Country survey: military expenditure and defence policy in Norway 1970–2013

This article examines military expenditure and defence policy in Norway from 1970 to 2013. Until 1990 Norwegian military expenditure remained between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite constant GDP shares, the military expenditure could not sustain a large and properly armed mobilization army. The constant nominal defence budgets of the 1990s accentuated the Norwegian Armed Forces' underlying imbalance between tasks, structure and budget. Around year 2000, large organizational reforms were effectuated, in which costs, the number of man-years, and underlying imbalances between tasks, structure and budget were reduced. Military expenditure increased in nominal terms between 2003 and 2013, while real military expenditure remained practically constant.     

With an eye to history: The origins and development of ‘Stay-Behind’ in Norway

Based on full access to Norwegian archives up to 1970, the article describes the origins and development of ‘stay-behind’– an organized preparedness, under the aegis of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, for intelligence and sabotage behind enemy lines in case of a Soviet occupation. Initiated by Defence Minister Jens Christian Hauge, wartime leader of the Norwegian military resistance, the set-up built on lessons learnt during the German occupation, when effective resistance was hampered by inexperience and improvisation. Secrecy and security, and national Norwegian control albeit with cooperative links with British and American secret services, were distinctive features of the networks that came into being from 1948 onwards. NATO began to take an interest from 1952, but SACEUR's main concern was for ‘retardation’– guerrilla and sabotage activities to delay Soviet forces even before entering NATO territory.     

Military Off the Shelf Procurements: A Norwegian Case Study

Buying off the shelf procurements (OTS) has become an important part of the national acquisition strategy in several countries, and this paper seeks to bring empirical evidence on OTS as the preferred acquisition strategy by use of data from 2015 to 2022 investment portfolio of the Norwegian Armed Forces. We develop definitions for three categories of procurement – OTS, modified OTS and development projects – as well as a method to classify projects into these categories. Our first finding is that the characteristics of OTS projects correspond to modified OTS and development projects. Our second finding indicates that OTS projects perform better when it comes to the completion of projects according to the initial schedule, compared to development projects.     

Coordination as showcasing: the establishment of Norway’s Afghanistan Forum

In complex operations such as the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where multiple government ministries are involved in putting together a state’s contributions, the use of national-level coordination bodies has become more widespread. Research has taken for granted that the rationale behind these bodies reflects their declared aim – enhanced coordination as a means to improve mission effectiveness. However, they appear to have had modest effect on coordination. That notwithstanding, they seem to remain popular. This prompts us to ask why such bodies are actually established. This article – based on in-depth interviews and archival records – critically explores the establishment of Norway’s ad hoc, inter-ministerial, political-level Afghanistan Forum. Distinguishing between a structural-instrumental, a cultural-institutional and an environmental perspective from organizational theory to structure the analysis, this article shows that the declared purpose of the forum, inter-ministerial coordination, proved less important than showcasing coordination efforts and keeping the coalition together. In addition, national traditions in handling coordination challenges in the central government apparatus and powerful international reforms helped bring the forum about. This has implications for research on the rationale and effectiveness of these bodies, and also for understanding their policy relevance.     

Atomic intelligence in Norway during the Cold War

Thanks to its geographical location and close military ties to the US and Britain, Norway took substantial part in the Western intelligence effort against the Soviet nuclear weapons programme during the Cold War. Norway's relative proximity to the nuclear weapons test sites on Novaya Zemlya and the nuclear submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula was of particular importance in this regard. Whereas the tasks of surveying the development, deployment and possible employment of Soviet nuclear forces always had first priority, Western atomic intelligence conducted from Norwegian soil and waters was occasionally aimed even at gathering information about the geophysical and possible long-term medical and environmental implications of high-yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.     

Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009

During their 60 years within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Denmark and Norway have experienced both high and low standings within the alliance, which can be attributed to both external and internal factors influencing their alliance strategies. During the ‘first’ Cold War and Détente, 1949–79, Danish and Norwegian alliance strategy aimed to simultaneously deter and reassure the Soviet Union. During the ‘second’ Cold War, 1979–89, Danish alliance policy became driven by domestic politics, and the Danish government was forced to formally dissociate the country from NATO's policies. Norway was not uncritical, but held a much lower profile. After the Cold War this situation shifted. Denmark successfully rehabilitated itself as a loyal and dependable ally by responding to the call for focusing on out-of-area operations. Meanwhile, Norway's continued focus on the lingering Russian Threat made the country seem out-of-touch with priorities in the post-Cold War alliance, and domestic politics prevented a more active out-of-area engagement.     

Trilateral defence cooperation in the North: an assessment of interoperability between Norway,Sweden and Finland

Norway, Sweden and Finland have proclaimed a willingness to cooperate militarily in a future crisis or conflict despite their diverging alliance affiliation. This article assesses their ability to do so through various elements affecting their interoperability, with Arctic Challenge, a multinational military exercise, as an empirical basis. The analysis finds that the NATO/non-NATO-divide has a negative impact on the trilateral defence cooperation, especially on exchange of information and aspects related to command and control. At the same time, Finland and Sweden have become largely NATO-standardized through their active partnership with the Alliance. This has affected interoperability aspects, such as communication, culture, and the compatibility of technical solutions, in a positive manner. Through agreements with the Alliance, as well as domestic legal changes, the two NATO-partners have facilitated receiving military assistance from Norway and other NATO-members during a crisis. Other agreements between the Nordic countries, however, have been limited to peacetime.     

Defence industrial policy – a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy?

This article explores whether it makes sense for national governments to employ defence industrial policies – such as offsets and discriminatory procurement practices – to support their domestic defence industries. This question has so far primarily been discussed by economists, who have argued strongly against the use of defence industrial policies. This article maintains that these economists fail to address the often complex motivation behind the introduction of these policies. It illustrates these shortcomings by contrasting their arguments against a case study of Norway, which accounts for the country’s use of defence industrial polices from the early post-Second World War era up until today. The article concludes that, depending on their objectives, defence industrial policies can be seen as either a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy.