Cold War era: a spatial econometrics approach

This paper examines the determinants of national defence budgets in the post-Cold War era employing a spatial econometric framework. Using data for 124 countries over a 16-year time period, I examine spatial relationships in defence spending to investigate how countries account for the military spending of other countries when setting their budgets. Using specially developed weighting matrices, the regression results indicate that defence budgets are positively spatially correlated. These results provide support for the use of ‘external’ factors when examining defence budgets over this time period. The importance of a country’s spatial location when setting its budget is further examined through the identification of regions of high and low defence spending.     

Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on US Drone Attacks

Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistanis are overwhelmingly opposed to American drone strikes in their country’s tribal areas and that this opposition is driven by mass media coverage of the loss of life and property the strikes purportedly cause. Using an approach based in the literature in political communication and public opinion, we argue this conventional wisdom is largely inaccurate. Instead, we contend that awareness of drone strikes will be limited because Pakistan is a poor country with low educational attainment, high rates of illiteracy and persistent infrastructure problems that limit access to mass media. Moreover, because of these same country characteristics, Pakistanis’ beliefs about drone strikes will be shaped primarily by informal, face-to-face political communication, rather than through more formal media sources. We test this argument using data that we collected by fielding a 7,656 respondent, nationally-representative survey carried out in Pakistan in 2013. The results of the statistical analysis support our arguments.     

Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture

This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.     

Comparable deterrence – target,criteria and purpose

The last decade has seen several advances in the study of deterrence. These advances have sparked some strong disagreements regarding interpretation of the models and what their contributions signify. This paper appraises the discussions from a model theoretic perspective. It is argued that when comparing rivalling models three aspects; (i) target, (ii) criteria and (iii) type of purpose should be taken into account in order to make a proper appraisal. Informed by these aspects it is evident that the three deterrence models analysed address different aspects, in different ways and to different ends. From this perspective, the so-called Perfect Deterrence model must be recognised as a clear advancement in the research field. Model comparison will always be context relative and a plurality of models should be viewed favourably.     

Reward,punishment or inducement? US economic and military aid, 1946–1996

If the US has wielded power as global hegemon, then there should be evidence of a linkage between American resources and the ability to influence behavior. However, there is widespread disagreement on how this power is manifested (see Krause, ). Methodological and epistemological issues have hampered empirical studies of US hegemonic behavior. For example, does the US reward past behavior or does it offer inducements for future behavior? We document and discuss these issues in terms of the aid–foreign policy compliance nexus. The empirical portion of our paper tests whether US military and non‐military aid are correlated with foreign policy similarity. The main merits of our study are that: (1) we test a new measure of foreign policy similarity developed by Signorino and Ritter () and compiled by Gartzke et al. (); (2) we relax the causality issue and test using vector autoregression (VAR) for 76 developing countries; and (3) our time horizon is a minimum of 30 years for each country. Our central finding is that aid is most often used as a reward. More specifically, foreign policy similarity leads to greater economic aid for most African countries, foreign policy similarity leads to greater military aid for a majority of Latin American states, and there are no overarching patterns for Asia and the Middle East. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of the bargaining and structural approaches to statecraft.     

Mediation,Peacekeeping And Civil War Peace Agreements

The post-civil war agreement phase is vulnerable to credible commitment problems, a lack of government capacity to implement, and/or mutual vulnerability to retribution from violating the agreement. This study’s main contribution is to demonstrate the combined utility of mediation and UN peacekeeping. Mediation builds trust and confidence and works with the parties to design an efficacious agreement conducive to, among other features, tamping down post-agreement violence. Peacekeeping stems violence and facilitates the implementation of the agreement. Agreements that are mediated and followed by UN peacekeeping are expected to be more robust in terms of staving off violence. We report the effects of the mediation–peacekeeping interaction using a method correcting for a common misinterpretation of interaction terms. We test logit and hazard models using a sample of full and partial civil war peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011. Controlling for agreement design, democracy, and income per capita, the results indicate mediation and its interaction with peacekeeping reduce the probability of renewed/continuing violence and have a positive impact on agreement duration. We also report brief case study evidence from the 1990s peace process in Guatemala.     

Battlefields and marketplaces

Divided societies in the developing world experience wasteful struggles for power. We study the relationship between political stability and resources wasted in the struggle within a model of competitive power contests. The model of power contests is similar in structure to models describing oligopolistic market competition. This analogy helps us in deriving results that are new to the conflict literature. We show, for example, that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index can be interpreted as a measure of power concentration and that a peace treaty between fighting groups has a parallel in tacit collusion between firms in a market.