Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

多智能体的设备采购合同管理系统建模与设计

从现代设备采购合同管理的概念出发,首先介绍了设备采购合同管理所面临的新的挑战,然后提出了基于多智能体的设备采购合同管理系统模型。多智能体系统和设备采购合同管理系统都是非常复杂的。为了降低开发基于多智能体设备采购合同管理系统的难度,采用SWARM建模方法,分析和设计了一个简化的设备采购合同管理系统。     

美军装备采办合同管理及其标准化

在我军武器装备建设逐渐"以计划为主要管理方式和手段"向"以合同为主要管理方式和手段"转变的背景下,装备采购合同管理的研究日趋深入。而装备采购合同"行政合同"的性质及合同标的物复杂性的特点,进一步凸显了标准化在保证装备采购合同规范性、降低不确定性、减少交易成本和提高工作效率中的重要作用。文章在对美军装备采办合同管理标准化特点与经验详细分析和提炼的基础上,对比我军装备采购合同管理体制及标准化现状,有针对性的提出了装备采购合同管理标准化建议,梳理了标准化重点,并为日后时机成熟时制定适用于装备采购合同管理的相关标准或指南,奠定了一定的研究基础。     

舰船研制的风险管理与合同形式分析

首先介绍了美国海军在舰船研制中常用的几种基本合同形式,然后对采用不同的合同形式时军地双方所承担的风险大小等问题进行了分析与讨论,最后针对风险分担给出了若干舰船采办合同形式的示例     

基于身份验证技术的后勤保障审核系统

对身份验证的易仿造和易篡改提出了一种新的解决方案--采用数字水印技术来保证身份验证的完整性和不可否认性.阐述了一种采用非对称密码体制的数字水印应用策略,并以在某部队的具体应用为背景实现了一套对身份验证进行散列、数字签名,然后再通过数字水印技术将信息隐藏入验证系统的方案.该方案有效地确保了部队信息传输的保密性、交易者身份的确定性、数据交换的完整性以及发送信息的不可否认性,具有较好的实用价值.     

装备采购线性合同优化研究

高额装备费支出使对招投标合同优化问题备受国防经济学界关注,对装备采办过程中招投标线性合同的优化进行了研究。采用招投标模型与委托-代理模型分析相结合的方法,先从道德风险与风险分担2个方面分析装备采购合同的优化问题,然后引入竞争效应,分析风险分担的问题。即使在双方为风险中性不需要风险分担时,DoD仍然需要在最初的投标竞争与中标后承包商降低成本行为之间进行权衡。一般的投标中,应使最终支付基于实际成本和投标值2个因素,并考虑最终支付基于道德风险损失。研究的基本结论是:固定价格合同应尽可能少地使用;若存在2个以上的投标人,成本加价合同也应禁止使用;在使用激励合同时,应慎重选择合同系数,提出了计算优化线性激励合同系数的方法。     

基于军民融合条件的装备性能维修保障合同执行情况

在军民融合背景下,部分新获得承制资格企业在首批装备制造或维修保障任务中时有违约问题发生。为解决该问题,提出了以基于性能的采办理论为基础的合同违约预测方法研究。以陆军通用武器装备维修保障承制单位为案例,运用SPSS软件进行数据整理和因子分析,构建合同履行预测评价模型。然后利用新入民营企业试生产实验数据在量产前建立费用和可用度模型,通过费效比最优的方式预测各新入企业的首批装备可用度及花费等关键指标,进行综合评估。结论表明该方法能够对装备合同履行情况和违约风险进行预判。     

Sequential bid selection by stochastic approximation

Suppose that a contractor is faced with a sequence of “minimum bid wins contract” competitions. Assuming that a contractor knows his cost to fulfill the contract at each competition and that competitors are merely informed whether or not they have won, bids may be selected sequentially via a tailored stochastic approximation procedure. The efficacy of this approach in certain bidding environments is investigated.     

Trade credit contract in the presence of retailer investment opportunity

This paper presents a model for designing a trade credit contract between a supplier and a retailer that would coordinate a supply chain in the presence of investment opportunity for the retailer. Specifically, we study a newsvendor model where the supplier offers a trade credit contract to the retailer who, by delaying the payment, can invest the accounts payable amount and earn returns. We find that when the channel partners have symmetric information about the retailer's investment return, a conditionally concessional trade credit (CTC) contract, which includes a wholesale price, an interest‐free period, and a minimum order requirement, can achieve channel coordination. We then extend the model to the information asymmetry setting in which the retailer's investment return is unobservable by the supplier. We show that, although the CTC contract cannot achieve the coordination in this setting, it can effectively improve channel efficiency as well as profitability for individual partners.     

