A Muslim by any other name

Abstract

A crisis is emerging in the Nile Basin, where some 300 million people in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi rely on the Nile directly or indirectly. Egypt and Sudan wish to preserve a regime based on treaties drawn up during the colonial era that allocated the vast majority of the Nile's water to them. Countries upstream are determined to challenge this. In 1999 the countries using the river formed the Nile Basin Initiative to try to resolve these differences. More than a decade of negotiations failed to break the impasse. In May Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda decided to wait no longer and signed a new treaty, without the consent of Egypt and Sudan. The signatories have given the other Nile Basin countries one year to join the pact. For Egypt, which relies on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water, this is a question of life or death. Egypt has, in the past, indicated it will go to war if its share of the Nile is reduced. Talks continue, but the impasse is driving the region towards a crisis to which there is no easy resolution.     

Kenya and Somalia

Much research has been done on patriarchy in numerous contexts in Africa, contributing to an understanding of the phenomenon. Recent developments in Kenya and Somalia, characterised by the adoption of new constitutions against the backdrop of stringent patriarchal practices, prompted the writing of this article. Kenya's journey towards gender equality has not been an easy one, given that prior to 2010 – when its new constitution was adopted – customary law that endorsed the violation of women's rights held precedence. For Somalia, over two decades of civil war had encouraged lawlessness, which acted as a barrier for women's progress. With the two countries' new constitutions now in place, expectations are high that past hindrances will be eradicated. Kenya and Somalia stand a good chance of achieving gender equality if lessons from other countries can be carefully considered to avoid a repeat of their failures. Using secondary and primary data, it is this article's argument that an honest dialogue on women's rights involving all relevant stakeholders needs to be initiated to tackle the deeper structural problem of patriarchy, which poses a huge threat to the gains achieved on paper.     

Minimum force in British counterinsurgency

With strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan far from certain, comforting beliefs about Britain's superiority at counterinsurgency have come under increasingly sceptical scrutiny. This article contributes to the debate with particular reference to the supposedly pivotal principle of minimum force. After discussing the recent literature on the subject, the article critiques the methodology employed by advocates of the traditionalist view on British COIN, arguing for a more rigorous historical approach based on primary sources. Following these historical matters, it is argued that conceptually, minimum force should be analysed dialectically in relation to practices of exemplary force, and above all, on the evidence of what happens in a conflict. Arguably the value ascribed to doctrine in strategic analysis has become unduly inflated, and we must look beyond it to understand war and political violence.     

Unnecessary or unsung? The utilisation of airpower in Britain's colonial counterinsurgencies

Making extensive use of primary archival documents, this article seeks to explore whether airpower in three of Britain's most significant post-war colonial counterinsurgency campaigns, Malaya, Kenya and South Arabia, was an unnecessary part of British strategy, offering little useful military force due to the futility and strategic damage rendered by offensive bombardment, or whether airpower was indeed an unsung factor that provided operational flexibility through its effectiveness in a supply context, as well as its intelligence role in providing valuable aerial reconnaissance. In all three case studies the role played by the RAF in medical evacuations, in troop drops, in crop spraying during food-denial initiatives, and in providing ‘Voice Aircraft’ for the propaganda campaign, provide insights into an under-explored component of Britain's politico-military efforts in counterinsurgency in the 1950s and 1960s and suggests that the main strategic value of airpower in counterinsurgency, then and now, lies in its non-kinetic functions.     

Airpower in the Mau Mau conflict: the government's chief weapon

Strategists are currently debating the efficacy airpower provides in counterinsurgency operations. Through the lens of Colonel John Warden's theory of systemic paralysis, this essay reveals the truth about how airpower was employed in the Mau Mau conflict – a subject that has, until now, been both shrouded in mystery and inaccurately reported. It reveals that the use of airpower in a conflict occurring almost 60 years ago proffers a number of lessons for its use in counterinsurgencies today. Moreover, it discovers that although useful in many respects, Warden's model is somewhat limited for analysing the true use of airpower in counterinsurgencies today and consequently, a more appropriate model is offered for airpower strategists to use in such conflicts.     

