基于CPSO算法的海空跨域无人航行器集群协同作业路径规划

针对海空跨域无人航行器集群在复杂水域环境下协同作业以追踪水下目标的任务,提出一种基于协同粒子群(CPSO)的协同作业路径规划算法.考虑不同无人航行器集群特性优势,合理分解并分配远距离追踪水下目标任务过程,并利用CPSO算法进行路径规划.在CPSO算法中,首先为无人机(UAVs)集群规划飞行路径,UAV飞行过程中探测水面...     

基于Legendre伪谱法的UGV避障路径规划

针对传统优化方法不易解决含有复杂动力学约束的路径规划问题,提出利用勒让德伪谱法(Legendre Pseudospectral Method,LPM)对地面无人驾驶器(unmanned ground vehicle,UGV)的避障路径规划进行研究。通过建立UGV的动力学模型和障碍物模型,整合了基于LPM的路径约束条件。最后应用以LPM为基础开发的MATLAB插件包DIDO,计算得出了优化路径。仿真实验中以UGV移动路径规划为例,设计实现了UGV的避障规划。仿真结果表明此方法具有较快的计算速度和准确性。     

基于遗传算法的无人机航迹规划代价函数

针对当前使用的无人机航迹规划代价函数的不足之处,提出一种利用遗传算法对无人机航迹规划代价函数进行优化的方法。对基本遗传算法进行了局部改进,设计了航迹极坐标编码方式及航迹适应度函数,在采用基本遗传操作算子的基础上采取精英保存策略,提高了算法的效率;采用代价归一化并进行优化的思想,得到优化之后的代价函数权重值。优化结果表明,该方法可以获得代价更低的航迹。     

‘What Kind of War is This?’

This article explores the nature of the American war in Vietnam in an effort to determine whether it was a response to an indigenous uprising or an external effort by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to use a wide array of policies and programs to unite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under the party’s leadership. It argues that, although there initially were elements of the South Vietnamese population that rose against the southern leadership, the CPV gained control of their resistance and relegated it to a secondary role in the CPV war effort.     

Grammar but No Logic: Technique is Not Enough – A Response to Nagl and Burton

Abstract

In issue 33/1 of The Journal of Strategic Studies, John Nagl and Brian Burton were provided with the opportunity to respond to the observations we made in our article, ‘Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency’, which appeared in the same issue. Nagl and Burton's reply, however, did not overtly address the points raised in our article, but instead offered a re-statement of the precepts of classical counter-insurgency (COIN). While we certainly recognise the value of counter-insurgency methods in conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, Nagl and Burton's reply overlooks our original concerns about the limited utility of neo-counter-insurgency thinking outside these environments and the dangerous political implications it contains. They further ignore our core contention that a narrow preoccupation with theatre-specific technique has profound limitations when offered as a universal panacea to address complex transnational threats.     

Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated military threat

ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates Boko Haram’s military capabilities and details the process of how its standing army, driven by these capabilities, came to pose a phased threat between 2013 and 2015 in particular. This was a period when military fighting dominated the insurgency in north-east Nigeria. Whereas there is an abundance of literature on Boko Haram’s histories and the impact of its insurgency on north-east Nigeria, analysis of Boko Haram’s military campaigning is still deficient. Attempting to fill this gap, this paper uses field findings and battlefield case studies from north-east Nigeria to highlight how Boko Haram’s overt front – its standing army – came to supplant its guerrilla operations as the main security threat to the frontier area.

This pivot towards military fighting, for a group initially composed of a few ragtag combatants, on the surface might seem surprising. Yet, whereas Boko Haram may lack the popular support required for ‘people’s war’, classic insurgency theories nevertheless hold some explanatory power for this deliberate shift: away from guerrilla warfare as the expedient of the weaker side, and towards the use of a large standing army of locals to swarm, and sometimes successfully overrun, state forces.     

Emulating US Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Barriers for Developing Country Forces,Evidence from Peru

ABSTRACT

Recent US advances in counterinsurgency doctrine have been adopted by developing country armed forces. Nevertheless, no systematic study has examined the barriers they face to implementing highly involved counterinsurgency strategy. Tracing the evolution of Peruvian doctrine demonstrates that Peru was able to quickly improve the unity of effort, intelligence capacity, and military basing to meet the demands of a population-centric hearts-and-minds approach to counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, the limited tactical initiative and flexibility of Peruvian forces remains a challenge. The Peruvian experience is instructive for other militaries undergoing similar transitions. However, given the diversity of insurgent conflicts, this doctrine is not universally appropriate.     

Counter-Insurgency in Pakistan: The Role of Legitimacy

The Pakistani security forces have won their fight against the insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban, though terrorism will remain a serious problem for the foreseeable future. Victory was won not chiefly on the basis of new tactics, but of the recovery of legitimacy for the campaign among the population and the armed forces. This occurred when the war came to be seen as one waged not in the interests of the USA, but for the defence of Pakistan. In Balochistan, the nationalist insurgency has been different from and weaker than that of the Taliban—but may prove longer lasting. Military tactics in Balochistan have closely resembled those of the British Raj, and have been based with some success on fomenting tribal divisions and co-opting tribal elites.     

定时拦截在轨拦截器机动轨道设计与优化

在满足对目标卫星在指定时间进行拦截的要求下,考虑拦截器变轨能量消耗最省,提出了基于定时拦截的在轨机动拦截轨道选择与优化方法。该方法能够迅速设计和优化出最优在轨机动拦截轨道、变轨点位置和变轨所需的能量。仿真结果表明,模型准确、有效,能够满足作战要求。     

Understanding Proto-Insurgencies

Abstract

Why do some small terrorist and guerrilla groups succeed in becoming full-blown insurgencies while many others fail? Proto-insurgencies face many difficulties in creating an insurgent movement: they must create a politically salient identity, harness a compelling cause, create an effective sanctuary, and defeat both violent and peaceful organizational rivals, all while evading the police and security services of the much more powerful state. Outside support is a mixed blessing for proto-insurgents. Often, the ultimate success of the proto-insurgency in becoming a full-blown insurgency depends on the mistakes of the government it opposes.