Managing components for assemble‐to‐order products with lead‐time‐dependent pricing: The full‐shipment model

We study a component inventory planning problem in an assemble‐to‐order environment faced by many contract manufacturers in which both quick delivery and efficient management of component inventory are crucial for the manufacturers to achieve profitability in a highly competitive market. Extending a recent study in a similar problem setting by the same authors, we analyze an optimization model for determining the optimal component stocking decision for a contract manufacturer facing an uncertain future demand, where product price depends on the delivery times. In contrast to our earlier work, this paper considers the situation where the contract manufacturer needs to deliver the full order quantity in one single shipment. This delivery requirement is appropriate for many industries, such as the garment and toy industries, where the economies of scale in transportation is essential. We develop efficient solution procedures for solving this optimization problem. We use our model results to illustrate how the different model parameters affect the optimal solution. We also compare the results under this full‐shipment model with those from our earlier work that allows for multiple partial shipments. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

某型火炮复拨器拨动子应力分析及其修复研究

针对某型榴弹炮炮闩复拨器拨动子的磨损情况, 分析了其接触应力的特点并拟合出应力分布曲线, 计算出最大接触应力, 同时对提高复拨器拨动子使用寿命的措施进行了可行性分析。     

Force deployment and the production of security: Why is the united states in NATO?

Standard economic concepts of production and cost minimization subject to a production constraint are used to derive the conditions of optimal deployment of home and forward military forces for the production of home security. United States' participation in the NATO alliance is then analyzed in the context of a two‐ally (U.S. and Western Europe) optimal force deployment model of NATO. Next, U.S. force‐basing policy is adduced as an enforcement mechanism for the “transatlantic contract.” Lastly, statistical evidence on burden sharing within Western Europe, and the effectiveness of the U.S. contract enforcement policy, is presented.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Structural models of award fee contracts

This paper describes the construction of a mathematical model structure in a particular area of management. In addition it is intended as an illustration of how appropriate levels of mathematics can be utilized in management research when original formulations lack sufficient precision for conducting quantitative analyses. The specific area studied deals with the formulation and analysis of contract types. In particular the award fee type contract is treated. At present mathematical structure models for other contract types have received considerable attention, but award fee types have not been structured in mathematical terms. The paper provides a discussion of model formulation for award fee contracts, develops a detailed example of such a structure, and illustrates that model by numerical examples indicating the application of such models to the formulation and analysis of award fee contracts.     

Vertically restrictive pricing in supply chains with price‐dependent demand

We examine the behavior of a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized supply chain under price‐dependent, stochastic demand. We model a retail fixed markup (RFM) policy, which can arise as a form of vertically restrictive pricing in a supply chain, and we examine its effect on supply chain performance. We prove the existence of the optimal pricing and replenishment policies when demand has a linear additive form and the distribution of the uncertainty component has a nondecreasing failure rate. We numerically compare the relative performance of RFM to a price‐only contract and we find that RFM results in greater profit for the supply chain than the price‐only contract in a variety of scenarios. We find that RFM can lead to Pareto‐improving solutions where both the supplier and the retailer earn more profit than under a price‐only contract. Finally, we compare RFM to a buyback contract and explore the implications of allowing the fixed markup parameter to be endogenous to the model. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006.     

装备合同履行管理的动态演化博弈研究

在装备合同履行中存在着明显的信息不对称现象。为提高装备合同的履行效益,减少信息不对称的影响,在有限理性假设的前提下,建立了装备合同履行监督的动态演化博弈模型。对合同履行过程中承制单位与军事代表、合同履行管理部门之间的博弈关系进行了探究,得到了各参与方在不同条件下均衡策略的选择,并对优化装备合同的履行管理提出了建议。     

Contracts and coordination: Supply chains with uncertain demand and supply

Considering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a “late order,” we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016     

论英文本对外经贸合同的语言特征

实务中有不少涉外经济合同纠纷是因各方对合同文字的理解不一而引起的,究其原因,主要是起草者对合同语言的特殊性缺乏应有的了解,结果导致合同语言的模糊性和不确定性。本文从词法、句法及篇章等三个层面对英文经贸合同语言的特殊性及其变化规律进行探讨,以期能有助于对此类合同的理解和起草。     

基于博弈论的装备采办成本控制问题研究

从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,以博弈论为理论工具,对武器装备采办过程中的生产成本控制问题进行了分析;建立了基于激励的生产成本控制模型,并对成本控制模型的特点进行了分析和解释;针对军方在激励合同执行过程中有可能出现的2类错误,对成本控制模型进行了优化。在非对称信息条件下,优化后的成本控制模型不但能有效减少2类错误的发生,而且可提高军方装备采办效用,减少代理方合同风险。     

基于备件需求预测的两步法理论?

在对备件需求时间序列研究的基础上,结合指数平滑法和Croston法的特点,分析了指数平滑法与两步法的原理,通过对指数平滑法和两步法方差的研究,得到两步法是指数平滑法的一般形式的结论,为两步法的进一步研究提供一定的理论支撑。