Book reviews

Third World Military Expenditure: Determinants and Implications. By Robert McKinlay. Frances Pinter, London (1989)

The UK Defence Industrial Base: Development and Future Policy Options. By Trevor Taylor and Keith Hayward. Brassey's, London, for Royal United Services Institute (1989), ISBN 0-08-036713-5, £22.50

Mutiny. By Lawrence James. Buchan & Enright, London (1987), ISBN 0-907675-70-0, £12.95; Scapegoat! Famous Courts Martial. By John Harris. Severn House, London (1988), ISBN 0-7278-2103-2, £12.95; In Glass Houses. By Robert Boyes. Military Provost Staff Corps Association, Colchester (1986), ISBN 0-9513467-0-9, £6.50 (paperback)

The Nuclear Weapons World: Who, How and Where. Edited by Patrick Burke. Frances Pinter, London (1988), ISBN 086187-705-5, £50.00

Merchants of Treason—America's Secrets for Sale. By Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar. Robert Hale, London (1988), ISBN 0-7090-3543-8, £14.95 ($21.95); Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Transnational Publishers, Dobbs Ferry, NY (1987), ISBN 0-941320-44-8, $37.50; Catching Spies—Principles and Practices of Counterespionage. By H. H. A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger. Paladin Press, Boulder, CO (1988), ISBN 0-87364-466-2, $24.95

The BattleshipRoyal Sovereignand Her Sister Ships. By Peter C. Smith. William Kimber, Wellingborough (1988), ISBN 0-7183-0704-6, £12.95; Air Power at Sea, 1945 to Today. By John Winton. Sidgwick & Jackson, London (1987), £9.95     

The Hydrogen Bomb,Lewis L. Strauss and the Writing of Nuclear History

In January 1950 President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would proceed with further work to determine the feasibility of a ‘Super’, or hydrogen, bomb. The events leading up to that decision – counter-pressures and advocacy from a number of quarters, including the divided Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the nuclear scientists, Congress and the Pentagon – is well known. Less attention has been given to how the story of the Super came to be told in official and popular publications. Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, rogue member of the AEC, later presidential adviser on atomic affairs and AEC chairman, was one of the most vigorous advocates of developing thermonuclear weapons. He was also a highly skilled player of bureaucratic politics. This article draws upon the Strauss archives to examine how he used his position and his contacts to shape the history of the H-bomb to his own political advantage.     

Allocation of carrier-based attack aircraft using non-linear programming

The paper presents the formulation and several solutions of a model for allocating a fixed number of aircraft to carriers and to missions. The amount of damage that can be inflicted is maximized. A nonseparable concave nonlinear objective function expresses diminishing marginal damage. Linear constraints on aireraft, carrier space, and aircraft availability for missions are included. The model is solved using the sequential unconstrained minimization technique (SUMT). The model is presented in terms of a scenario. Several different exponential damage functions are treated, and S-shaped damage functions are discussed.     

Does Military Spending Really Matter for Economic Growth in China and G7 Countries: The Roles of Dependency and Heterogeneity

This study revisits the causal linkages between military spending and economic growth in China and G7 countries (i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA) by focusing country-specific analysis for the period 1988–2010. The panel causality analysis, which accounts for both cross-country dependency and heterogeneity across countries, is employed in this study. Our results find evidence of the neutrality hypothesis for Italy, France, and Germany, the military spending–growth detriment hypothesis for both Canada and the UK, and one-way Granger causality running from economic growth to military spending for China. Furthermore, we find a feedback between military spending and economic growth in both Japan and the USA. Thus, our results do not support that one size fits all.     

The Royal Navy's Polaris lobby, 1955–62

This article examines the background to the Royal Navy's acquisition of Polaris. The conventional wisdom is that the Navy had little interest in Polaris, which was foisted on it upon the cancellation of Skybolt. Extensive use of files in the Public Record Office is made to mount the contrary argument, that the Admiralty had been interested in the submarine-launched ballistic missile since at least 1955, that there was widespread support for it among the Naval Staff, that a substantial amount of preparatory work was undertaken with the assistance of the US Navy, and that the naval staff were prepared to accept the deterrent role. Naval tactics – to play a waiting game and feign indifference – have contributed to the establishment of the orthodox interpretation, as has the view that the Navy was handicapped by the lack of a body of doctrine within which the deterrent role could be accommodated. The article shows that the orthodox account cannot be sustained by the evidence, which points to a naval triumph in terms of Whitehall politics and inter-service competition.