CHILDREN IN THE SPOTLIGHT

September 11 2001 has put the spotlight on terrorism, and it has been at the apex of the international security agenda ever since. Politicians, lawmakers, scholars and others have been debating the meaning and definition of terrorism for many years. Numerous myths and misconceptions persist on this highly debated issue. With the aid of historical case studies, this article aims to demonstrate how broad a concept terrorism has become. It focuses on its subjective and value-laden interpretation and hence the difficulty of arriving at a universally acceptable definition. The author introduces the concept of ‘colonial terror’, which depicts a distinct form of state terrorism perpetrated during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Like many before her, the author concludes that the definition and meaning of terrorism lie in the eye of the beholder.

There are two ways to approach the study of terrorism. One may adopt a literal approach, taking the topic seriously, or a propagandistic approach, construing the concept of terrorism as a weapon to be exploited in the service of some system of power. In each case it is clear how to proceed. Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the phenomenon—concentrating on major examples, if we are serious—and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is the responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as ‘terrorist’ just in the cases where they can be attributed (whether plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed or termed ‘retaliation’ or ‘self-defence’. (Noam Chomsky)     

REINVENTING PEACE

The use of children in armed conflict has become a symbol of the apparent brutality of warfare in Africa. They have become a powerful tool for child rights advocates, who lobby for the protection of children through the provision of essential services such as health care, education and social services. But taking children and youth out of the broader security debate has turned the issue into a ‘soft’ humanitarian concern that rarely enters into discussions on African politics, militaries and economies. The danger in this lies in the fact that Africa is, demographically speaking, an extraordinarily young continent. The marginalisation of youth from the security debate is paralleled by their absence from political and economic agendas. In war-affected nations in particular, the priority of social sectors plummets while governments attend to the business of the war economy, leaving health and education in the hands of humanitarian agencies. At the same time, children and youth, being the majority, represent manpower for both governments and armed forces. Thousands of children involved in combat in Africa are in fact a symptom of instability deeply exaggerated by demographics.     

FOUNDATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: PREPARING TO KEEP THE PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the continent of Africa, particularly Greater East Africa, has played an increasingly signifi cant role in United States (US) national security strategy. Transnational security threats and political authoritarianism continue to plague the region, creating calls for greater US and international involvement. Before reacting to the situation, however, it is prudent to pause, reflect, and understand that the United States developed strategic relations with nation-states in the region well before contemporary concerns for international terrorism and ungoverned spaces entered the strategic lexicon. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of Greater East Africa's strategic history, this paper examines the core strategic relationship in the region, US-Kenya relations, its origins and implications, and offers policy recommendations that will affect future international security.     

Rentier peacekeeping in neo-patrimonial systems: The examples of Burundi and Kenya

International peacekeeping in Africa has developed dynamically in the last decade. The majority of global missions are deployed to the continent, the largest regional contingent of troops comes from Africa, and the African Peace and Security Architecture has made significant progress. Peacekeeping is Africanized today more than at any time before. However, mainstream research has insufficiently paid attention to African agency in this context. This article sheds light on the often neglected influence of African politics on international peacekeeping missions. The focus is set on the consequences of neo-patrimonial political systems, which can use international peacekeeping missions as an opportunity to generate rents. It will be shown that such a rent-seeking approach is highly problematic for the troop-contributing as well as mission-hosting countries. Instead of curbing conflict, rentier peacekeeping is prolonging and exporting it. The empirical examples used are the Burundian and Kenyan involvement in peacekeeping in Somalia.     

Neo-elitism and counterterrorism operations in Kenya

Counterterrorism operations in Kenya have often been hindered by a lack of collaboration, coordination and cooperation among the security agencies involved in such operations. This article examines the relationship between neo-elitism and counterterrorism security interagency activity in Kenya. Using neo-elitism as a framework for analysis, with specific reference to the September 2013 Westgate Mall attack counterterrorism operation, it is argued that the lack of collaboration, coordination and cooperation among Kenya’s counterterrorism security agencies often results in unintended adverse consequences. The interagency conflict over the Westgate operation was primarily about command and control, intelligence sharing and official information shared with the public pertaining to the stages of the siege and operation. These security agencies share similar responsibilities and jurisdictions in the rest of the country’s counterterrorism efforts. The interagency conflicts reveal that the country’s security elites pursue personal and agency-specific interests that are aimed at maintaining organisational supremacy over counterterrorism efforts. Recommendations are offered for how to tackle the problem of interagency conflict in order to enhance the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations in Kenya.