一种精确打击下桥梁毁伤视景仿真系统设计实现

目前,在桥梁毁伤仿真领域采用的数值仿真方法虽具有精确性高的优点,但是仿真过程不直观、形象,整体性不强。采用视景仿真技术进行精确打击下桥梁毁伤仿真,在保证精确性要求的基础上,利用Unity3D软件以三维画面的形式进行展示,仿真过程形象、直观、明了。给出的精确打击下桥梁毁伤视景仿真系统的设计方法,能够满足真实性和实时性的要求,利用Unity3D自带的物理引擎完成了桥梁模型的物理特性建模和爆炸仿真分析,通过全过程仿真,能够分析得出相应的毁伤结论,达到了预期效果。     

地理信息系统和军事测绘

阐明了的内涵.地理空间情报已成为美军作战指挥控制系统的运作基础.高精度的地理空间数据成为美军实现精确打击的重要保证.军事测绘保障为战场指挥、武器使用以及作战行动提供精确、实时的战场地理空间情报.     

一种改进的空袭目标威胁等级评估模型

量化判定空袭目标威胁等级是数字化战场信息融合的重要内容,也是未来联合防空作战中指挥决策系统合理分配作战资源的基本依据。但是,空袭目标威胁等级的评判标准至今尚未统一,本文首先使用AHP法建立空袭目标威胁等级层次分析模型,针对AHP法构建成对比较矩阵过于繁琐及各指标权重难以把握的弊端,只针对层次分析模型最下层的相关指标进行分析并提出量化方法,随后根据量化数值直接构建判断矩阵,并结合DELPHI法给出诸项评估指标的权重。最后,通过实例验证了该模型的有效性和准确性。     

时敏打击指挥控制技术初探

分析了时敏目标打击链,介绍了压缩打击链的主要途径,描述了图像处理、战场数据管理、武器动态分配、智能代理集成等有关时敏打击指挥控制技术,为时敏打击指挥控制系统的研究提供参考。     

基于随机时间影响网络的联合火力打击方案评估

联合火力打击方案评估是作战筹划和指挥决策的核心问题之一,对于打击手段的选择、战法的运用等具有重要的影响,其难点是在不确定条件下有效地建立作战方案到使命目标达成效果之间的映射关系.作战仿真方法往往存在突出的低效率问题,而解析模型的方法难以充分反映目标体系的内部联系和整体效果.目前概率推理模型广泛应用于军事领域的作战方案评...     

ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional “prompt global strike” program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.     

SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT A FIRST STRIKE

This article critiques recent articles in Foreign Affairs and International Security that argue that in the foreseeable future the United States could acquire an assured first-strike capability vis-à-vis Russia and China thanks to technological improvements in U.S. nuclear delivery systems and a general decline in the numbers and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces. Notwithstanding these articles, this analysis finds that mutual deterrence will persist regardless of the scale of possible future imbalances because deterrence is a highly flexible phenomenon. The pertinent question is not whether the United States will be able, in a surprise first strike, to cripple severely Russian response capabilities, but whether political stakes in any foreseeable conflict could justify the risk of even a small retaliatory strike on the United States. This article also assesses whether the Foreign Affairs and International Security articles could inadvertently exacerbate an already highly charged anti-American sentiment in Russia, possibly laying the foundation for a revitalization and expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal.     

地空导弹战术单位作战能力评估方法建模研究

采用仿真试验台方法对战术单位作战能力进行评估研究。该方法将人、硬件置于环路中,其结果具有很高的可信度。提出了评估指标体系,建立了测试与评估试验台,其中包括空袭模型、测量误差模型、评估算法模型等,并在此基础上通过模拟典型空袭模式给出部分评估结果。     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.